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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Systemic Risk in Financial Networks
by
Tathagata Banerjee
Doctor of Philosophy in Systems Science and Mathematics
Washington University in St. Louis, 2019
Professor Dr. Zachary Feinstein, Chair

In this dissertation, I have used the network model based approach to study systemic risk in
financial networks. In particular, I have worked on generalized extensions of the Eisenberg-Noe [2001] framework to account for realistic financial situations viz. pricing of corporate
debt while accounting for network effects, asset liquidation mechanisms during fire sale,
dynamic clearing, and impact of contingent payments such as insurance and credit default
swaps.
First, I present formulas for the valuation of debt and equity of firms in a financial network
under comonotonic endowments. I demonstrate that the comonotonic setting provides a
lower bound to the price of debt under Eisenberg--Noe financial networks with consistent
marginal endowments. Special consideration is given to the setting in which firms only invest
in a risk-free bond and a common risky asset following a geometric Brownian motion.
Next, I develop a framework for price-mediated contagion in financial systems wherein banks
are forced to liquidate assets to satisfy a risk-weight based capital ratio requirement. I
xi

consider the case of multiple illiquid assets and develop conditions for the existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium prices. I show that the sensitivity analysis of these prices with
respect to the system parameters can be written as a fixed point problem and prove the
existence and uniqueness of a solution to this problem. I also develop a methodology to
quantify the cost of regulation faced by different banks in this setting. Numerical case
studies are provided to study the application of this model to data.
Furthermore, I extend the network model of financial contagion to allow for time dynamics
in both discrete and continuous time. Emphasis is placed on the continuous-time framework
and its formulation as a differential equation driven by the operating cash flows. I provide
results on existence and uniqueness of firm wealths under the discrete and continuous-time
models and discuss the financial implications of time dynamics. In particular, I focus on
how the dynamic clearing solutions differ from those of the static Eisenberg--Noe model.
Finally, I study the implications of contingent payments on the clearing wealth in a network
model of financial contagion. I first consider the problem in a static framework and develop
conditions for existence and uniqueness of solutions as long as no firm is speculating on
the failure of other firms. In order to achieve existence and uniqueness under more general
conditions, I introduce a dynamic framework and demonstrate how this setting can be applied
to problems that are ill-defined in the static framework.

xii

Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1
1.1.1

Background
The interconnected financial system and the 2008 financial
crisis

The modern day financial system is a highly interconnected network. The connections that
exist within this network might be through direct channels such as interbank debt linkages
or through indirect channels such as overlapping portfolios. These shared connections open
up avenues for shared prosperity but also introduce potential channels for contagion. These
avenues of contagion become particularly significant when initial losses for one bank or a
particular asset class propagate through these linkages and affect other organizations, assets,
economic sectors and countries and result in a financial crisis, such as the 2008 financial crisis.
The 2008 financial crisis began with losses in the housing market in the United States. These
losses led to a rapid devaluation of financial instruments such as mortgage-backed securities
and precipitated a crisis in the subprime mortgage market. Banks with a large exposure to
such assets faced a liquidity crunch and the contagion spread to the financial sector with the
collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. As a consequence,
AIG faced bankruptcy due to the large payouts it was required to make on its Credit Default
Swap(CDS) contracts referencing Lehman and mortgage backed securities. The sudden call
to pay out the CDS contracts put great pressure on AIG, which traditionally had a thin
capital base. The panic that ensued caused a severe liquidity crisis and a run on the money
1

market funds. The U.S. Treasury was eventually required to provide a 700 billion dollar
bail-out to prevent a possible collapse of the world financial system. The 2008 financial
crisis was followed by the The Great Recession, a global economic downturn. This resulted
in tremendous losses across all sectors of the economy such as income, stock values, home
values and employment and caused massive hardships for people.
The 2008 financial crisis prompted action from the policymakers. The U.S. Congress passed
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to reorganize the financial
regulatory system. Some of the provisions in the act included creating agencies such as the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (to identify threats to the financial stability of the
United States) and the Office of Financial Research (to conduct research and standardize data
collection), providing the Federal Reserve with additional powers to regulate systemically
important institutions and restricting banks from certain kinds of speculative investments.
On a global scale, the Bank for International Settlements developed the Basel III Accords
to promote stability in the international financial system.
From an academic standpoint, the 2008 financial crisis has prompted the need to understand
the mechanisms and channels which propagate financial contagion, to construct indicators
which identify such contagion beforehand and to develop measures for the effective prevention
and mitigation of such contagion. It is hoped that such research will aid in the development
of prudent policy and regulations that will prevent financial crises from happening in the
future.

1.1.2

Systemic risk and channels of contagion

A major characteristic of the 2008 financial crisis was the amplification of losses through
interconnections within the financial system. The field of systemic risk studies these channels
and mechanisms within the financial system through which an initial shock to the system
gets greatly exacerbated and can ultimately threaten the stability of the entire system.
Thus systemic risk refers to the "risk or probability of breakdowns (losses) in an entire
system as opposed to breakdowns in individual parts or components and is evidenced by
comovements (correlation) among most or all the parts." ([76]). The researchers in this field
try to understand and model contagion channels and loss amplification mechanisms as have
2

been observed in past crises. The goal of this is to develop policy and regulatory measures
to prevent such crises in the future.
In the systemic risk literature, researchers have identified different channels through which
financial contagion spreads across the network. In the remainder of this subsection, I describe
some of these interconnections and mechanisms which might act as loss-amplifying channels
in financial systems. This will provide the necessary context for the mathematical modeling
undertaken in this dissertation. I want to stress that this is by no means an exhaustive list;
rather, it is intended to provide a flavor of the myriad interconnections in a financial system.
The first of these channels is the direct linkages or local interactions among financial organizations. For example, if we consider a network with bidirectional debt linkages, the failure of
a bank will result in losses for its counterparties which may now default on their obligations.
Thus the initial shock may propagate across the entire network through these direct linkages
and result in cascading failures.
A different form of linkages exist between banks and insurance companies and are formed
and resolved in a way that is different from normal debt contracts. A typical example of
such a linkage is a credit default swap [CDS]. A credit default swap is a contract in which
a buyer pays a premium to a seller in order to protect itself against a potential loss due to
the occurrence of a credit event that affects the value of the contract’s underlying reference
obligation, e.g., a corporate or sovereign bond. The contract specifies the credit events that
will trigger payment from the seller to the buyer. Whereas such instruments can be used to
hedge risks, they may also be used for speculative purposes to put a short position on the
credit markets. The important role that such contingent linkages plays is demonstrated by
the financial crisis of 2008. As that crisis unfolded, AIG faced bankruptcy after the failure
of Lehman Brothers due to the large payouts it was required to make on its CDS contracts
referencing Lehman and mortgage-backed securities. Eventually AIG had to be rescued by
the U.S. Department of Treasury so as to avoid jeopardizing the financial health of firms
that had bought CDSs from AIG.
The banks in a financial system are also connected through cross-holdings. Banks often own
the equity of other banks and these linkages can potentially trigger a financial vicious cycle.
For example if Bank A owns a part of Bank B, the deterioration of the financial health
of Bank B due to a default by Bank A will result in the damage of the financial health of
3

Bank A itself due to its ownership of Bank B. Such cyclical dependencies within the financial
network will result in amplification of losses due to feedback effects.
A different channel of contagion comes through fire sale spillovers. Those originate when a
firm is forced to liquidate its assets to meet some obligation or regulation. As firms hold
overlapping portfolios, this causes impacts globally to all other firms due to marked-tomarket accounting. These firms are now forced to liquidate their assets, exacerbating the
crisis. An important factor in the origin of fire sale is the unintended consequence of capital
regulations in the form of capital ratio or leverage ratio. Due to these regulatory constraints,
banks might be forced to deleverage, setting off a vicious cycle of contagion: the develeraging
results in the depreciation of prices, causing marked-to-market losses and further weakening
the position of banks, which are forced to sell more. Such deleveraging occured in a large
scale in the 2008 financial crisis, resulting in amplification of losses.
The loss amplification due to the cascading defaults during a financial crisis can be further
exacerbated through default mechanisms such as bankruptcy costs. When a bank defaults,
there are legal and administrative costs associated with such an event. Additionally, the
bankruptcy proceedings will result in delays in payment to the creditors. Thus the combination of these costs and delays will increase the likelihood of defaults in the system and
magnify the overall losses.
In a financial network, all of these channels may become active simultaneously, and hence a
minor initial shock may be severely amplified and potentially bring down the entire financial
system, thereby causing significant damage to the economy.

1.1.3

Network Models: Approach and Challenges

The 2008 financial crisis showed the severe impacts that systemic crises can have on the
financial sector and the economy as a whole. As the costs of such events is tremendous, the
modeling of such events is imperative. Post 2008, there has been a surge in the research in the
domain of systemic risk. A number of modeling frameworks and interdisciplinary approaches
have been proposed. One of the most significant modeling approaches in systemic risk is
the network model based framework. In the remainder of this subsection, I discuss this
4

particular approach. A more detailed discussion on individual papers is provided in Section
1.2.
The network model of systemic risk has been pioneered by the seminal paper of [45]. [45]
proposes a weighted graph framework to model the spread of defaults in the financial system.
In this approach, banks’ liabilities are modeled through the edges. The banks use their liquid
assets to pay off these liabilities; unpaid liabilities may cause other banks to default as well.
Under simple conditions, [45] proves the existence and uniqueness of the clearing payments
and develops an algorithm for computing the same. [45] provides a simple foundational
model and boosts of attractive features from mathematical and financial standpoints. From
a mathematical standpoint, it provides results on existence and uniqueness of solutions under
a general network setting. It further provides an elegant algorithm for the computation of
the solution. From a financial viewpoint, the Eisenberg--Noe framework is able to capture
the heterogeneity of real world networks and encode an intuitive notion of the cascading
default process, which makes it suitable for the design of stress testing algorithms. Thus the
Eisenberg--Noe model provides financial intuition and is suitable for use in an operational
framework, without compromising on mathematical rigor.
Despite being elegant, the framework of [45] is undoubtedly simple and it only considers
local interactions among banks in the form of debt contracts. Hence there have been efforts
to use this baseline model and adopt it for the study of other channels of contagion and more
realistic financial mechanisms such as bankruptcy costs, cross-holdings, fire sale etc. These
extensions form the crux of the network model of systemic risk. In these extensions, the focus
is on deriving the clearing solution (payment/price) and to study which market participants
default during the clearing process. Thus, much emphasis is placed on developing conditions
for the existence and uniqueness of the clearing solution. The stress tests, designed using this
approach, typically consist of applying shocks to different parts of the financial network and
identifying contagion through a pre-defined measure such as the number of defaults or the
resultant wealth. These models typically inherit the benefits of [45]: they are able to capture
properties of real world financial networks, they are comparatively easier to operationalize,
and they can be used to develop stress tests based on rigorous mathematical results instead
of relying on heuristics. In fact, many central banks and regulatory bodies have incorporated
these network models into their stress tests of the financial system (see, e.g., [9, 73, 25, 50,
101, 61]).
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However, these models are not free from challenges. One such challenge is that in models
with more realistic financial mechanisms a consolidation of the desirable mathematical and
financial features is often difficult to achieve. In fact, in many of these works incorporating practical financial systems, results on uniqueness and, sometimes, existence can not be
obtained. Despite being challenging from a mathematical standpoint, this has provided us
additional insights into financial systems. First, it might be perfectly natural to expect multiple equilibria in several situations owing to the non-linearity of the financial system and
often, even though there is not a unique solution, a worst-case analysis can be performed
to bound the system behaviour. Secondly, it is often observed that restricting the system
parameters to certain domains can result in uniqueness of solutions. Hence, this can be seen
as a method to calibrate system parameters instead of using heuristics.
A second challenge stems from the fact that the results of the network models are very
much dependent on the system parameters, which are often not exactly known. Despite
the progress that has been made in recent years, the regulators still face significant legal
and logistical hurdles in the data collection process. A second factor which hinders this
process is the fact that most of the systemic risk models are very nascent and the discovery
of which data is actually required in this analysis is very much an ongoing process. In that
context, the stress testing results using network models are very much dependent upon how
these parameters are calibrated. Owing to this uncertainty, it is imperative that we have an
understanding of how a variation in these parameters might affect the results. Thus it is very
important to perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the system parameters. A different
way to look at this problem is that the models will inform the data collection process. Thus
regulators can look at these models and identify which data they are required to collect for
efficient oversight.
In this dissertation, I have employed the network model based approach for the study of
systemic risk in financial networks. In particular, I have extended the baseline model of [45]
to study corporate debt pricing and dynamic clearing as well as model contagion channels
such as contingent payments and fire sale. The main contributions of this dissertation are
discussed in Section 1.4.
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1.2

Literature Review

In this section, I review the literature on systemic risk. In particular, my focus will be on the
network model of systemic risk that has been pioneered by the seminal paper of Eisenbeg-Noe ([45]). The majority of this literature review will revolve around [45] and its extensions.
Other approaches such as mean-field models are not discussed separately but highlighted as
a comparison to the network models in particular situations.

1.2.1

Eisenberg--Noe Model(2001)

Interbank networks were studied first in [45] to model the spread of defaults in the financial
system. This work considers debt linkages between different banks in a financial system and
models these linkages using a bidirectional graph. The failure of a bank will result in losses
for its counterparties, which may now default on their obligations. Thus the initial shock
may propagate across the entire network through these debt linkages and result in cascading
failures. This interdependency of realized (clearing) payments is modeled as a fixed point
problem. [45] proves the existence and uniqueness of the clearing payments and provides an
elegant algorithm for the computation of the same. The mathematical framework used in
this model is discussed in Section 1.3. The Eisenberg--Noe model provides a foundational
framework in the systemic risk literature. The simple but elegant baseline model has been
extended in many directions to capture complexities in the financial system.

1.2.2

Network Valuation Models

An important question in financial mathematics is the valuation of corporate debt and
determination of the market capitalization. Traditionally, two alternative approaches have
been followed. The first of these approaches is the structural approach, which was introduced
in the seminal paper of [86]. The second approach is the reduced form approach where the
modeling is done from a more statistical perspective, taking into account the historical default
intensities and the underlying stochastic factors ([44]).

7

The valuation in structural models is generally done from the perspective of an individual
bank. However, this does not take into account the myriad interconnections that exist within
a financial system and might result in gross misspecification in firm health. The Eisenberg-Noe framework provides an elegant framework to incorporate these interconnections and has
been considered in multiple works. [99] considers the problem in a setting with cross-holdings
and [58] generalizes that setting to include multiple seniority classes and derivatives; these
works rely solely on Monte Carlo simulation for numerical computations. [69] considers a
model with random exogenous shocks on the assets of each bank. [70] gives an interpretation
of this problem as one with a “hidden” Collaterized Debt Obligations (CDO). [16] considers
the problem of network valuation and the effect of a random exogenous shock in the external
assets. A different approach is considered in [75] where a PDE method is used for the
case where the banks’ assets are driven by correlated multidimensional Brownian motions
with drift. A reduced form model for studying distress contagion and marked-to-market
write-downs of debt contagion has been studied by [103].
Network valuation adjustment mechanisms, using a SDE approach, have been studied in
[21, 22].

1.2.3

Dynamic Contagion Models

[45] considers a static framework. Several works have considered the extension of this framework to include multiple clearing dates. This has been studied directly in [27, 57]. Additionally, [80] considers a similar approach to model financial networks with multiple maturities.
[52] provides another approach to financial networks with multiple maturities by considering
each clearing date as a different asset. All of these works, however, only consider clearing
at discrete times. [98] presents a continuous-time clearing model that exactly replicates the
static Eisenberg--Noe framework.
Dynamic contagion has been studied using mean field models, which represent an alternative
approach to the network models in the systemic risk literature. [60] provides a model of
agents who revert to the ensemble mean to provide understanding of “systemic risk events”
in which many firms fail. Similar mean field diffusion models without controls were studied
in, e.g., [59, 65, 66]. In contrast, mean field and stochastic games have been proposed for the
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study of systemic risk in, e.g., [30, 29]. In such models the firms are allowed to borrow from
(or lend to) a central bank, the amount of which is optimized to minimize a quadratic cost
function. Thus the choice of borrowing and lending provides an optimal control problem
beyond the simpler mean field model of [60]. [90] proposes a separate particle system model
with mean field interactions.

1.2.4

Contingent Payment Models

[45] considers interconnections through bilateral debt contracts. However, linkages formed
between banks and insurance companies can also act as potential channels of financial contagion. These linkages are formed and resolved in a way that is different from normal
bank loans, e.g. Credit Default Swaps. The framework in [45] is not suitable to deal with
such contingent payments and several extensions have been proposed to incorporate such
interconnections in the Eisenberg--Noe framework. [19, 18] show that the clearing vector
in the presence of generalized CDS contracts is not well-defined and need not exist. They
further propose a static setting to model CDS payments and give sufficient conditions on
the network topology for existence of a clearing solution. [81] considers such a model in a
static framework and proposes a method to rewrite some classes of network topologies as
an Eisenberg--Noe system. [17, 36] model CDS payments, but most of the reference entities
are required to be external to the financial system. [78] models reinsurance networks and
studies the implications of network topologies on existence and uniqueness of the liabilities
and clearing payments. A different approach has been taken in [74] in which a stochastic
setting is used to analyze contagion caused by credit default swaps. The role of credit default
swaps in causing financial contagion has been captured in several empirical studies, see e.g.
[92, 84].

1.2.5

Models with bankruptcy cost

In [45], the defaulting banks can use the entire proceeds from other banks to pay off their
obligations. However, in reality this is not the case. The defaulting banks suffer additional
losses due to legal and administrative fees and there are often delays in payments to creditors.
This additional loss is termed as bankruptcy cost. [96] extends the framework of [45] by
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incorporating bankruptcy costs in the default mechanism. It shows the existence of a greatest
and least fixed point and presents an algorithm for the efficient computation of the same.
[104] considers a joint framework to study the impact of cross-holdings, bankruptcy cost
and fire sale and concludes that bankruptcy costs are a main driver of systemic risk. [67]
finds that "bankruptcy costs must be quite large in order to have an appreciable impact
on expected losses as they propagate through the network". Other notable works which
consider bankruptcy costs in their models include [46, 47].

1.2.6

Models with cross-holding

Beyond debt linkages, banks are connected with each other via equity claims. [47] considers an extension of [45] to accommodate cross-holdings and develops an algorithm for
the determination of clearing solutions. Furthermore, it discusses the impact of seniority
structure of debt on the clearing solutions. [46] considers a model with cross-holdings and
studies the impact of diversification and integration on the clearing solutions. [104] finds
that cross-holdings can stabilize the system against default contagion.

1.2.7

Fire sale models

An important channel of contagion in financial networks comes through indirect connections
or global interactions among organizations, e.g., fire sale spillovers. [33] considers the liquidation problem in the context of a capital adequacy ratio. [6] studies the fire sale problem
in a single asset setting when banks are forced to liquidate assets to meet debt obligations
and shows the existence and uniqueness of a solution to the resultant fixed point problem.
[51] considers a multi-asset extension to [6] and shows the existence of a Nash equilibrium
to the the joint payment-pricing-liquidation problem. [54] develops an extension to [51]
where banks, in addition to meeting their debt obligations, must satisfy a leverage ratio.
[26] considers the fire sale problem in a single asset setting where banks are required to
satisfy a risk-weighted capital ratio. [53] considers the price-mediated contagion problem in
a continuous time setting and provides results on existence and uniqueness as well as analytical bounds under a random setting. [71] develops empirical measures of the vulnerability
and connectivity of banks and discusses intervention measures to reduce the vulnerability
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to fire sale contagion. [38] develops an operational framework for quantifying the effects of
deleveraging and "shows that such indirect contagion effects may modify the outcome of
bank stress tests and lead to heterogeneous bank-level losses which cannot be replicated in a
stress test without deleveraging effects". [43] constructs an index of aggregate vulnerability
and discusses the connection of this index to SRISK, one of the most prominent systemic
risk measures.

1.2.8

Implications of network topology

The importance of the network topology in the Eisenberg--Noe framework has been explored
to identify structures that tend to propagate default or alternatively dampen it. [1] shows
the ’robust-yet-fragile’ tendency of financial networks. [28] considers the problem of network topology using majorization-based tools. [46] studies the effect of diversification and
integration on financial contagion.
An alternative approach to study the effect of network topology is the random graph model.
[5] derives rigorous asymptotic results for the magnitude of contagion and gives an analytical
expression for the asymptotic fraction of defaults, in terms of network characteristics. [41]
derives conditions under which local shocks can propagate through the network. [8] gives
bounds on the size of the cascade and derives testable conditions for this cascade to be small.

1.2.9

Calibration of network models

The results on financial contagion in the network models is dependent upon the system
parameters. Unfortunately, these parameters might not be exactly known due to logistical
and legal issues. For example, in the Eisenberg--Noe framework ([45]), the nominal liabilities
matrix L is not often exactly known and thus needs to be estimated ([72, 50, 10]). An entropy
maximizing approach has been proposed in [102] and has been used to estimate the liabilities
matrix from balance sheet data in [102, 49, 40]. However, empirical literature has shown that
the real world liabilities matrix L might be quite different in contrast to the homogeneous
network that is produced by that approach ([88, 37]). A minimum density method, based on
minimizing the total number of edges consistent with the aggregated assets and liabilities,
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has been proposed in [10]. [63] proposes a Bayesian method to estimate the liabilities matrix,
given the total liabilities. This method has been applied to reconstruct credit default swap
markets in [64].

1.2.10

Sensitivity analysis

As discussed in the previous subsection, the results on identifying contagion and designing
stress tests using network models is dependent upon system parameters that are often not
exactly known and need to be calibrated. Hence, sensitivity analysis with respect to the
system parameters becomes an important exercise. [82] performs sensitivity analysis of the
clearing vector with respect to the initial net worth of each bank in the framework of [45]. [55]
considers the sensitivity problem with respect to estimation errors in the relative liabilities
matrix in the Eisenberg--Noe framework and poses it as a fixed point problem. It further
studies worst case and probabilistic interpretations of the perturbation analysis.

1.2.11

Adoption of network models in stress tests

Central banks and regulatory bodies have incorporated these network models into their
stress tests of the financial system. [9] discusses the results of using MacroFinancial Risk
Assessment Framework (MFRAF), a stress testing framework, to the stress testing scenario
used in the 2013 Canada Financial Sector Assessment Program led by the International
Monetary Fund. [61] uses the network model for a study of the UK banks. [73] studies the
emergence of interbank networks using data of the European banks. Other notable works in
this domain include [25, 50, 101]).

1.3

A Brief Review of the Eisenberg--Noe Model

In this section, I review the mathematical framework used in [45]. This will provide insights
into the type of mathematical modeling and arguments that are typically employed in the
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network model based approach. Additionally, I show that the Eisenberg--Noe problem can
be reformulated as a fixed point in the clearing wealth, rather than the clearing payment.

1.3.1

Notation

I begin with some simple notation that will be consistent for the entirety of this dissertation.
Let x, y ∈ Rn for some positive integer n, then
x ∧ y = (min(x1 , y1 ), min(x2 , y2 ), . . . , min(xn , yn ))> ,
x− = −(x ∧ 0), and x+ = (−x)− . Further, to ease notation, I will denote [x, y] := [x1 , y1 ] ×
[x2 , y2 ] × . . . × [xn , yn ] ⊆ Rn to be the n-dimensional compact interval for y − x ∈ Rn+ .
Similarly, I will consider x ≤ y if and only if y − x ∈ Rn+ .
Throughout this dissertation I will consider a network of n financial institutions. I will
denote the set of all banks in the network by N := {1, 2, . . . , n}.

1.3.2

Mathematical framework of Eisenberg--Noe Model (2001)

[45] considers linkages in the form of bilateral debt contracts. These are represented mathen×n
matically by the nominal liability matrix L ∈ R+
. Any bank i ∈ N may have obligations
Lij ≥ 0 to any other firm j ∈ N . It is assumed that no firm has any obligations to itself,
i.e., Lii = 0 for all firms i ∈ N . Thus the total liabilities for bank i ∈ N is given by
P
L
p̄i := j∈N Lij and relative liabilities πij := p̄iji if p̄i > 0 and arbitrary otherwise; for sim1
plicity, in the case that p̄i = 0, we will let πij = n−1
for all j ∈ N \{i} and πii = 0 to retain
P
the property that j∈N πij = 1. On the other side of the balance sheet, all firms are assumed
to begin with some amount of external assets xi ≥ 0 for all firms i ∈ N . Thus the complete
financial system can be characterized by the pair (L, x) or equivalently by the triple (Π, p̄, x).

The central question explored in this work is the determination of a clearing payment p. To
accomplish this, [45] considers the following stylized rules of bankruptcy:
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(i) Limited liabilities: the total payment made by any firm will never exceed the total
assets available to the bank.
(ii) Priority of debt claims: the shareholders of a firm receive no value unless all its debts
are paid in full.
(iii) All debts are of the same seniority: in case a bank defaults, debts are paid out in
proportion to the size of the nominal claims.
I will assume that these rules hold for the remainder of this dissertation. The resultant
clearing payments, is represented by the following mapping Φ : [0, p̄] 7→ [0, p̄], which is given
by

Φ(p) = p̄ ∧ x + Π> p .
(1.1)
P
That is, each bank pays the minimum of what it owes (p̄i ) and what it has (xi + j∈N πji pj ).
A clearing payment is defined by a fixed point p∗ of Equation (1.1) satisfying
p∗ = Φ(p∗ ).

(1.2)

The existence of a clearing payment is proved in the following proposition which is taken
from Theorem 1 of [45].
Proposition 1.3.1. Consider a financial system given by (Π, p̄, x). There exists a greatest
and least clearing payment p↑ ≥ p↓ .
Proof. Φ(p) is monotonically non-decreasing in p and its domain is compact. So the Tarski
fixed point theorem can be used to get a greatest and least clearing payment p↑ ≥ p↓ .
The clearing payment, given by (1.2) is not generally unique. However, [45] provides very
simple conditions under which uniqueness is guaranteed. For this, the following definitions
need to be considered which is given in [45].
Definition 1.3.2. A set S ⊂ N is a surplus set if no node in the set has any obligations
to any node outside the set and the set has positive operating cash flows, that is, for all
P
(i, j) ∈ S × S c , Πij = 0 and i∈S xi > 0.
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Definition 1.3.3. For each node i ∈ N , define the risk orbit of node i, given by o(i), as
follows: o(i) = {j ∈ N |there exists a directed path from i to j}.
The preceding definitions can now be used to define a regular financial system.
Definition 1.3.4. A financial system is regular if every risk orbit, o(i), is a surplus set.
An economic interpretation of regularity is the existence of some value somewhere in the
financial system that can reach all nodes in the system. A sufficient condition to ensure
regularity is to set x > 0. The uniqueness condition is now stated in the following proposition
which is replicated from Theorem 2 of [45].
Proposition 1.3.5. Consider a regular financial system. Then the clearing payment p is
unique.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix 1 of [45].
[45] gives an elegant algorithm, termed as the Fictitous Default Algorithm, for the determination of the clearing payment. This algorithm converges to the clearing solution in, at
most, n steps. It is replicated as follows:
Algorithm 1.3.6. Initialize k = 0, D0 = ∅, and p0 = p̄.
(i) Increment k = k + 1;
(ii) Denote the set of insolvent banks by Dk = {i ∈ N | xi +

P

(iii) If Dk = Dk−1 then terminate;
(iv) Define the matrix Λ ∈ {0, 1}n×n so that

1 if i = j ∈ Dk
Λij =
;
0 else
(v) pk = p̂ is the solution of the following fixed point problem:
p̂ = (I − Λ)p̄ + Λ(x + Π> p̂)
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j∈N

πji pkj < p̄};

(vi) Go back to step (i).
[45] gives results on the comparative statics of the clearing vector in Lemma 5 which is
restated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.3.7. The clearing payment vector p∗ is a concave, increasing function of the
operating cash flow vector x and the level of nominal liabilities L.
Proof. The proof is given in Lemma 5 of [45].

1.3.3

Reformulation as a fixed point in clearing wealth

The resultant vector of wealths for all firms, in the Eisenberg--Noe setting, is given by
V = x + Π> p − p̄.

(1.3)

Noting that payments can be written as a simple function of the wealths (p = p̄ − V − ),
I provide the following proposition. I refer also to [103, 16] for similar notions of utilizing
clearing wealth instead of clearing payments.
Proposition 1.3.8. A vector p ∈ [0, p̄] is a clearing payment in the Eisenberg--Noe setting
(1.1) if and only if p = [p̄ − V − ]+ for some V ∈ Rn+1 satisfying the following fixed point
problem
V = x + Π> [p̄ − V − ]+ − p̄.
(1.4)
Vice versa, a vector V ∈ Rn+1 is a clearing wealth (i.e., satisfying (1.4)) if and only if V is
defined as in (1.3) for some clearing payment p ∈ [0, p̄] as defined in the fixed point problem
(1.1).
Proof. I will prove the first equivalence only, the second follows similarly.
Let p ∈ [0, p̄] be a clearing payment vector. Define the wealth vector V by (1.3), then it
is clear that V − = p̄ − p by definition as well, i.e., p = p̄ − V − ≥ 0. Thus from (1.3) I
immediately recover that the wealth vector V must satisfy (1.4).
16

Let p = [p̄ − V − ]+ for some wealth vector V ∈ Rn+1 satisfying (1.4). By construction I find
p = [p̄ − V − ]+ = p̄ − x + Π> [p̄ − V − ]+ − p̄
Note that p̄ ≥ x + Π> [p̄ − V − ]+ − p̄

−

−

= p̄ − x + Π> p − p̄

−


= p̄ ∧ x + Π> p .

can be shown trivially.

Due to the equivalence of the clearing payments and clearing wealths provided in Proposition 1.3.8, I am able to consider the Eisenberg--Noe system as a fixed point of equity and
losses rather than payments.

1.4

Main contributions

In this dissertation, I have used the network model based approach to study systemic risk
in financial networks. In particular, I have proposed extensions to the base model of [45]
to study channels of contagion such as fire sale and contingent payments and account for
realistic financial situations such as corporate debt pricing and dynamic clearing. These
models are presented under general settings without presupposing the nature of the network
or system parameters. Hence, these results can be used to augment stress tests, calibrate
system parameters and improve the data collection process. The main contributions of this
dissertation are summarized as follows:
(i) Valuation of debt and equity in a financial network with comonotonic endowments: I
study the problem of valuation of corporate debt and the determination of market
capitalization. I follow the structural approach, introduced in the seminal paper of
Merton [86]. The valuation in structural models is generally done from the perspective
of an individual bank. However, this does not take into account the interconnections
that exist within a financial system. As evidenced by the 2008 financial crisis, considering the risk of a single firm alone can cause gross misspecification in firm health.
As such, valuing claims that take the full network effects into account is imperative
in ensuring that the true risk of the claims are taken into account. To account for
the network effects, I consider this valuation problem in the Eisenberg--Noe framework
[45]. A common thread of the existing literature in this domain ([99, 58, 69, 70, 16])
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is that explicit, analytical solutions are considered only for cases with either no direct interconnection between firms or where the number of firms in the system is very
low. This is because the valuation problem, under a general endowment vector, will
require partitioning the endowment space into 2n possible default scenarios in a system
with n banks. Therefore, computing the expectation suffers from the curse of dimensionality and is typically computationally intractable for realistic systems. Further
complications arise if bankruptcy costs are considered along the lines of [96]. Without
bankruptcy costs, the 2n default scenarios result in the partition of the bank endowment space into 2n mutually exclusive and convex regions. However, in the presence
of bankruptcy costs, these partitioned regions are not, in general, convex. Providing
any analytical solution in this case becomes very challenging even in small systems.
In contrast, I focus on the setting wherein the banks have comonotonic endowments.
This setting follows from a portfolio optimization perspective. Under the assumption
of comonotonic endowments, the default regions can be characterized by at most n
intervals on R+ and become tractable analytically. This tractability extends to the
case where bankruptcy costs are considered. Thus the comonotonic setting allows me
to explore the network effects from an analytical perspective. Furthermore, I show
that the comonotonic setting provides a lower bound for the price of debt under the
framework of [45]. This is particularly valuable in the context of systemic risk. I derive
the closed-form expressions for the price of debt, market capitalization and and the
survival probability in the case where the firms invest in a risk-free bond and a risky
asset following a geometric Brownian motion. This allows me to compare this setting to
the the one taken by Merton [86]. Using the 2011 European Banking Authority data, I
show that the price of debt should be significantly higher under the full network effects
compared to the scenario in which it is assumed that the banks will be able to pay in
full. Incorporating this risk properly in the valuation of assets will ensure that there
are no pricing shocks to the system at a future date.
(ii) Price-mediated contagion through capital ratio requirements: Fire sale is a critical
source of contagion in financial systems. An important factor in the origin of fire
sale is the unintended consequence of capital regulations in the form of capital ratio or leverage ratio. Due to these regulatory constraints, banks might be forced to
deleverage, setting off a vicious cycle of contagion: the develeraging results in the
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depreciation of prices, causing marked-to-market losses and further weakening the position of banks, which are forced to sell more. Such deleveraging occured in a large
scale in the 2008 financial crisis, resulting in amplification of losses ([39, 77, 83]). I
develop a general mathematical and economic framework to study price-mediated contagion in a multi-asset setting where the firms liquidate assets during a crisis due to
risk-weighted capital requirements. This multi-asset setting provides a suitable framework to model cross-asset contagion, which was widely observed in the 2008 financial
crisis. One of the major challenges of the multi-asset setting is the effective modeling
of the strategic aspect, that presents itself while performing liquidation to satisfy the
capital requirements. Existing literature (e.g. [71, 43, 38]) considers proportional liquidation for this analysis. In contrast, I consider a general liquidation function with
mild continuity and monotonicity requirements and am thus able to study liquidation schemes beyond proportional liquidation ( e.g. utility maximizing liquidation)
and encode the strategic aspect in my framework. Hence this model can be used to
design stress tests beyond proportional liquidation and linear price impact. This is
particularly important as the modeling of the contagion is dependent upon the choice
of the liquidation function (as shown in this work). In contrast to the other static
models of fire sale ([26, 54, 51, 7, 33, 38, 43, 71]), I consider two notions of pricing: the
current liquidation price and the volume weighted average liquidation price. The adoption of these two separate notions of pricing, besides being realistic, significantly aides
the mathematical analysis, particularly in the development of conditions for uniqueness. In fact, in contrast to existing literature on price-mediated contagion due to
leverage/capital requirements ([26, 54]), I am able to prove the uniqueness of the pricing equilibrium, conditional on certain properties of the inverse demand function. I
also provide an alternative characterization of the uniqueness condition in terms of a
monotonicity condition on the inverse demand function and a lower bound on the riskweights, which can be used in the calibration of the risk-weights. In contrast to other
works on fire sale, I develop a mathematical framework to perform sensitivity analysis
of the equilibrium prices with respect to the system parameters. This is particularly
important as the system parameters are often not exactly known and hence the results
are very much dependent on how the system parameters are calibrated. Using these
results on sensitivity analysis, I develop a method to study the cost of regulation incurred by each bank and highlight this through an empirical study with the six banks
19

participating in the 2015 Federal Reserve CCAR with the largest trading operations.
Through a numerical simulation with a two bank two asset system, I study the effect
of diversification of bank portfolio in our framework and find that diversification does
not uniformly lead to a more stable system. In fact, under certain liquidation regimes,
the cross-asset contagion might outweigh the benefits of diversification.
(iii) Dynamic clearing and contagion in financial networks: The Eisenberg--Noe model and
the majority of the literature in the network model based approach consider a static
framework. Hence, they fail to account for dynamic clearing in financial networks which
can give an incorrect assessment of the health of the financial system. I consider a generalized extension of the Eisenberg--Noe model to allow for cash flows and obligations
to be dynamic in time. I present this model in both discrete and continuous time, thus
extending the frameworks of [80, 27, 57], which consider only discrete time clearing.
However, my emphasis is on the derivation and the characterization of the continuoustime model as a differential equation driven by stochastic cash flows. In particular, I
consider existence and uniqueness of the clearing solutions, and a numerical algorithm
for finding sample paths of this clearing solution, under cash flows modeled by Itô
processes. The proof of existence and uniqueness in the continuous time framework is
approached in an entirely different manner than the traditional fixed point approach
used in the network models. This is in contrast to the other works on multiple maturity models such as [80, 27, 57]. The main benefit of my approach is that it no
longer requires strong monotonicity assumptions for existence and uniqueness which
are generally required for static and discrete-time systems (that typically employ the
Tarski fixed point theorem). This is also valuable for future works that may model
network formation and payments as a non-cooperative game; such games may not
satisfy the strong monotonicity assumptions usually considered in static and discretetime systems, but would likely satisfy the sufficient conditions for the continuous-time
framework. I provide a discussion of the financial implications of time dynamics in
interbank networks and show that the dynamical system for the Eisenberg--Noe contagion model may include an inherent prioritization scheme. In particular, I find that the
static Eisenberg--Noe clearing solution can be recovered in the continuous-time setting
by choosing the network parameters precisely. This allows for a notion of determining
the true order of defaults as opposed to the fictitious default order discussed in the
static literature based on [45]. However, if the continuous-time network parameters
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are determined to not follow the rules for recreating the static Eisenberg--Noe setting,
then the dynamic and static clearing solutions will generally not coincide. In fact, the
set of defaulting and solvent institutions can be altered by rearranging the timing of
obligations. As such, using the static Eisenberg--Noe framework for stress testing may
result in an incorrect assessment of the health of the financial system.
(iv) Impact of contingent payments on systemic risk in financial networks: Contingent
payments such as credit default swaps and insurance are an important part of the financial system. These instruments introduce additional linkages in financial networks,
which played a vital role in the 2008 financial crisis. As that crisis unfolded, AIG
faced bankruptcy after the failure of Lehman Brothers due to the large payouts it was
required to make on its CDS contracts referencing Lehman and mortgage-backed securities and eventually had to be rescued by the U.S. Department of Treasury. However,
despite the importance of these linkages, current models are unable to account for the
conditional payment that an insurance or credit default swap contract would require.
I provide a generalized theoretical framework in which to study credit default swaps
and other contingent payments in the Eisenberg--Noe setting. I focus on existence and
uniqueness of the clearing vectors under contingent payments without presupposing
the nature of those payments or making strong assumptions on the network topology.
This is in contrast to the existing literature on CDS network models ([19, 18, 81]) in
which there is no guarantee that the realized networks would obey the required conditions. Hence it is paramount to develop results for a general network, irrespective of
the topology. I do this by first considering the problem in a static framework where
all claims are settled simultaneously and develop conditions to provide existence and
uniqueness of the clearing wealth. Further, sensitivity analysis and financial implications are considered in this setting. I find that the static framework is suitable only for
a certain class of networks and I cannot guarantee the existence of a clearing solution
beyond these systems. Indeed, the problem often becomes ill-defined from a financial
standpoint. Hence I introduce a dynamic framework. This setting ensures both existence and uniqueness of a clearing solution under the usual conditions from [45] and
makes the problem well-defined from a financial viewpoint. Further, I show that the
problems which could not be solved in the static framework can be studied with this
dynamic approach. This approach can be used to design stress tests that take into
account the conditional nature of the payments under contingent claims.
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1.5

Organization

The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 presents the problem of valuation of debt and equity in a financial network
with comonotonic endowments. I provide the expectation of the equilibrium payments,
equity, and wealth and prove that these expected values can provide lower bounds for
the general random endowment setting. I consider the special case where the firms
invest in a risk-free bond and a common risky asset following a geometric Brownian
motion and present the explicit solutions for the risk neutral price of debt, the market
capitalization, and the survival probability. Furthermore, I consider simple comparative statics of the provided valuations with respect to the different system parameters.
• Chapter 3 discusses price-mediated contagion through capital ratio requirements. I
develop a framework for price-mediated contagion in financial systems where banks are
forced to liquidate assets to satisfy a risk-weight based capital ratio requirement and
derive conditions for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium prices. I show that
the sensitivity analysis of these prices with respect to the system parameters can be
written as a fixed point problem and prove the existence and uniqueness of a solution
to this fixed point problem. Furthermore, I develop a methodology to quantify the
cost of regulation faced by different banks in this setting. Numerical case studies are
provided to study the application of this model to data.
• Chapter 4 considers dynamic clearing and contagion in financial networks. I propose
a discrete-time formulation for the Eisenberg--Noe model and provide results on existence and uniqueness, as well as a numerical algorithm based on the fictitious default
algorithm of [45]. I then extend our model to a continuous-time setting and consider
existence and uniqueness of the clearing solutions, and a numerical algorithm for finding sample paths of this clearing solution, under cash flows modeled by Itô processes.
Finally, I discuss the financial implications of time dynamics in interbank networks.
• Chapter 5 presents the impact of contingent payments on systemic risk in financial
networks. I develop the static framework for incorporating contingent payments such
as insurance and CDS and provide results on existence and develop conditions for
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uniqueness that are intimately related to considerations of insurance versus speculation. Further I demonstrate some shortcomings inherent to the static framework with
contingent payments. Then I introduce a discrete time dynamic framework and discuss
existence and uniqueness results. Additionally I demonstrate how this framework can
be applied to problems that are ill-defined in the static framework through numerical
examples.
• Chapter 6 concludes and offers directions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Pricing of debt and equity in a
financial network with comonotonic
endowments
This chapter is based on [13] which is joint work with Zachary Feinstein.

2.1

Introduction

In this chapter, I consider the problem of valuation of corporate debt and determination
of market capitalization. Traditionally, two alternative approaches have been followed. The
first of these approaches is the structural approach, which was introduced in the seminal paper
of Merton [86]. Merton considered the debt and equity of a firm to be derivatives on the
value of the assets of the firm where the strike price is given by the firm’s liabilities. Merton’s
model has been extended in many directions and forms the basis of modern structural credit
risk models, used in the Basel 2 framework and KMV. In these models, the value of the
firm’s assets is given by an underlying stochastic process and a credit event occurs when the
value of the assets fall below the liabilities of the firm. The second approach is the reduced
form approach where the modeling is done from a more statistical perspective, taking into
account the historical default intensities and the underlying stochastic factors ([44]). In this
chapter, I will focus exclusively on the structural approach.
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The valuation in structural models is generally done from the perspective of an individual bank. However, this does not take into account the myriad interconnections that exist
within a financial system. As evidenced by the 2008 financial crisis, considering the risk
of a single firm alone can cause gross misspecification in firm health. In this work, I will
focus on interconnections through correlated assets as well as interbank debt claims. These
interconnections effectively link the balance sheets of different banks and make the value
of a firm dependent on the performance of other firms. These shared connections might
open up avenues for shared prosperity but also introduce potential channels for contagion.
These avenues of contagion become particularly significant during a financial crisis where
the default of one firm might cause the failure in other firms. This effect is also referred
to as cascading defaults. As such, valuing claims that take the full network effects into
account is imperative so that the true risk of the claims are also taken into account. In the
Eisenberg--Noe framework for interbank payments, this valuation problem has been considered in multiple works by means of a structural approach. [99] considers the problem in
a setting with cross-holdings and [58] generalizes that setting to include multiple seniority
classes and derivatives; these works rely solely on Monte Carlo simulation for numerical computations. [69] considers a model with random exogenous shocks on the assets of each bank.
[70] gives an interpretation of this problem as one with a “hidden” CDO. [16] considers the
problem of network valuation and the effect of a random exogenous shock in the external
assets. A different approach is considered in [75] where a PDE method is used for the case
where the banks’ assets are driven by correlated multidimensional Brownian motions with
drift. A reduced form model for studying distress contagion and mark-to-market write-downs
of debt contagion has been studied by [103]. A common thread of the existing literature is
that explicit, analytical solutions are considered only for cases with either no direct interconnection between firms or where the number of firms in the system is very low. I wish to
note that the general methodology of [69] requires partitioning the endowment space into
2n possible default scenarios in a system with n banks. Therefore computing the expectation suffers from the curse of dimensionality and is typically computationally intractable
for realistic systems. Further complications arise if I consider bankruptcy costs along the
lines of [96]. Without bankruptcy costs, the 2n default scenarios result in the partition of
the bank endowment space into 2n mutually exclusive and convex regions. However, in the
presence of bankruptcy costs, these partitioned regions are not, in general, convex. I refer
the reader to Appendix A for elucidation of this point. Providing any analytical solution in
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this case becomes very challenging even in small systems. Hence a numerical approach has
been generally followed, i.e. via Monte Carlo simulations.
In light of the above, I focus on the setting where the banks have comonotonic endowments.
This setting follows from a portfolio optimization perspective. If all firms are portfolio
optimizers, then each will position their endowments to be countermonotonic to the pricing
kernel ([93]). Hence the endowments of the banks will be comonotonic to each other. Under
the assumption of comonotonic endowments, the default regions can be characterized by at
most n intervals on R+ and the problem becomes tractable analytically. This tractability
extends to the case where bankruptcy costs are considered. Thus the comonotonic setting
allows me to explore the network effects from an analytical perspective. Furthermore, I am
able to provide a lower bound on the expectation of the system behavior under any general
random endowment with the comonotonic framework. This is particularly valuable from a
stress testing perspective. I highlight the closed-form expressions for the price of debt and
market capitalization in the case where the firms invest in a risk-free bond and a risky asset
following a geometric Brownian motion. I compare this setting to that taken by [86] using
numerical case studies.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I provide a description of my
mathematical setting. Section 2.3.1 considers network clearing when firms have comonotonic
endowments. I provide the expectation of the equilibrium payments, equity, and wealth.
Further, I prove that these expected values can provide lower bounds for the general random
endowment setting of, e.g., [69]. Section 2.3.2 considers the special case where the firms
invest in a risk-free bond and a common risky asset following a geometric Brownian motion
as in [86]. I provide the explicit solutions for the risk neutral price of debt, the market
capitalization, and the survival probability. Section 2.4 considers simple comparative statics
of the provided valuations with respect to the different system parameters.

2.2

Setting

Throughout this chapter, I will consider a network of n financial institutions. Often I will
consider an additional node n + 1, which encompasses the entirety of the financial system
outside of the n banks; this node n + 1 will also be referred to as society or the societal node.
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I refer to [56, 67] for further discussion of the meaning and concepts behind the societal
node.
In this chapter, I consider obligations with a single maturity date, as considered in [45].
Any bank i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} may have obligations Lij ≥ 0 to any other firm or society j ∈
{1, 2, ..., n + 1}. I will assume that no firm has any obligations to itself, i.e., Lii = 0 for
all firms i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, and the society node has no liabilities at all, i.e., Ln+1,j = 0 for
all firms j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n + 1}. Thus the total liabilities for bank i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} is given by
P
p̄i := n+1
j=1 Lij ≥ 0 and relative liabilities from bank i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} to bank j ∈ {1, 2, ..., j}
L
is given by πij := p̄iji if p̄i > 0 and arbitrary otherwise; for simplicity, in the case that
p̄i = 0, I will let πij = 0 for all j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. Note that, for any firm i, I recover
P
the property that nj=1 πij ≤ 1. Throughout this work I will consider the square matrix
Π ∈ [0, 1]n×n ; the relative liabilities from firm i to the societal node n + 1 can be defined
P
as being 1 − nj=1 πij ≥ 0. On the other side of the balance sheet, all firms are assumed to
begin with some endowments xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, with x0 > 0.
The central question explored in the network models is the determination of the firm wealths
after network clearing. Let the clearing wealths be given by V ∈ Rn . To determine the
clearing wealths, I assume the stylized rules of bankruptcy viz., limited liabilities, priority
of debt claims and same seniority as discussed in Chapter 1.3. Throughout this work, I
consider a system with some exogenous recovery rate in case of default, i.e. a special case of
[96]. This means if bank i has negative wealth Vi < 0 then it is defaulting and its assets are
reduced with recovery rate β ∈ [0, 1].
With the rules set, I formalize the clearing process Ψ : Rn → Rn in wealths to describe this
system. I can define the payments and equity from the wealths V as p = (p̄ − V − )+ and
E = V + respectively. The clearing process is defined for all firms i as
"
Ψi (V ) := I{Vi ≥0} xi +

n
X

#
πji (p̄j − Vj− )+ − p̄i

j=1

"
+ I{Vi <0} β

xi +

n
X

!
πji (p̄j − Vj− )+

#

(2.1)

− p̄i .

j=1

As such, the clearing procedure Ψ implies: if bank i has nonnegative wealth Vi ≥ 0 then it
is solvent and its wealth is equal to its total assets minus its total liabilities; if bank i has
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negative wealth Vi < 0 then it is defaulting and its assets are reduced by the recovery rate
β. I note that with β = 1 (i.e. under no bankruptcy costs) I recover the model of [45].
I will now consider existence and uniqueness results on the clearing wealth V . In general, I
can get existence by applying Tarski’s fixed point theorem.
Proposition 2.2.1. There exists a greatest and least clearing solution to V = Ψ(V ) for
V ∈ Rn and any finite clearing solution falls within the lattice [−p̄, x + Π> p̄ − p̄].
Proof. First note that Ψ is nondecreasing in wealths V . Now I will prove that −p̄ ≤ V ≤
x + Π> p̄ − p̄ for any V = Ψ(V ) ∈ Rn .
• For any bank i: Vi ≥ I{Vi ≥0} [−p̄i ] + I{Vi <0} [−p̄i ] = −p̄i by construction.
• By monotonicity of the clearing procedure I recover V ≤ Ψ(V + ) = x + Π> p̄ − p̄.
The proof is completed by an application of Tarski’s fixed point theorem on the lattice
[−p̄, x + Π> p̄ − p̄].
In general, however, the clearing wealth V is not unique. In the special case without
bankruptcy costs (β = 1), this reduces to the network described in [45]. In that setting
one can get uniqueness under very mild assumptions.
Corollary 2.2.2. Consider a setting with no bankruptcy costs (β = 1) and all firms have
P
obligations to the societal node n + 1 (i.e. nj=1 πij < 1 for all firms i), then there exists a
unique clearing solution V = Ψ(V ).
Proof. The external node n + 1 implies the system is a regular network [45, Definition 5].
Thus by Theorem 2 of [45] I recover the uniqueness of the clearing solution.
Assumption 2.2.3. For the remainder of this chapter, I will assume that all firms have
P
obligations to the societal node n + 1 (i.e. nj=1 πij < 1 for all firms i).
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Proposition 2.2.4. Let V ↑ = Ψ(V ↑ ) denote the greatest clearing solution from Proposition 2.2.1. Then V ↑ = Ψ∗ (V ↑ ) and is the greatest real-valued fixed point of Ψ∗ where:
"
Ψ∗i (V ) := I{Vi ≥0} xi +

n
X

#
πji (p̄j − Vj− ) − p̄i

j=1

"
+ I{Vi <0} β

xi +

n
X

!
πji (p̄j − Vj− )

#

(2.2)

− p̄i .

j=1

Proof. By Proposition 2.2.1, V ↑ ≥ −p̄ and thus V ↑ = Ψ∗ (V ↑ ) as well. Similarly to the
proof of Proposition 2.2.1, I can apply Tarski’s fixed point theorem to (2.2) on the lattice
[−∞, x + Π> p̄ − p̄]. Let V ∗ = Ψ∗ (V ∗ ) be the greatest real-valued fixed point of Ψ∗ and
assume V ∗ ≥ V ↑ with Vi∗ > Vi↑ for some bank i. Then it must follow that V ∗ ≥ V ↑ ≥ −p̄,
which implies V ∗ = Ψ(V ∗ ). However this is a contradiction to V ↑ being the greatest clearing
solution to Ψ.
I can compute the maximal clearing solution, as discussed in the previous proposition,
through an application of the fictitious default algorithm as described in [96].
Corollary 2.2.5. The following algorithm converges to the maximal clearing solution V ↑ =
Ψ(V ↑ ):
(i) Initialize V (0) = x + Π> p̄ − p̄, z (0) = 0 ∈ Rn , and k = 0.
(ii) Iterate k = k + 1 and define z (k) = I{V (k−1) <0} ∈ {0, 1}n .
(iii) If z (k) = z (k−1) then V ↑ = V (k−1) and terminate.
(iv) Define Λ = diag(z (k) ) to be the diagonal matrix with main diagonal defined by z (k) and


V (k) = (I − Λ) x + Π> p̄ + Π> ΛV (k) − p̄



+ Λ β x + Π> p̄ + Π> ΛV (k) − p̄
−1 


= I − (I − (1 − β)Λ) Π> Λ
(I − (1 − β)Λ) x + Π> p̄ − p̄ .
(v) Go to step (ii).
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Proof. The convergence of this algorithm to the greatest clearing wealth solution follows
from the logic of the fictitious default algorithm in [45]. The nonsingularity of the matrix
I − (I − (1 − β)Λ)Π> Λ follows from input-output results as detailed in [55, Theorem 2.6].
Throughout this work I will focus on the greatest clearing wealths solution V ↑ . I choose
this equilibrium as all firms and regulators, if given the choice, would prefer these clearing
wealths to all others as no firm can improve on their performance beyond that given by V ↑ .
I wish to note that if a different clearing solution were chosen, and in particular the least
clearing wealths, all subsequent results of this chapter would follow comparably.
Definition 2.2.6. Define the mapping V : Rn+ → Rn so that V (x) is the maximal clearing
wealth solution under endowments x ∈ Rn+ . Further, define x 7→ p(x) := p̄ − V (x)− and
x 7→ E(x) := V (x)+ to be the associated payments and equity.
Proposition 2.2.7. The greatest clearing wealth mapping V , and thus also the payment and
equity mappings p and E, is nondecreasing in the endowments x.
Proof. The monotonicity of the clearing wealths in the endowments follow from Theorem 3
of [87]. The results for the payments and equity follow directly from the definition of those
mappings from the clearing wealths.
From Corollary 2.2.5 I am able to give a linear construction for the clearing vector provided
the defaulting set is known. This is given by the following construction. I compare this
linear structure to the directional derivative proposed in [82] and the “network multipliers”
from [32] when considering only the model of [45], i.e. with full recovery (β = 1). For the
remainder of this chapter I will use the following definitions:
∆(z) := I − (I − (1 − β) diag(z)) Π> diag(z)

−1

(I − (1 − β) diag(z))


−1 
δ̄(z) := I − (I − (1 − β) diag(z)) Π> diag(z)
I − (I − (1 − β) diag(z)) Π> p̄

(2.3)
(2.4)

for z ∈ {0, 1}n denoting the set of defaulting institutions as in the fictitious default algorithm
above. Thus
V (x) := ∆(I{V (x)<0} )x − δ̄(I{V (x)<0} )
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for any endowment x ∈ Rn+ by construction.

2.3

Expectations and pricing of debt and equity

Consider now a probability space (Ω, F, P). Denote by L0 := L0 (Ω, F, P) all measurable
random variables. Further, denote by L1 ⊆ L0 those random variables that have finite
absolute expectation, i.e. X ∈ L1 if X is (Ω, F, P) measurable and E[|X|] < ∞. Further I
will denote by L1+ those random variables that are almost surely nonnegative.
I note, first, that the problem of finding the expectation of the clearing wealths and payments
under random endowments X ∈ (L1+ )n was considered in [69] in the case of no bankruptcy
costs (β = 1) but with cross-ownership. I replicate those results and extend them to consider
the case with bankruptcy costs in the Appendix A. As finding the expectations in such a
general setting requires computing the measure of 2n regions in Rn , this would typically
require Monte Carlo simulation and suffer greatly from the curse of dimensionality. Furthermore, if all firms are portfolio optimizers and do not take any other firm’s investments
into account, the chosen endowments will all be countermonotonic to the pricing kernel (see,
e.g., [93]). As such, a general endowment space is not necessary for understanding systemic
risk and financial contagion. This motivates me to consider comonotonic endowments as
these are often tractable analytically and require the consideration of at most n intervals.
In fact, I will demonstrate that, in the setting of [45], I am able to provide a bound on
the expectation of the system behavior under any random endowment using the comonotonic setting. I will present below, first, the expectations and probability distributions under
general comonotonic endowments and, second, a special case related to Merton’s model for
credit pricing ([86]). I wish to emphasize that in this chapter, I consider a single maturity
model along the lines of [45, 96], i.e. the network is formed and fixed at time 0 and all claims
mature (and solvency is determined) at time T > 0.
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2.3.1

Expectations under comonotonic endowments

In this section I will consider the endowments to be random and comonotonic. As such, I wish
to recall a definition of comonotonicity of random variables which comes from Proposition
7.18 of [85].
(d)

Definition 2.3.1. X ∈ (L1 )n is comonotonic if X = f (q) (i.e. equal in distribution) for
some random variable q ∈ L0 and f : R → Rn nondecreasing.
Assumption 2.3.2. Throughout this chapter, I will restrict my consideration to comonotonic nonnegative random vectors of endowments X ∈ (L1+ )n that are equal in distribution
to f (q) for some nonnegative random variable q ∈ L0+ and nondecreasing map f : R+ → Rn+ .
For any random endowment satisfying Assumption 2.3.2, I can now consider the defaulting
regions, i.e. the regions in which different combinations of banks are deemed to be defaulting
on a portion of their liabilities. In fact, under the comonotonic setup considered herein, all
such regions in the q-space must be convex intervals in R+ . This is in contrast to a general
endowment space in which the regions need not be convex if the recovery rate is strictly less
than 1 (β < 1); I refer to [69] and Appendix A for more on this analysis. Thus, with the
comonotonicity assumption I can uniquely define the regions of q under which different firms
default, which I will do so with the vector q ∗ ∈ Rn+ .
Definition 2.3.3. Fix some random endowments satisfying Assumption 2.3.2. Define q ∗ ∈
Rn+ so that qi∗ is the minimal value such that firm i is solvent, i.e.
qi∗ = inf {q ≥ 0 | Vi (f (q)) ≥ 0} .
With this comonotonic setting described in Assumption 2.3.2 I can provide an iterative
representation for the lowest prices q ∗ ∈ Rn+ such that each firm is solvent.
Proposition 2.3.4. The lowest prices such that the various firms are solvent, defined by q ∗
in Definition 2.3.3, can be defined explicitly by the following iterative relation of decreasing
∗
values. Initialize q[0]
= ∞ and z (0) = 0 ∈ Rn . Then for any k = 1, 2, ..., n:

(k−1)
[k] ∈ arg max sup q ≥ 0 | e>
)f (q) < δi (z (k−1) )
i ∆(z
(k−1)

i: zi

=0
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+

n

∗
∗
(k−1)
q[k]
:= min q[k−1]
, sup q ≥ 0 | e>
)f (q) < δ[k] (z (k−1) )
[k] ∆(z

+

o

z (k) := z (k−1) + e[k] .
As a convention, the supremum of the empty set is assumed to be −∞. If the set definition of [k] has cardinality greater than one, then only a single argument is chosen arbitrarily.h In particular, if f is continuous
and strictly increasing in the single factor then
i+
Pn
−1
∗
∗
q[1] = maxi fi (p̄i − j=1 Lji ) and q[k] can be found via bisection search between 0 and
∗
.
q[k−1]
Proof. This follows directly from the monotonicity of the wealths as given in Proposition 2.2.7
∗
is chosen exactly to be the
and the construction of ∆, δ in (2.3) and (2.4). The level q[k]
largest price q so that the [k]th bank would have 0 wealth (i.e. the lowest price so that it is
solvent) given that the prior [1] through [k − 1] banks have already been deemed insolvent.
∗
The minimum taken with q[k−1]
is necessary only in the case of contagious defaults, i.e. from
bankruptcy costs if the jump in payments from bank [k − 1] causes bank [k] to also become
insolvent at the same time.
Assumption 2.3.5. Without loss of generality I will assume for the remainder of this chapter (except where explicitly mentioned otherwise) that the banks are placed in descending
∗
order of q ∗ , i.e. so that q1∗ ≥ q2∗ ≥ ... ≥ qn∗ . Additionally, define q0∗ = ∞ and qn+1
= 0.
Thus the value qi∗ is, in some sense, indicative of the financial stability of bank i. Immediately
with this construction of minimal values q ∗ for which each firm is solvent, I am able to deduce
formulations for the defaulting probabilities for each bank as well as the expectations of the
wealth, payments, and equity for each firm. In contrast to the general formulation in [69]
which requires a partition of the endowment space into 2n defaulting regions, the formulations
given in the below theorem require only a partition into n intervals. Further, as demonstrated
in Lemma 2.3.8 below, in the setting of [45], this formulation provides a tractable bound on
the general expectations given in, e.g., [69, 16] for large networks.
Theorem 2.3.6. Let the endowments be defined by X ∈ (L1+ )n satisfying Assumption 2.3.2.
The probability of default, the expected wealth, the expected payment, and the expected equity
for firm i are given, respectively, by:
P(Vi (X) < 0) = P(q < qi∗ )
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E[Vi (X)] =

e>
i

n h
X

i
∗
∗
∗
∆k E[f (q)I{q∈[qk+1
,qk∗ )} ] − δ̄k P(q ∈ [qk+1 , qk ))

k=0

E[pi (X)] = p̄i +

e>
i

n h
i
X
∗
∗
∗
∗
∆k E[f (q)I{q∈[qk+1 ,qk )} ] − δ̄k P(q ∈ [qk+1 , qk ))
k=i

E[Ei (X)] =

e>
i

i−1 h
X

∗
∆k E[f (q)I{q∈[qk+1
,qk∗ )} ] − δ̄k P(q ∈

i

∗
[qk+1
, qk∗ ))

k=0

where I define ∆k and δ̄k by:

∆k :=

 P
k
∆

j=1 ej

I



if k = 1, 2, ..., n

and δ̄k :=

if k = 0

 P
k
δ̄

j=1 ej

(I − Π> )p̄



if k = 1, ..., n

.

if k = 0

Proof. This follows directly from the construction of V in the fictitious default algorithm of
Corollary 2.2.5 and the construction of q ∗ .
Remark 2.3.7. I will now compare the expectation results above to those from [69] with
cross-ownership of equity but no bankruptcy costs. In this setting the ownership of equity
is denoted by Γ ∈ [0, 1]n×n where bank j owns γij of bank i’s equity. Under the assumption
P
that no firm has sold off all of its equity, I consider only the case that nj=1 γij < 1. I can
consider this setting in the same way by redefining ∆, δ̄ as:

−1
∆(z) := I − (I − (1 − β) diag(z)) Π> diag(z) + Γ> (I − diag(z))
× (I − (1 − β) diag(z))

−1
δ̄(z) := I − (I − (1 − β) diag(z)) Π> diag(z) + Γ> (I − diag(z))


× I − (I − (1 − β) diag(z)) Π> p̄.
The comonotonic case that I consider would, as discussed previously, solve the curse of
dimensionality issue that exists in the work of [69].
I now wish to consider how the formulas above for the expectations of wealth and debt under
comonotonic endowments can provide a bound for the more general random endowments.
As previously mentioned, the expectations of debt and equity were studied in [69, 16], but
the formulations required suffer from the curse of dimensionality. More generally, if the
correlations between firm endowments is unknown, the following lemma is useful from a
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stress test viewpoint as I find that the comonotonic case is a lower bound on the health of
the system.
Lemma 2.3.8. Consider the setting of [45], i.e. β = 1. Let X ∈ (L1+ )n and Z = (FX−11 (U ), ..., FX−1n (U ))
for uniform random variable U on the support [0, 1] and marginal distributions FX1 , ..., FXn
for X1 , ..., Xn respectively. Then
E[Vi (Z)] ≤ E[Vi (X)] ≤ Vi (E[X]) and
E[pi (Z)] ≤ E[pi (X)] ≤ pi (E[X])
for any bank i.
Proof. By construction X ≤sm Z with respect to the supermodular order (see Section 9.A.4
and, in particular, Theorem 9.A.21 of [97]). I further note that, under the setting of [45],
I can consider this system as a fixed point in the payments p(x) = p̄ ∧ (x + Π> p(x)) with
V (x) = x + Π> p(x) − p̄. Thus if p : Rn+ → [0, p̄] is submodular then the lower-bounding
result is proven. To prove this result I consider that the payment function is the pointwise
limit of the mappings pk : Rn+ → [0, p̄] defined iteratively as:
p0 (x) := p̄ and pk+1 (x) := p̄ ∧ (x + Π> pk (x)) ∀k ∈ N, ∀x ∈ Rn+ .
As p(x) = limk→∞ pk (x) by construction (where convergence follows from the monotonicity
and boundedness of the arguments 0 ≤ pk+1 (x) ≤ pk (x)), if pk is submodular for all k then
the same must be true for the clearing payments p. Trivially p0 is submodular. Now by
induction assume that pk−1 is submodular. Take x, y ∈ Rn+ and i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}; there are
three cases that must be considered:
(i) If pki (x) = pki (y) = p̄i then pki (x) + pki (y) ≥ pki (x ∧ y) + pki (x ∨ y) by construction.
(ii) If pki (x) < pki (y) = p̄i then pki (x) ≥ pki (x ∧ y) and pki (y) = pki (x ∨ y) by monotonicity
(Proposition 2.2.7); thus pki (x) + pki (y) ≥ pki (x ∧ y) + pki (x ∨ y).
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(iii) If pki (x) < p̄i and pki (y) < p̄i then pki (x) = xi +
Pn
k−1
(y). Therefore I find
j=1 πji pj
"
pki (x) + pki (y) = xi +

n
X

#

"

πji pk−1
(x) + yi +
j

j=1

= xi + yi +

Pn

n
X

j=1

πji pk−1
(x) and pki (y) = yi +
j

#
πji pk−1
(y)
j

j=1
n
X



πji pk−1
(x) + pk−1
(y)
j
j

j=1

≥ xi ∧ yi + xi ∨ yi +

n
X



πji pk−1
(x ∧ y) + pk−1
(x ∨ y)
j
j

j=1

"
= (x ∧ y)i +

n
X

#

(x ∧ y) + (x ∨ y)i +
πji pk−1
j

j=1

≥

pki (x

∧ y) +

"

pki (x

n
X

#
(x ∨ y)
πji pk−1
j

j=1

∨ y).

Further, by p concave (see Lemma 5 of [45]), the upper bound follows by Jensen’s inequality.

In the below simple network, I demonstrate some counterexamples to extending the results
of Lemma 2.3.8. For instance, I first consider the setting with bankruptcy costs, i.e. with
recovery rate β < 1. Second I demonstrate that, even in the Eisenberg--Noe setting, no
consistent bounds for firm equity exists. Intriguingly, though the payments and wealth
attain their worst-case under comonotonic endowments, the equity of the different firms in
the financial system may actually be higher under the comonotonic endowments than other
correlation structures. However, I wish to note that the societal node would exhibit the
same lower bound property as given in Lemma 2.3.8 since its equity is equal to its wealth
by construction.
Example 2.3.9. I wish to consider the cases not proven to have bounds in Lemma 2.3.8
above. Specifically, I will demonstrate that the lower bounds do not hold when bankruptcy
costs exist (β < 1) and that the equity does not satisfy the bounding property with comonotonicity. For these counterexamples I will consider the 2 bank and societal node system
depicted in Figure 2.1. That is, firm 1 owes 1 to both firm 2 and the societal node and firm
2 owes 1 to firm 1 and 2 to the societal node.
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L21 = 1
Bank 1

L13 = 1

Societal 3

L23 = 2

Bank 2

L12 = 1
Figure 2.1: Example 2.3.9: A sample network topology used to determine counterexamples
to expanding the results of Lemma 2.3.8.
• First, I wish to consider a counterexample to the bounds provided in Lemma 2.3.8
for a network with bankruptcy costs (β < 1). Consider the countermonotonic and
comonotonic random endowments (including for the societal node 3)

(0, 2, 0) with
X=
(1, 0, 0) with

(0, 0, 0) with
Z=
(1, 2, 0) with

P(X = (0, 2, 0)) =

1
2

P(X = (1, 0, 0)) =

1
2

P(Z = (0, 0, 0)) =

1
2

P(Z = (1, 2, 0)) =

1
2

.

With recovery rate β ∈ [0, 1] I find that the four possible payment vectors are:
p((0, 0, 0)) = (0, 0, 0)


12β
4β 2
,
, 0
p((0, 2, 0)) =
6 − β2 6 − β2


6β
3β 2
p((1, 0, 0)) =
,
, 0
6 − β2 6 − β2
p((1, 2, 0)) = (2, 3, 0).
Thus I can conclude

E[p(X)] =

 

β(2β + 3) 3β(β + 4)
3
,
, 0 ≤ 1, , 0 = E[p(Z)].
6 − β2
2(6 − β 2 )
2

In fact E[pi (X)] < E[pi (Z)], and thus also E[Vi (X)] < E[Vi (Z)], for both firms i if
β ∈ [0, 1).
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• Second, I wish to consider a counterexample to a bound for the equity. Again I will
consider two simple random endowments

(1 + , 2, 0) with P(X = (1 + , 2, 0)) = 1
2
X=
(2, 1 + , 0) with P(X = (2, 1 + , 0)) = 1
2

(1 + , 1 + , 0) with P(Z = (1 + , 1 + , 0)) =
Z=
(2, 2, 0)
with P(Z = (2, 2, 0)) = 1

1
2

2

with  ∈ (0, 41 ). I find that the four possible payment and equity vectors are:

p((1 + , 1 + , 0)) =


8
9
(1 + ) , (1 + ) , 0
5
5

p((1 + , 2, 0)) = (2, 3, 0)
p((2, 1 + , 0)) = (2, 2 + , 0)
p((2, 2, 0)) = (2, 3, 0).
Thus I can conclude from E(x) = x + Π> p(x) − p(x) that


8+
1 + 2
, 0,
E[E(X)] =
3
3


1
5
E[E(Z)] =
, 0, + .
2
2



Notably I find that I cannot compare E[E(X)] and E[E(Z)] since E[E1 (X)] < E[E1 (Z)]
but E[E3 (X)] > E[E3 (Z)].

2.3.2

Pricing under geometric Brownian motion with common
noise

In this section, I will consider a specific case of the comonotonic structure. Here I consider
a market with a risk-free bond and a single risky asset in which the different firms have
heterogeneous investments. The risky asset, which can be viewed as an investment in the
market portfolio, will be assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion. This setting is
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chosen for the purposes of comparison to [86]. Due to the heterogeneity of portfolios, but
with a common risky asset, this system can be considered equivalent to a vector of geometric
Brownian motions with differing volatilities but a single common noise term.
Assumption 2.3.10. Let r ≥ 0 be the risk-free rate. Let b, s ∈ Rn+ denote the investments
of the firms in the risk-free bond and in a risky asset. Consider a terminal time T > 0.
Define X = f (qT ) := berT + sqT almost surely where
dqt
= µdt + σdWt
qt
for Brownian motion W and with initial price of the risky asset q0 > 0.
I wish to compare this setting to the single firm setting proposed in [86] in which the assets of
a firm follow a geometric Brownian motion and the pricing of debt and equity is considered.
I note that the comonotonic construction from the prior section would allow me to consider
more complicated underlying market models, e.g. a jump diffusion model. But for simplicity
and due to its use in the seminal work by Merton, I will restrict myself to the geometric
Brownian motion setting herein.
With the setting proposed in Assumption 2.3.10 I can explicitly give an iterative representation for the lowest prices q ∗ ∈ Rn+ such that each firm is solvent. I note that this
construction does not rely on Assumption 2.3.5.
Proposition 2.3.11. The lowest prices such that the various firms are solvent, defined by q ∗
in Definition 2.3.3, can be defined explicitly by the following iterative relation of decreasing
∗
= ∞ and z (0) = 0 ∈ Rn . Then for any k = 1, 2, ..., n:
values. Initialize q[0]

+
(k−1)
)s)−1 δ̄(z (k−1) ) − ∆(z (k−1) )−1 berT
[k] ∈ arg max e>
i diag(∆(z
(k−1)

i: zi

=0

(
∗
∗
q[k]
:= min q[k−1]
,

max
(k−1)

i: zi

 >
+
ei diag(∆(z (k−1) )s)−1 δ̄(z (k−1) ) − ∆(z (k−1) )−1 berT

)

=0

z (k) := z (k−1) + e[k] .
If the maximizing argument in the definition of [k] is non-unique, then only a single argument
is chosen arbitrarily.
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Proof. This follows directly from the monotonicity of the wealths as given in Proposition 2.2.7
∗
and the construction of ∆, δ̄ in (2.3) and (2.4). The level q[k]
is chosen exactly to be the
largest price q so that the [k]th bank would have 0 wealth (i.e. the lowest price so that it is
solvent) given that the prior [1] through [k − 1] banks have already been deemed insolvent.
∗
is necessary only in the case of contagious defaults, i.e. from
The minimum taken with q[k−1]
bankruptcy costs if the jump in payments from bank [k − 1] causes bank [k] to also become
n
insolvent at the same time. I wish to note that, if e>
i ∆(z)s = 0 for some z ∈ {0, 1} , I take
1/(e>
i ∆(z)s) = ∞. This can only occur if firm i holds no risky assets (si = 0) and all firms
j with obligations to firm i (Lji > 0) either are solvent (zj = 0) or hold no risky assets
(sj = 0), i.e. if firm i’s solvency is independent from the behavior of the risky asset under
the default set z.
For the remainder of this chapter I will consider Assumption 2.3.5 to hold, i.e. q1∗ ≥ ... ≥ qn∗ .
This is for simplicity of notation and does not restrict the results of this work. With this
construction I now present a corollary to Theorem 2.3.6 to provide the risk-neutral price
of debt and value of the market capitalization for the firms in the financial system in this
common investment scenario. These formulations are analytical expressions with respect to
the vector q ∗ which was algorithmically provided in Proposition 2.3.11.
Corollary 2.3.12. Let Q be the risk-neutral measure in the market, i.e.
dQ
1
= exp −
dP
2



µ−r
σ

2


T−

µ−r
σ

!


WT

.

Under the risk-neutral measure Q, the probability of firm i’s default Q(Vi (X) < 0), the discounted price of firm i’s debt EQ [e−rT pi (X)/p̄i ], and firm i’s market capitalization EQ [e−rT Ei (X)]
are given by:

Q(Vi (X) < 0) = Φ −d2i


n



1 >X
Q
−rT pi (X)
−rT
E e
=e
+ ei
∆k b − e−rT δ̄k Φ −d2k − Φ −d2k+1
p̄i
p̄i k=i



+∆k sq0 Φ −d1k − Φ −d1k+1
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(2.5)
(2.6)

EQ [e−rT Ei (X)] = e>
i

i−1
X


∆k b − e−rT δ̄k




Φ −d2k − Φ −d2k+1

k=0




+∆k sq0 Φ −d1k − Φ −d1k+1
 
log qq0∗ + (r + 21 σ 2 )T
k
√
d1k =
∀k = 0, 1, ..., n + 1
σ T
√
d2 = d1 − σ T

(2.7)

(2.8)
(2.9)

where Φ : R → [0, 1] is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 2.3.6. Particularly,
∗
∗
∗
∗
b
∗
EQ [e−rT (berT + sqT )I{qT ∈[qk+1
,qk∗ )} ] = bQ(qT ∈ [qk+1 , qk )) + sq0 Q(qT ∈ [qk+1 , qk ))
e−rT qT
q0

. In fact, I can explicitly provide these probabilities by, first, noting that
b Therefore, letting Z and Ẑ follow a normal
=
− σt is a Brownian motion under Q.
b respectively, for any q̄ ≥ 0:
distribution under Q and Q

where

b
dQ
dQ

b
WtQ

WtQ

=


Q(qT ≤ q̄) = Q(q0 exp (r −

b
b
Q(qT ≤ q̄) = Q(q0 exp (r +




√
log(q0 /q̄) + (r − 12 σ 2 )T
1 2
√
σ )T + σ T Z ≤ q̄) = Φ −
,
2
σ T



√
log(q0 /q̄) + (r + 12 σ 2 )T
1 2
√
.
σ )T + σ T Ẑ ≤ q̄) = Φ −
2
σ T

Remark 2.3.13. As an external investor may wish to hedge her counterparty risk, I wish
to consider the Greeks for debt for firm i. In particular, from a pricing and hedging perspective, I find the delta of the debt in a financial network as the most interesting. By direct
computation I find that, for the price process Pi (t) := EQ [e−r(T −t) pi (X)/p̄i | Ft ], the delta at
time t is given by:
n
X
 −r(T −t)


∂Pi (t)
1
>
√
=
ei
e
δ̄ − ∆k bert φ(−d1k ) − φ(−d2k+1 )
∂q
p̄i qt σ T − t k=i
 i


+ (∆k s) Φ(−d2k ) − Φ(−d2k+1 ) − qt φ(−d2k ) − φ(−d2k+1 )
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d1k

log
=

 
qt
qk∗

+ (r + 12 σ 2 )(T − t)
√
σ T −t

∀k = 0, 1, ..., n + 1

√
d2 = d1 − σ T − t.

In the above formulation I define φ = Φ0 as the standard normal probability density function.
In a similar way I can compute the other Greeks.
Under this geometric Brownian motion setting I am able to provide the explicit distribution
for the wealths (and therefore also payments and equity). These joint distributions would
be particularly useful for stress testing a financial system as it would allow the regulatory
authority to assign probabilities to the outcomes of the stress tests. This is more explicitly
considered in the numerous works on systemic risk measures, see e.g. [31, 79, 56, 20, 11],
in which some “aggregate” of the financial system needs to be deemed acceptable. This
acceptability criterion would commonly be constructed from a law-invariant framework, e.g.
value-at-risk or expected shortfall, which explicitly requires the distribution of the system
outcomes.
Lemma 2.3.14. Take v ∗ ∈ −p̄ + Rn+ , p∗ ∈ [0, p̄], and e∗ ∈ Rn+ :
Q(V (X) ≤ v ∗ ) =

n
X

"

k=0

!)

1 2
k ∗
σ
)T
log
q̄
(v
)/q
−
(r
−
0
i
2
√
min Φ(−d2k ), min Φ
i=1,2,...,n
σ T
(
!)#

1 2
k ∗
σ
)T
log
q̄
(v
)/q
−
(r
−
0
i
2
√
− min Φ(−d2k+1 ), min Φ
i=1,2,...,n
σ T
(

(2.10)
∗

Q(V (X) ≥ v ) =

n
X
k=0

"

(

!)

log q̄ik (v ∗ )/q0 − (r − 12 σ 2 )T
√
max
max Φ
i=1,2,...,n
σ T
(
!)#

log q̄ik (v ∗ )/q0 − (r − 21 σ 2 )T
2
√
− max Φ(−dk+1 ), max Φ
i=1,2,...,n
σ T


Φ(−d2k ),

(2.11)
Q(p(X) ≤ p∗ ) = Q(V (X) ≤ diag(I{p∗ <p̄} )[p∗ − p̄] + I{p∗ =p̄} ∞)

(2.12)

Q(p(X) ≥ p∗ ) = Q(V (X) ≥ p∗ − p̄)

(2.13)

Q(E(X) ≤ e∗ ) = Q(V (X) ≤ e∗ )

(2.14)

Q(E(X) ≥ e∗ ) = Q(V (X) ≥ e∗ )

(2.15)
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−1
v ∗ + δ̄k − ∆k berT .
where q̄ik (v ∗ ) := e>
i diag(∆k s)
Proof. Consider first the probability distribution for the wealths V given in (2.10). Take
v ∗ ∈ −p̄ + Rn+ (if v ∗ is taken otherwise then Q(V (X) ≤ v ∗ ) = 0 by the bound given in
Proposition 2.2.1).
Q(V (X) ≤ v ∗ ) =

n
X

∗
Q(V (X) ≤ v ∗ , qT ∈ [qk+1
, qk∗ ))

k=0

=
=
=
=

n
X
k=0
n
X
k=0
n
X

∗
Q(∆k [berT + sqT ] − δ̄k ≤ v ∗ , qT ∈ [qk+1
, qk∗ ))

−1
Q(qT ≤ e>
v ∗ + δ̄k − ∆k berT
i diag(∆k s)

∗
∀i, qT ∈ [qk+1
, qk∗ ))






∗
k ∗
∗
k ∗
Q qT ∈ [min qk+1 , min q̄i (v ) , min qk , min q̄i (v ) ]

k=0
"
n
X
k=0



i=1,2,...,n

i=1,2,...,n

!)

1 2
k ∗
σ
)T
(v
)/q
−
(r
−
log
q̄
0
i
2
√
min Φ(−d2k ), min Φ
i=1,2,...,n
σ T
!)#
(

1 2
k ∗
(v
)/q
−
(r
−
σ
)T
log
q̄
0
i
2
√
.
− min Φ(−d2k+1 ), min Φ
i=1,2,...,n
σ T
(

>
As before, I take 1/(e>
i ∆k s) = ∞ if ei ∆k s = 0. This cannot occur if, by construction of
∆k for any k, all firms are long the risky asset (s ∈ Rn++ ). The construction of the explicit
form of the probabilities in the final equation come from the same logic as in the proof of
Corollary 2.3.12 above.

Now consider the survival distribution for the wealths V given in (2.11). Again take v ∗ ∈
−p̄ + Rn+ (if v ∗ is taken otherwise then Q(V (X) ≥ v ∗ ) = Q(V (X) ≥ [−p̄] ∧ v ∗ ) by the bound
given in Proposition 2.2.1). The logic for the representation in (2.11) follows similarly to
that for the distribution function for wealths given above.
Finally, consider the distribution for the payments p and equity E given in (2.12)-(2.15).
Take p∗ ∈ [0, p̄]. I note that p ≤ p̄ + V with equality for any defaulting bank i. Thus I can
conclude:
Q(p(X) ≤ p∗ ) = Q(pi (X) ≤ p∗i ∀i : p∗i < p̄i )
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= Q(Vi (X) ≤ p∗i − p̄i ∀i : p∗i < p̄i )
= Q(V (X) ≤ diag(I{p∗ <p̄} )[p∗ − p̄] + I{p∗ =p̄} ∞)
Q(p(X) ≥ p∗ ) = Q(V (X) ≥ p∗ − p̄).
Take e∗ ∈ Rn+ . Then E ≤ e∗ if and only if V ≤ e∗ and similarly for E ≥ e∗ . Thus the result
is proven.
L21 = 3

Bank 1
b1 = 0
s1 = 3

L13 = 3

Societal 3
b3 = 100
s3 = 0

L23 = 3

Bank 2
b2 = 0
s2 = 4

L12 = 7
Figure 2.2: A simple network topology for Examples 2.3.15, 2.3.16, and 2.4.2.
I wish to conclude this section by providing simple examples to demonstrate the results
considered so far in this chapter. Namely, I wish to show the analytical distribution for the
payments from the firms followed by an empirical example showing the bounding properties
first proposed in Lemma 2.3.8. In both of these examples I will focus on a simple 2 bank
network with societal node as depicted in Figure 2.2.
Example 2.3.15. Consider the financial system depicted in Figure 2.2 under geometric
Brownian motion assets with a common noise. This two bank system with an additional
societal node will be considered with bankruptcy costs described by the recovery rate β =
0.75 and is such that bank 1 owes 7 units to bank 2 and 3 to the societal node and bank
2 owes 3 units to both bank 1 and the societal node. Further, for simplicity, the riskfree rate is assumed to be r = 0. Additionally, the maturity is set so that T = 1 and
volatility so that σ = 1. Finally, the initial price of the risky asset is set to q0 = 1. With
this financial system, I will demonstrate the distributions of the clearing payments under
the risk-neutral measure. Figure 2.3a displays the cumulative distribution function of the
clearing payments as a contour plot. Notably, the joint cumulative distribution function has
fairly stark right-angles in the individual contour lines. This structure follows from the use
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of minimums and maximums in the construction of the joint distribution for the clearing
payments. The marginal cumulative distribution function for the payments from bank 1
is displayed in Figure 2.3b. The sections over which no probability is assigned are due to
the bankruptcy costs in this setting. Notably, though piecewise similar to the cumulative
distribution function of the lognormal, the marginal distribution clearly exhibits behavior
that can only be found by accounting for the network effects.
Q(p(X) ≤ p * )

6
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Marginal Cumulative Distribution Function for Payments from Bank 1
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(a) The joint cumulative distribution function
of payments.

(b) Marginal cumulative distribution function
of payments from bank 1.

Figure 2.3: Example 2.3.15: The probability distribution of the clearing payments of the
financial network provided by Figure 2.2 under bankruptcy costs.

Finally, I wish to numerically consider the case in which firm assets are correlated lognormals,
but not comonotonic. I will use this numerical example to illustrate the bounding properties
found in Lemma 2.3.8.
Example 2.3.16. Consider again the financial system with 2 banks and an additional societal node presented in Figure 2.2 and discussed in Example 2.3.15. Herein I wish to
demonstrate the accuracy of the bounds found in Lemma 2.3.8 compared with varying correlations between the risky investments of the two firms. As such I will restrict myself to the
Eisenberg--Noe setting without bankruptcy costs (β = 1). To construct the assets of the two
banks I consider separate pricing processes for each bank. These pricing processes follow the
correlated geometric Brownian motions with correlations ρ ∈ [−1, 1] under the risk-neutral
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measure Q:
dqt1
= rdt + σdWt1 ,
qt1

dqt2
= rdt + σdWt2 ,
qt2

EQ [dWt1 dWt2 ] = ρdt.

I will primarily focus on bank 2 in this example as it has a typical response. I first draw
attention to Figure 2.4a. In this figure I see that the price of debt is bounded from below
by the comonotonic case as proven in Lemma 2.3.8. However, as previously discussed in
Example 2.3.9, the market capitalization does not need to have its worst-case under the
comonotonic asset scenario. In fact, in this example, I find that under the comonotonic
scenario the price of debt is lowest but the market capitalization is at its maximum for
bank 2. In contrast, the societal node finds its equity worth the least when the firms have
comonotonic assets. Finally, in Figure 2.4b I plot the (risk-neutral) probability of default
of bank 2 as a function of asset correlations. Notably, the comonotonic case provides the
greatest probability of default for bank 2, but the countermonotonic setting is not the lowest
probability of default.
1

Impact of Asset Correlations on the Price of Debt for Bank 2

Impact of Asset Correlations on the Default Probability for bank 2

0.55
Monte Carlo approximation
Comonotonic solution

0.95

Probability of Default

0.5

Price of Debt

0.9

0.85

0.8

0.45

0.4

0.35

0.75

Monte Carlo approximation
Comonotonic solution
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0.8

1

Correlation ρ

(a) Clearing payments from bank 2 under
changes in asset correlations (solid line) and
comonotonic assets (dashed line).

(b) Risk-neutral probability of default for bank
2 under changes in asset correlations (solid
line) and comonotonic assets (dashed line).

Figure 2.4: Example 2.3.16: Demonstration of that clearing payments under comonotonic
assets provide a lower bound, but the probability of default is not monotonically increasing
in correlation of assets.
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2.4

Comparative statics

In this section I provide the comparative statics for the performance of the system with
respect to important system parameters through numerical examples. In these numerical
examples I will assume the geometric Brownian motion setting of Section 2.3.2.
Definition 2.4.1. Define the effective interest rate on firm i’s debt by:
Ri =


1
log(p̄i ) − log EQ [e−rT pi (X)] .
T

For bank i, I can define Ri − r as the risk premium along the lines of [86]. Please note that
the risk premium can be taken as an effective measure of the price of debt.
Example 2.4.2. Consider again the financial system with 2 banks and an additional societal
node as depicted in Figure 2.2 and used in Examples 2.3.15 and 2.3.16. Additionally, for
simplicity and where otherwise I am not varying that parameter, I consider the risky asset
to have initial price q0 = 1, volatility σ = 1, and the claims to have maturity at time T = 1.
Further, the risk-free rate is assumed to be r = 0. I consider this simple, illustrative, example
so as to demonstrate the effects of the financial network (in comparison to the same system
in two baseline systems without interbank debt as in [86]). For a clear comparison I will take
this system without bankruptcy costs (β = 1) and with a common risky asset following a
geometric Brownian motion. Specifically, I will consider the same comparative statics on the
risk premium as undertaken by [86], i.e. by varying the debt-firm value ratios, the volatility
of the risky asset, and the maturity of the debt claims. Please note that since I have assumed
r = 0 I will use the terms risk premium and effective interest rate interchangeably.
−1
(i) First, I will consider the impact of the debt-firm value ratios d = diag b + sq0 + Π> p̄
p̄
on the risk premium and thus the price of debt for each firm. In [86] in which no firm
P
holds any risk-free assets (bi = 0) nor any interbank assets ( nj=1 πji p̄j = 0), it was
shown that an individual firm’s debt-firm value ratio can completely determine its own
risk premium R − r. However, herein I consider explicitly the effects of the interbank
assets. In my case, I can vary d by either:
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(a) altering the liabilities p̄ and keeping endowments b and s constant, i.e.
"
p̄ =

1
−π21 d1
−π12 d2
1

#−1 "

(b1 + s1 q0 )d1
(b2 + s2 q0 )d2

#

given the desired debt-firm value ratio d ∈ R2+ constrained by d1 d2 π12 π21 < 1; or
(b) altering the assets s and keeping liabilities p̄ constant, i.e.


s = diag(d)−1 p̄ − diag(d)Π> p̄
given the desired debt-firm value ratio d ∈ R2++ so that d ≤ diag(Π> p̄)−1 p̄.
The distinction between the two approaches to varying d is important because I find
that the manner in which the debt-firm value ratio is modified can greatly affect the
price of debt as measured by the risk premium. The contour plots of the risk premium
of bank 2 with respect to debt-firm 1 value ratio d1 and debt-firm 2 value ratio d2 are
shown in Figure 2.5a and Figure 2.5b for varying the debt-firm values by altering liabilities and altering assets respectively. To provide further clarity on how the individual
debt-firm values affect each other, I consider three slices of this data, by fixing the level
of d1 and varying d2 through either altering the liabilities or the assets in Figure 2.5c
and Figure 2.5d respectively. Notably, if firm 1 has a lower debt-firm value ratio d1
constructed through the change in assets, then firm 2 consistently has a lower effective
interest rate for any debt-firm ratio chosen. However, there is no such monotonicity
when the debt-firm value ratios are constructed through changes in the liabilities.
(ii) Second I will consider the impact of the volatility σ of the risky asset on the risk
premium (and thus the price of debt) and the market capitalization for each firm.
In this consideration I wish to compare the network effects with two baseline models
without a network. In order to consider the system without network effects I consider
two settings:
(a) with the assumption that all interbank assets are paid off in full in units of the
risk-free asset; and
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Figure 2.5: Example 2.4.2(i): The effective interest rate of firm 2 versus changes in the
debt-firm value ratios.
(b) with the assumption that all interbank assets are treated no differently than other
risky assets (i.e. following the market geometric Brownian motion and not capped
by the total obligations).
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Due to the risk of the interbank assets, and as verified numerically, it is clear that
the risk premium would be lower when neglecting counterparty risk and all interbank
assets are treated as if they are risk-free than in the full networked system. Further, the
market capitalization would be higher when neglecting the network effects and debts
are treated as being paid in full in the risk-free asset. However, when interbank assets
are treated as if they follow the market, the effective interest rates are comparable with
the network effects. In contrast, the equity is significantly higher in this setting as the
limited value that interbank assets can obtain is removed when treated as being an
investment in the market. I display the results for the risk premium and the market
capitalization for firm 1 and firm 2 under the networked system and the two baseline
models in Figure 2.6a and Figure 2.6b respectively. As depicted in Figure 2.6a, firm 1
has greater effective interest rate when including the network effects or risk; in fact, firm
1 has its highest interest rates (asymptoting to approximately a 7% higher interest rate)
when interbank assets are treated as risky assets. However, as shown in Figure 2.6a,
firm 1 has equal market capitalization with network effects and when all interbank
assets are treated as being paid in full; the market capitalization is significantly higher
when interbank assets follow the market geometric Brownian motion. Firm 2, as
depicted in Figure 2.6b, has orders of magnitude higher effective interest rates under
the network effects than if they had no counterparty risk, and highest effective interest
rates (asymptoting to approximately an 8% higher interest rate) when full network
effects are taken into account. Here the market capitalization is distinct under all
three considerations with the networked effects having the lowest market capitalization.
This distinction makes clear that network effects can and should not be neglected when
considering the price of debt and market capitalization.
(iii) Finally I will consider the impact of the maturity T for the claims on the risk premium
(and thus the price of debt) and the market capitalization for each firm. As with
the consideration on volatility above, I wish to compare the network effects with two
baseline models without a network. I accomplish this in exactly the same way as
considered previously. Again, due to the risk of the interbank assets in a network, it is
clear that the effective interest rate would be higher and market capitalization lower
when including the network effects than when all interbank assets are treated as in
baseline model (iia). As depicted in Figure 2.7a, firm 1 has similar effective interest
rate in all three scenarios, though the market capitalization is nearly double when
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(a) The effective interest rate and market capitalization for firm 1 under changes to the
volatility of the risky asset with network effects and under single firm effects only.

(b) The effective interest rate and market capitalization for firm 2 under changes to the
volatility of the risky asset with network effects and under single firm effects only.

Figure 2.6: Example 2.4.2(ii): The effective interest rate and market capitalization versus
changes in the volatility of the risky asset.
interbank assets are treated as the market asset (baseline model (iib)). Firm 2, as
depicted in Figure 2.7b, has orders of magnitude higher effective interest rates under
the network effects than if they had no counterparty risk and noticeably higher effective
interest rate when full network effects are taken into account than if interbank assets
are treated no differently than other risky assets (i.e. following the market model).
As with all prior discussions on the market capitalization, the network effects greatly
reduce the market capitalization compared to the two single-firm scenarios considered
herein. I wish to conclude by considering the shapes of the interest rates as a function
of the maturity of the claims under network effects. In [86] the hyperbolic shape of firm
1’s effective interest rate would only occur if its debt-firm value ratio was greater than
or equal to 1; similarly the shape exhibited by firm 2’s effective interest rate would only
occur if its debt-firm value ratio was strictly less than 1. However, as discussed above,
the debt-firm value ratio does not have as unique a property under network effects as
it did in [86] without counterparty risk. Thus I find that the change in shape need not
(and in this numerical example, does not) change shape at the individual debt-firm
value ratios of 1.
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Figure 2.7: Example 2.4.2(iii): The effective interest rate and market capitalization versus
changes in the maturity of the debt claims.
Example 2.4.3. I will now consider a larger financial network consisting of n = 87 banks.
This large network provides clear reasoning for considering the comonotonic approach taken
within this chapter. As previously discussed, with 87 banks, there are 287 > 1026 potential
combinations of defaulting banks z ∈ {0, 1}87 . As such, the general framework for considering expected payments from [69] would be computationally intractable. However, the
comonotonic framework presented herein (and which, under the setting of [45], provides a
worst-case for the general setting) is computationally tractable as only 87 defaulting regions
need to be considered.
For this example, I will consider these 87 banks to come from the 2011 European Banking
Authority EU-wide stress tests.1 This dataset has been used in multiple prior empirical case
studies (e.g. [63, 32]) of financial contagion in interbank networks. To calibrate this system,
I will take the same approach from [52]. I note, however, that though I am calibrating the
financial network to a real dataset, the marginal distribution for bank endowments are not
calibrated and as such this example is for illustrative purposes only. I believe that there
1

Due to complications with the calibration methodology, I only consider 87 of the 90 institutions. DE029,
LU45, and SI058 were not included in this analysis.
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would be significant value in a further, detailed, case study to empirically determine the
marginal distributions of the bank endowments and, with that result, consider yield rates
and bond prices to compare with the realized prices in the market. This is, however, beyond
the scope of the current example. In fact, the primary purpose of using this dataset in this
example, as opposed to a large fictional network, is to demonstrate the order of magnitude
that the price of debt and effective interest rates can achieve (in comparison to the values
presented in the prior case studies on the 2 bank system).
For this network calibration, I consider a stylized balance sheet for each bank. I consider
Pn
banks with only two types of assets: interbank assets
j=1 Lji and external (risky) assets
P
si . Similarly, I consider three types of liabilities for each bank: interbank liabilities nj=1 Lij ,
external liabilities Li,n+1 , and capital Ci . In contrast, the EBA dataset provides the total
P
assets Ai , capital Ci , and interbank liabilities nj=1 Lij for each bank i.
Therefore, to calibrate the interbank network, I will need to make a few simplifying assumptions and take advantage of techniques from prior literature. In particular, as in [52, 32, 67],
the external (risky) assets are the difference between the total assets and interbank assets,
the external obligations (owed to the societal node Li,n+1 ) are equal to the total liabilities
less the interbank liabilities and capital, and the interbank assets will be assumed equal to
P
P
the interbank liabilities, i.e., nj=1 Lij = nj=1 Lji for all banks i. Thus, I can construct the
remainder of my stylized balance sheet through the system of equations
si = A i −

n
X
j=1

Lij ,

Li0 = Ai −

n
X
j=1

Lij − Ci ,

p̄i = Li0 +

n
X

Lij .

j=1

To verify the consistency of this calibration, I note that firm i’s net worth is equal to its
capital, i.e., Ci = Ai − p̄i .
Finally, for my calibration, I need to consider the full nominal liabilities matrix L ∈ R87×87
+
and not just the total interbank assets and liabilities. In order to accomplish this task I
consider the methodology of [63]. That paper presents an MCMC methodology to construct
the nominal liabilities matrix consistent with the total interbank assets and liabilities and
which allows for a (randomized) sparsity structure. As noted previously, this example is for
illustrative purposes only and thus I will consider only a single calibration of the interbank
network.
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In order to complete my model, I need to consider the remaining parameters of the system.
First, as all economic data pulled from the EBA EU-wide stress test dataset are already
in a consistent unit (millions of euros), I will consider q0 = 1 (million). Further, during
the period over which this data was collected, central banks were setting a low interest rate
environment. Therefore I estimate that the risk-free interest rate is r = 0. Additionally, as
this is data from a single year’s stress test, I will consider maturity on all debt claims to
be T = 1 (year). Finally, the volatility of the risky asset is estimated to be σ = 20% from
comparisons to annualized historical volatility of European markets in 2011.
First, I wish to consider the impact of the full network effects on the effective interest rates
and market capitalization in the setting without bankruptcy costs (β = 1). For this analysis
I consider the same two baseline models as in Example 2.4.2 above, i.e.
(i) with the assumption that all interbank assets are paid off in full in units of the risk-free
asset; and
(ii) with the assumption that all interbank assets are treated no differently than other
risky assets (i.e. following the market geometric Brownian motion and not capped by
the total obligations).
The data for these are provided in Figures 2.8 and 2.9 respectively. I note that, as in
Example 2.4.2 above, the price of debt with full network effects is generally comparable
to the single firm effect case with all interbank assets treated as the risky asset. In fact,
the interest rate of debt with full network effects is lower than if all interbank assets are
treated as the risky asset, but significantly higher than when interbank assets are treated as
the risk-free asset. In contrast, and again comparable to that in Example 2.4.2 above, the
market capitalization for firms is strikingly similar between the full network effects and the
single firm effects with interbank assets treated as the risk-free asset. The single firm effects
with interbank assets treated as the risky asset can differ by a large degree from the network
effects for the market capitalization of the individual firms.
Second, though above I consider the setting without bankruptcy costs, I now wish to consider
how the price of debt and equity are affected by the bankruptcy costs. Analytically, I can
conclude before any simulations, that the effective interest rates will decrease and the market
54

70

Comparing the Price of Debt

Change from Introducing Full Network Effects on Price of Debt
Change from Merton model: risk-free obligations
Change from Merton model: risky obligations

60

0.07

50

Number of Firms (#)

R-r Term Premium

0.06

0.05

0.04

40

30

20

0.03
10

0.02
0
-20%

Network effects

Merton: risk-free

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Percent Change (%)

Merton: risky

(a) Box plot of effective interest rates under
network effects and under single firm effects
only.

(b) Histogram of the relative change in the effective interest rates by including full network
effects.

Figure 2.8: Example 2.4.3: Comparison of the price of debt under network effects and under
single firm effects only without bankruptcy costs (β = 1).
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Figure 2.9: Example 2.4.3: Comparison of market capitalization under network effects and
under single firm effects only without bankruptcy costs (β = 1).
capitalization will increase with the recovery rate β. Figure 2.10 depicts the median price of
debt and market capitalization for the 87 banks under consideration; this demonstrates that
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the comparisons made at high values of β that appear accurate lose their predictive power
if β < 1. Thus, if bankruptcy costs exist, considering the interbank assets as either the
risk-free or risky asset can cause mispricing of risk. Given the simulated network below, the
full network effects cause higher risk in both debt and equity than if each firm were treated
individually.
Median Price of Debt
0.8

Median Market Capitalization

13.4
With network effects
Merton model: risk-free obligations
Merton model: risky obligations

0.7

With network effects
Merton model: risk-free obligations
Merton model: risky obligations

13.2

13

0.6

R-r Term Premium

12.8

0.5
12.6

0.4

12.4

12.2

0.3

12

0.2
11.8

0.1
11.6

0

11.4

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

0

Recovery Rate β

(a) Effect of recovery rate on the median effective interest rate.

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

Recovery Rate β

(b) Effect of recovery rate on the median market capitalization.

Figure 2.10: Example 2.4.3: Comparative statics on the recovery rate (β) to the market
prices of debt and equity.
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Chapter 3
Price-mediated contagion through
capital ratio requirements
This chapter is based on [15] which is joint work with Zachary Feinstein.

3.1

Introduction

An important channel of contagion in financial systems comes through indirect connections
or global interactions among organizations, e.g., fire sale spillovers. Those originate when
a firm is forced to liquidate its assets to meet some obligation or regulation. As firms
hold overlapping portfolios this causes impacts globally to all other firms due to marked-tomarket accounting. These firms are now forced to liquidate their assets, thus exacerbating
the crisis. An important factor in the origin of fire sale is the unintended consequence
of capital regulations in the form of capital ratio or leverage ratio. Due to these regulatory
constraints, banks might be forced to deleverage, setting off a vicious cycle of contagion. Such
deleveraging occured in a large scale in the 2008 financial crisis, resulting in amplification of
losses. For further discussion on such mechanisms see [26, 38].
The literature in the study of fire sale may be broadly divided into two different bodies
depending on the focus of the study. The first among these two bodies places more emphasis
on the development of a general mathematical framework and exploring questions about
existence and uniqueness in this general setting. Such works maybe considered as extensions
of [45] in the setting of price-mediated contagion. Among these works, [33] considers the
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liquidation problem in the context of a capital adequacy ratio. [7, 51] study the fire sale
problem when banks are forced to liquidate assets to meet debt obligations. [54] develops
an extension to [51] where banks, in addition to meeting their debt obligations, must satisfy
a leverage ratio. [26] considers the problem where banks are required to satisfy a riskweighted capital ratio. [53] considers the price-mediated contagion problem in a continuous
time setting and provides results on existence and uniqueness as well as analytical bounds
under a random setting. The second body of work in the domain of fire sale focuses more
on the development of an operational modeling framework and the design of stress tests
using this approach. Typically these results depend on a particular liquidation strategy (e.g.
proportional liquidation) and linear price impacts. Some of the notable works in this domain
include [71, 43, 38].
The primary goal of this chapter is to develop a general mathematical and economic framework to study price-mediated contagion in the case in which firms liquidate assets during a
crisis due to risk-weighted capital requirements. The risk-weighted capital ratio is defined as
the ratio of the capital of a bank divided by the risk-weighted assets of that bank. Such type
of regulatory requirements have been considered in the Basel regulation to assess the health
of financial institutions. In particular, Basel III mandates that this risk- weighted capital
ratio be greater than 8% for any bank. In order to adhere to such regulation during a crisis,
banks will liquidate their assets thus setting off fire sale and causing widespread losses, as
documented in [39, 77, 83]. Hence it is imperative that we accurately model such contagion.
The main highlights and contributions of my analysis are summarized as follows:
(i) I consider a multi-asset setting to model the price-mediated contagion due to riskweighted capital requirement constraints. The multi-asset setting provides a suitable
framework to model cross-asset contagion, which was widely observed in the 2008
financial crisis. This consideration of multiple assets, though realistic, offers a much
more challenging setting in comparison to a single asset. One of the major challenges
is the strategic component that presents itself while performing liquidation to satisfy
the capital requirements. Existing literature (e.g. [71, 43, 38]) considers proportional
liquidation for this analysis. In contrast, I consider a general liquidation function with
mild continuity and monotonicity properties and am thus able to study liquidation
schemes beyond proportional liquidation and encode the strategic component in my
framework. An interesting example that I consider is utility maximizing liquidation
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in which banks choose which assets to liquidate in order to maximize their utility. I
highlight the importance of the choice of the liquidation function through numerical
examples.
(ii) In contrast to other static models of fire sale ([26, 54, 51, 7, 33, 38, 43, 71]), I consider
two notions of pricing: the current price, which gives the current valuation for the
unliquidated assets, and the volume weighted average liquidation price, which I use to
determine the proceeds for liquidation. The adoption of these two separate notions of
pricing is important from financial and mathematical standpoints. While liquidating,
the prices of the assets which have already been sold will be higher than the current
price of the assets. The average liquidation price enables me to encode this dynamic
aspect in my modeling. Beyond this financial motivation, the adoption of the average liquidation price significantly aides the mathematical analysis, particularly in the
development of conditions for uniqueness.
(iii) In the existing literature on price-mediated contagion due to leverage/capital requirements, results on the existence of the equilibrium prices have been explored in [26, 54].
However, results on uniqueness have not been explored in this setting. In contrast,
in this work I develop conditions for the uniqueness of the pricing equilibrium. This
condition is characterized by certain properties on the inverse demand function. I
also provide an alternative characterization of the uniqueness condition in terms of
a monotonicity condition on the inverse demand function and a lower bound on the
risk-weights which depends on the liquidity of the assets under consideration. Equivalently, this result provides a way to calibrate the risk-weights properly depending on
the liquidity of the assets rather than using heuristics. I compare my result to the
analysis performed in [53] for a continuous time framework.
(iv) An important consideration in the study of fire sale is how prices vary as more assets are
liquidated. This is often modeled by an inverse demand function. Existing literature on
fire sale mostly consider a linear inverse demand function ([71, 26, 38, 43]). Although
such an inverse demand function will be easier to calibrate, this is a strong assumption.
In contrast, in my analysis I consider a general inverse demand function and develop
conditions on the inverse demand function to get uniqueness of solutions.
(v) The equilibrium pricing is dependent upon a number of system parameters. In reality,
it is very difficult to have a complete and accurate knowledge of all these system
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parameters. Despite the progress that has been made in recent years, the regulators
face significant legal and logistical hurdles in the data collection process. A second
factor which hinders this process is the fact that most of the systemic risk models are
very nascent and the discovery of which data is required in this analysis is very much
an ongoing process. In that context, the determination of the equilibrium prices and
hence the stress testing results is very much dependent upon how these parameters are
calibrated. Owing to this uncertainty, it is imperative that we have an understanding
of how a variation in these parameters might affect the equilibrium prices. I develop a
mathematical framework to perform sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium prices with
respect to the system parameters. In the systemic risk literature, sensitivity analysis
has been studied in the case where the banks have bilateral debt linkages in [82, 55].
As far as I am aware, this is the first work to perform sensitivity analysis in the fire
sale literature.
(vi) I develop a method to study the cost of regulation incurred by each bank. This is based
on the fact that tightening the regulatory threshold, that the banks have to satisfy,
will result in increased loss for the banks. Thus the marginal rate of change of this
loss with respect to the marginal change in the threshold gives a measure of the cost
of regulation. Based on my result in the sensitivity analysis, I can compute this loss.
In fact, I develop two notions of this cost depending on the type of loss that a bank
might suffer. The first one is based on the actual realized loss a bank may suffer and it
depends directly on the increased liquidation of that bank as a result of the increased
regulation. I develop a second notion of loss based on the marked-to-market impact.
This encodes the notion that even if a bank might not need to liquidate anything
as a result of the increased regulation, and hence do not have any realized loss, it
is still susceptible to contagion through global interactions brought about by price
depreciation and overlapping portfolios. I highlight these ideas through an empirical
study and focus on the six banks participating in the 2015 Federal Reserve CCAR with
the largest trading operations.
(vii) Through a numerical simulation with a two bank two asset system, I study the effect
of diversification of bank portfolio in this framework. I vary the portfolio of these
institutions as the system moves from fully diverse to fully diversified and study the
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price-mediated contagion under different liquidation schemes. I find that diversification does not uniformly lead to a more stable system, measured in this case by the
total market capitalization. In fact, under certain liquidation regimes, the cross-asset
contagion might outweigh the benefits of diversification.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.2, I develop the mathematical framework of my model and characterize the fire sale as a fixed point problem. In
Section 3.3, I develop conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium prices.
In Section 3.4, I formulate the sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium prices with respect to
the system parameters as a fixed point problem and prove the existence and uniqueness of a
solution to this problem. Further, I develop a methodology to evaluate the cost of regulation.
Numerical case studies highlighting the applications of this model are presented in Section
3.5.

3.2
3.2.1

Mathematical framework
Balance sheet and risk-weighted Capital Ratio

Throughout this chapter I will consider a network of n financial institutions. I will denote
the set of all banks in the network by N := {1, 2, . . . , n}.
I will consider two time points t = {0, 1}. At t = 0, each firm i = 1, ..., n holds xi ≥ 0 in
liquid assets (e.g. cash). I will assume without loss of generality that the price of this asset
stays constant at 1 at all times. In addition to this liquid asset, the bank portfolio comprises
of illquid assets. In line with [26, 53], I consider two classes of illiquid assets: marketable
(stocks or bonds issued by a non-financial corporation) or non-marketable (loans). The
distinction between these two classes of illiquid assets is that non-marketable assets are
difficult to sell in the short-run, and hence those cannot be liquidated. For further discussion
on non-marketable assets see [26, 42]. I will consider m ∈ Z+ marketable illquid assets.
Specifically I allow for the situation where banks hold multiple marketable illiquid assets.
This represents a more realistic setting in comparison to single asset models, such as [26].
A particularly significant aspect of the multi-asset setting is that this allows me to model
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cross-asset contagion. However, the multi-asset case is much more challenging to deal with
mathematically compared to the single asset case, as has been demonstrated in [51, 54].
I assume that each bank holds si ∈ Rm
+ shares of marketable iilquid assets and li ≥ 0 of
non-marketable assets. Without loss of generality, I assume that the price of all the illiquid
assets are 1 at time 0.
On the other side of the balance-sheet each firm i has p̄i ≥ 0 in liabilities. I assume that the
liabilities are long-term and these are not owed to any other bank within the system. Thus,
at time 0, bank i has a capital of xi + li + 1> si − p̄i . This is depicted in Figure 3.1.
Banking Book t = 0
Assets
Liabilities
Liquid
xi
Total
p̄i
Illiquid
(Marketable)
1> si

Banking Book t = 1
Assets
Liabilities
Liquid
xi
Total
q̄ > γi
p̄i
Illiquid
(Marketable)
q > (si − γi )
Capital
Illiquid
xi + li + q̄ > γi
(Nonmarketable) +q > [si − γi ]
li
−p̄i

Capital
x
+
li + 1> si
i
Illiquid
−p̄i
(Nonmarketable)
li

Figure 3.1: Stylized banking book for a firm before and after liquidation updates for bank i
In terms of vector notation, at time t = 0, the banks are holding an amount x ∈ Rn+ of
shares of
liquid assets, l ∈ Rn+ shares of non-marketable illiquid assets, S = (sik ) ∈ Rn×m
+
n
marketable illquid assets and an amount p̄ ∈ R+ in liabilities.
The Basel Regulation mandates the use of a risk-weighted capital ratio to assess the solvency
of banks. The risk-weighted capital ratio is defined as
Risk-weighted capital ratio =

Total Capital
Risk-Weighted Assets

The determination of the risk-weights of different assets requires the consideration of a
number of complex factors. In this case, I make the assumption that these risk-weights are
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known to me and given by 0 for the liquid asset and αk for k = 1, ..., m for the marketable
illiquid assets for all the banks. For the non-marketable asset I let the risk-weight to be
dependent on each bank and let αli be the risk-weight for bank i. Let me define A ≡
diag(α1 , ..., αm ).
Thus at time t = 0, the risk-weighted capital ratio θi of bank i is given by
θi =

xi + li + 1> si − pi
1> Asi + αli li

(3.1)

According to banking regulations, banks are required to maintain a minimum capital ratio
θmin e.g. 8% in Basel III regulations. I assume that at t = 0, all banks comply with this
regulatory constraint i.e. θi ≥ θmin for all i ∈ N .

3.2.2

Leverage targeting and asset liquidation

At time t = 0+ , the system is subject to an exogenous shock. This might be
(i) shock in prices, where the prices of any or all of the assets are hit as assumed in the
standard literature viz. [26, 71, 43].
(ii) shock in the risk-weight, where the risk-weight of an asset jumps due to a credit
downgrade.
Depending on the size of the shock and the state of the balance-sheet at t = 0, the capital
ratio of some banks may fall below the regulatory minimum θmin . In this situation, banks
typically have two options:
(i) issue new stocks
(ii) sell existing assets
At the time of a crisis, issuing new stocks might not be feasible. In this situation, banks will
be forced to liquidate assets to meet the regulatory constraint and might set off fire sale.
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Assumption 3.2.1. Banks will sell assets to restore their risk-weighted capital ratio to θmin .
This practice, known as leverage-targeting, is in line with the existing literature [26, 71, 43,
53] as well as empirical evidence [3].
To effectively model the fire sale, I need to consider how prices vary with the amount of
assets that need to be liquidated. In line with the systemic risk literature I assume that
the current price of the marketable illiquid assets is given by the current inverse demand
m
m
function F : Rm
+ 7→ [0, 1] ⊂ R+ .
In a break with the existing literature on static fire sale models ([26, 54, 51, 7, 33, 38, 43,
71]), I consider a second notion of pricing: the volume weighted average price (VWAP) of
liquidation. This is the average over all liquidation prices where the average is taken over the
total volume sold. This average liquidation price is given by the volume weighted average
m
m
inverse demand function F̄ : Rm
+ 7→ [0, 1] ⊂ R+ . Intuitively, the average liquidation price
encodes the notion that the price of the assets that have already been sold will be higher
than the current price of the assets. Thus considering these two separate prices makes this
model more realistic and enables me to encode a dynamic notion which is absent in the
existing literature. This is further discussed in Remark 3.2.4.
m
⊂ Rm
Assumption 3.2.2. The current inverse demand function F : Rm
+ and
+ 7→ [0, 1]
m
m
m
the average inverse demand function F̄ : R+ 7→ [0, 1] ⊂ R+ are continuous and nonincreasing. Further the components of the inverse-demand functions are independent i.e.
F (s) = [F1 (s1 ) F2 (s2 ) ... Fm (sm )]> and F̄ (s) = [F̄1 (s1 ) F̄2 (s2 ) ... F̄m (sm )]> .

The assumption about continuity and monotonicity is standard and intuitive. The componentwise assumption implies that there are no cross-impacts, i.e., the sale of one asset does not
directly affect the prices of other assets. I make this assumption for mathematical and
computational simplicity. It should be noted that I do not require an an explicit assumption on the linearity of the inverse demand function, in contrast to existing literature such
as [26, 43, 38, 71]. Under this assumption, the current and the average inverse demand
functions are related by the following equation:
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1
F̄k (sk ) =
sk

sk

Z

Fk (ak )dak ∀k

(3.2)

0

Since I am dealing with multiple assets, the banks will often have a number of ways in which
they can liquidate the assets. I encode this strategic component in my model through the
liquidation function γ. Let me define D = {q × q̄ ∈ [0, 1]2m |q̄ ≥ q}. Then the liquidation
function is given by γik : D 7→ R+ and defined as the number of units of asset k = 1, 2, ..., m
that firm i = 1, 2, ..., n wishes to sell. For a further discussion on liquidation function see
[51]. In the standard literature on fire sale due to regulatory requirements, this strategic
component does not present itself in single asset models [26] or the banks are assumed to
follow a particular strategy, e.g., proportional liquidation [71, 43, 38].
Remark 3.2.3. It might be entirely possible that even when a bank liquidates all its assets
it cannot restore its capital ratio to θmin . In this situation I will assume that such a bank is
insolvent and costlessly liquidated at t = 1 along the lines of [26].
Given a marked-to-market average liquidation price q̄ ∈ Rm
+ and current liquidation price
q ∈ Rm
+ , the liquidation is given by γ(q, q̄) and the capital of bank i is given by xi + li +
>
q̄ γi + q > [si − γi ] − p̄i . The risk-weighted capital ratio for bank i is then given by
xi + li + q̄ > γi + q > [si − γi ] − p̄i
q > A[si − γi ] + αli li
This situation is depicted in Figure 3.1. If bank i needs to perform liquidation but is solvent,
by Assumption(3.2.1) it will perform liquidation γi such that
xi + li + q̄ > γi + q > [si − γi ] − p̄i
= θmin
q > A[si − γi ] + αli li

(3.3)

Let me define shortfall of bank i as hi ≡ p̄i − xi − (1 − θmin αli )li for i = 1, 2, .., n. Then (3.3)
can be reformulated as,
>
q̄ > γi + q > [I − θmin A](si − γi ) = h+
i ∧ q̄ si
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(3.4)

I refer to (3.4) as the liquidation condition. It encodes the liquidation constraint for bank i
when bank i is solvent but needs to perform some liquidation.
More generally, a bank i ∈ N can belong to any of the following three mutually exclusive
and exhaustive sets:
• Solvent and do not need to liquidate: Let me denote this set by S(q, q̄). In this case
γi = 0 and hi ≤ q > [I − θmin A]si .
• Solvent but needs to liquidate: Let me denote this set by L(q, q̄). This is characterized
by q > [I − θmin A]si < hi < q̄ > si .
• Defaults: Let me denote this set by D(q, q̄). In this case γi = si and hi ≥ q̄ > si .
To reflect these three possible states of a bank, I can rewrite (3.4) as the general liquidation
condition
>
q̄ > γi + q > [I − θmin A](si − γi ) = h+
i ∧ q̄ si

(3.5)

Equation (3.5) states that the number of units liquidated by a bank is either enough to meet
the risk-weighted capital requirement or all assets are liquidated. Additionally, it ensures
that the banks are adhering to the principle of leverage targeting i.e. no bank is selling more
than it is necessary to meet the threshold θmin . This is similar to the liquidity constraint
used in [51, 54].
Remark 3.2.4. In Equation 3.3, while computing the capital of bank i, the proceeds from
liquidation is given by q̄ > γi . This is in contrast to existing literature in fire sale (e.g [26,
54]) where no distinction is made between liquidation price and current price and thus the
proceeds would be computed as q > γi . This is a more realistic scenario and it offers more
favourable conditions to analyze the uniqueness of solutions (as discussed in the succeeding
section).
Assumption 3.2.5. αk θmin < 1 for k = 1, 2, .., m.
If αk θmin ≥ 1 for any k, then the setting of this chapter implies that as price drops in that
asset, the bank will always satisfy the capital regulation which is opposite to the scenario
that I am modeling. For further discussion see Remark 2.2 of [53].
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3.2.3

Fixed point formulation

Equation (3.5) gives the liquidation that bank i performs under a given marked-to-market
price(q, q̄). However this liquidation might result in further price depreciation which necessitates the consideration of a different γi . Thus this situation can be accurately modeled
using a fixed point equation, as is common in the systemic risk literature.
Pn
Let me define Γ(q, q̄) ∈ Rm
+ as the vector of total illiquid assets sold i.e Γk (q, q̄) =
i=1 γik (q, q̄)
for k = 1, 2, .., m. Then the equilibrium price is defined by the function Φ : [0, 1]m ×[0, 1]m 7→
[0, 1]m × [0, 1]m where

(3.6)

Φ(q, q̄) = (F > (Γ(q, q̄)), F̄ > (Γ(q, q̄)))>
and γi (q, q̄) must satisfy the liquidation condition (3.5) for i = 1, 2, .., n.

The value of the equilibrium liquidation price q̄ ∗ ∈ [0, 1] and current price q ∗ ∈ [0, 1] is given
by the fixed point of Φ defined in Equation (3.6), i.e.
(q ∗ , q̄ ∗ ) = Φ(q ∗ , q̄ ∗ )

3.3

Existence and uniqueness

In this section, I develop conditions for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium prices
described by the fixed point equation (3.6). In the existing literature on price-mediated
contagion due to regulatory requirements, existence of solutions has been explored for the
one asset case in [26] and for the multi-asset case in [54]. However in these works, uniqueness
has not been explored.

3.3.1

Existence and uniqueness theorems

Theorem 3.3.1. Consider the general setting as described above. Let M ≥
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Pn

i=1

si :

(i) If the liquidation function γ is jointly continuous in (q, q̄), there exists an equilibrium
price (q ∗ , q̄ ∗ ).
(ii) If the liquidation function γ is non-increasing in (q, q̄), there exists a greatest and least
equilibrium price (q ↑ , q̄ ↑ ) ≥ (q ↓ , q̄ ↓ ).
(iii) If additionally, F̄ (Γ)> Γ + F (Γ)> [I − θmin A](M − Γ) is strictly increasing in Γ, then
there exists a unique equilibrium price (q ∗ , q̄ ∗ ).
Proof.

(i) This is a straight-forward application of Brouwer fixed point theorem.

(ii) This is a straight-forward application of Tarski fixed point theorem.
(iii) As discussed in the preceding section, a bank i can belong to any of the following three
mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets:
• S(q, q̄) = {i ∈ N |hi ≤ q > [I − θmin A]si }.
• L(q, q̄) = {i ∈ N |q > [I − θmin A]si < hi < q̄ > si }.
• D(q, q̄) = {i ∈ N |hi ≥ q̄ > si }.
Then using the liquidation condition (3.5) and under (q ∗ , q̄ ∗ ),



q ∗> [I − θmin A]si


q̄ ∗> γi (q ∗ , q̄ ∗ ) + q ∗> [I − θmin A](si − γi (q ∗ , q̄ ∗ )) = hi



q̄ ∗> s
i

if i ∈ S(q ∗ , q̄ ∗ )
if i ∈ L(q ∗ , q̄ ∗ )
if i ∈ D(q ∗ , q̄ ∗ )

Using (ii), there exists a greatest and least clearing price (q ↑ , q̄ ↑ ) ≥ (q ↓ , q̄ ↓ ). Further
from (ii), Γ is non-increasing in (q, q̄), hence Γ↑ = Γ(q ↑ , q̄ ↑ )) ≤ Γ(q ↓ , q̄ ↓ )) = Γ↓ .
Since, (q ↑ , q̄ ↑ ) ≥ (q ↓ , q̄ ↓ ), ∃k ∈ {1, 2, .., m} such that qk↑ > qk↓ or q̄k↑ > q̄k↓ . Now (q ↑ , q̄ ↑ )
and (q ↓ , q̄ ↓ ) are equilibrium solutions, so using (iii),
>

>

0 ≥ [q̄ ↑> Γ↑ + q ↑ [I − θmin A](M − Γ↑ )] − [q̄ ↓> Γ↓ + q ↓ [I − θmin A](M − Γ↓ )]
n
n
X
X
↑> ↑
↑>
↑
↓> ↓
↓>
≥ [q̄ Γ + q [I − θmin A](
si − Γ )] − [q̄ Γ + q [I − θmin A](
si − Γ↓ )]
i=1

i=1
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X

=

i∈D↑ ∩D↓

X

+

X

(q̄ ↑ − q̄ ↓ )> si +

i∈L↑ ∩D↓

X

(hi − hi ) +

i∈L↑ ∩L↓

i∈S ↑ ∩L↓

(hi − q̄ ↓> si ) +

X

(q ↑ [I − θmin A] − q̄ ↓ )> si

i∈S ↑ ∩D↓

(q̄ ↑> [I − θmin A]si − hi ) +

X

(q ↑ − q ↓ )T [I − θmin A]si

i∈S ↑ ∩S ↓

>0
This is a contradiction.

Remark 3.3.2. The adoption of the average liquidation price in this framework, besides
providing a more realistic financial framework, offers significant mathematical advantages,
particularly in the analysis of uniqueness as is evident from the preceding theorem.
Remark 3.3.3. I want to point out the similarity in the uniqueness condition presented in
this work to one of the very few uniqueness result in the fire sale literature as presented in
[7]. In that paper, the analysis was restricted to the sale of a single asset to satisfy short
term interbank liabilities. Considering the same setting, my uniqueness condition is exactly
similar to Assumption (iii) on the inverse demand function in [7].
Theorem 3.3.1 provides a condition for the uniqueness of solution for an equilibrium price
(q ∗ , q̄ ∗ ) in terms of the inverse demand function F . However this condition also depends on
the risk-weight α. I can make this dependence explicit by stating the uniqueness condition
in terms of the inverse demand function F and the risk-weight α along the lines of [53]. This
is described in the following corollary.
(Mk −Γk )Fk0 (Γk )
be nonFk (Γk )
0
Mk Fk (0)
1
(− θmin
, 1 ) ∀ k
1−Mk Fk0 (0) θmin

Corollary 3.3.4. Let the inverse demand function F be such that
decreasing in Γk ∀ Γk ∈ [0, Mk ] for any asset k = 1, 2, .., m. If αk ∈
then there exists a unique equilibrium price (q ∗ , q̄ ∗ ).
Proof. The uniqueness condition in Theorem 3.3.1 requires that:
Pm

k=1

Γk F¯k (Γk ) +

Pm

k=1 (Mk

− Γk )(1 − αk θmin )Fk (Γk ) is increasing in Γk for k = 1, 2, .., m.

Taking partial derivative of the above expression with respect to Γk , I have for k = 1, 2, .., m,
αk > −

(Mk − Γk )Fk0 (Γk )
∀ Γk ∈ [0, Mk ]
θmin Fk (Γk ) − (Mk − Γk )Fk0 (Γk )
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1

(3.7)

.
Then the condition that

(Mk −Γk )Fk0 (Γk )
Fk (Γk )

is non-decreasing in Γk ∀ Γk ∈ [0, Mk ] is a sufficient
(M −Γ )F 0 (Γ )

k
k
k
1
k
is noncondition to ensure that the right-hand side of (3.7) i.e. − θmin
Fk (Γk )−(Mk −Γk )Fk0 (Γk )
increasing in Γk ∀ Γk ∈ [0, Mk ] for k = 1, 2, ..., m.

Thus to ensure (3.7), I require αk to satisfy the inequality at Γk = 0. Using this fact and
Assumption 3.2.5, uniqueness is ensured if

αk ∈



Mk Fk0 (0)
1 
−
,
∀ k
θmin 1 − Mk Fk0 (0) θmin
1

(3.8)

.
Remark 3.3.5. Proposition 3.3.4 is a sufficient condition for Theorem 3.3.1, and hence
represents a stronger condition than Theorem 3.3.1. However, Proposition 3.3.4 is easier to
deal with in terms of the analysis of practical inverse demand functions and provides clearer
financial interpretations.
Remark 3.3.6. Proposition 3.3.4 requires the exact same condition on the risk-weight α
and the inverse demand function F for uniqueness as Lemma 3.11 of [53] which deals with
price-mediated contagion for multiple assets in a continuous time setting.
Remark 3.3.7. The assumed monotonicity property in Proposition 3.3.4 implies that for
every illiquid asset, the firm need not increase the speed it is selling the asset solely to
counteract its own market impacts. For a further discussion on this see Remark 3.5 of [53].
Remark 3.3.8. The bound on α as given by (3.8) can be viewed as a method to calibrate
the risk-weight properly in terms of the illiquidity of the asset (as measured by the derivative
of the inverse demand function). This is similar to the notion introduced in [53].
Example 3.3.9. The monotonicity condition on F in Proposition 3.10 is readily satisfied
by the linear inverse demand function F (Γ) = 1 − βΓ with β ∈ [0, M1 ) and the exponential
inverse demand function F (Γ) = exp(−βΓ) with β > 0. The risk-weight α in these cases
can be readily calibrated using (3.8).
Remark 3.3.10. In the existing literature on fire sale, the linear price impact has been
mostly used ([71, 26, 38, 43]). Although such inverse demand functions are relatively easier
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to calibrate, those represent very strong assumptions on the system behavior. However in
this work I can work with more general inverse demand functions that satisfy the conditions
of Theorem 3.3.1 or Corollary 3.3.4.

3.3.2

Examples

In this subsection, I consider several examples of liquidation functions and explore their
properties.

One Asset:
My first example is the case with one asset, i.e. m = 1. This has been explored in details in
[26]. The liquidation function γ, for m = 1 is entirely decided by the liquidation condition
(3.5). In this case, I have

γi (q, q̄) =

 h − q(1 − αθ )s +
i
min i
∧ si
q̄ − (1 − αθmin )q

Proposition 3.3.11. γi (q, q̄) is continuous and non-increasing in (q, q̄).
Proof. The proof of continuity is trivial. γi (q, q̄) is clearly non-increasing in q̄.
For the case where γi = si or γi = 0,
∂γi (q, q̄)
≡0
∂q
For the case where 0 < γi < si ,
∂γi (q, q̄)
(hi − q̄si )(1 − αθmin )
=
∂q
(q̄ − (1 − αθmin )q)2
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(3.9)

(q,q̄)
≥ 0 is possible only if hi ≥ q̄si . In this case bank i will default i.e. γi = si .
Thus ∂γi∂q
(q,q̄)
Hence in this case, ∂γi∂q
= 0.

Hence, γi (q, q̄) is non-increasing in q.

Proportional Liquidation:
My second example is Proportional Liquidation where the banks liquidate the assets in
proportion to the initial holding i.e. for each bank i, and j = 1, 2, ..m, k = 1, 2, ..., m.
sij
γij (q, q̄)
=
γik (q, q̄)
sik

(3.10)

Proportional liquidation has been widely explored in the existing literature (e.g. [43, 71, 38])
for the analysis of fire sale. For each bank, if I consider the first asset to be the numeriare
I can express si in terms of si1 and the ratios of the amount of shares in the other assets to
the first asset. In case some bank is holding none of asset 1, I can use the second asset as
my numeriare.
Then for i = 1, 2, .., n,
ri ≡ [ri1 ri2 ri3 ....]> where rik ≡

sik
si1

for k = 1, 2, .., m.

Then using (3.10) and the definition of ri , for i = 1, 2, ..n,
γi ≡ γi1 [ri1 ri2 ri3 ....]>

(3.11)

Then the liquidation condition Equation (3.5) reduces to

γi1 =

 h − q > [I − θ A]s +
i
min
i
∧ si1
(q̄ − [I − θmin A]q)> ri )
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(3.12)

From γi1 I can easily recover γi using (3.11).
Proposition 3.3.12. γi (q, q̄) is continuous and non-increasing in (q, q̄).
Proof. The proof of continuity is trivial. γi1 (q, q̄) and hence γi (q, q̄) is clearly non-increasing
in q̄.
For the case where γi = si or γi = 0, for any asset k = 1, 2, .., m I have
∂γi1 (q, q̄)
≡0
∂qk
For the case where 0 < γi < si ,

(rik hi − sik q̄ > ri ) + (sik q > [I − θmin A]ri − rik q > [I − θmin A]si )
∂γi1 (q, q̄)
=
∂qk
((q̄ − [I − θmin A]q)> ri )2
Now, sik ri ≡ rik si . Hence,
∂γi1 (q, q̄)
rik (hi − q̄ > si )(1 − αk θmin )
=
∂qk
((q̄ − [I − θmin A]q)> ri )2
Thus ∂γi1∂q(q,q̄)
≥ 0 is possible only if hi ≥ q̄ > si . In this case bank i will default i.e. γi = si .
k
= 0. This argument holds for k = 1, 2, ..., m.
Hence in this case, ∂γi1∂q(q,q̄)
k
Hence, γi (q, q̄) is non-increasing in q.

Utility Maximizing:
My final example is the Utility Maximizing liquidation function. In this case each bank i
decides on its liquidation strategy γi to maximize its utility ui . This represents a realistic
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scenario as a bank can choose an appropriate utility representing its priorities as opposed to
a mechanically imposed condition. Thus γi is decided by the following optimization problem:
argmaxγi ui (γi )
s.t.

(3.13)

γi ∈ [0, si ]
q̄ > γi + q > [I − θmin A](si − γi ) ≥ hi

Assumption 3.3.13. ui (γi ) is strictly concave in γi .
Example 3.3.14. An example of a feasible utility function is the Cobb-Douglas utility.
Q
tk
Thus ui (γi ) = m
where 0 < tk < 1.
k=1 (sik − γik )
Let me denote the constraint set in (3.13) as S(q, q̄) and let γi∗ (q, q̄) to be the solution to
(3.13).
Proposition 3.3.15.

(i) (3.13) admits a unique solution.

(ii) γ ∗ (q, q̄) is continuous in (q, q̄).
Proof. (i) ui (γi ) is strictly concave in γi . Further the constraints are linear in γi . Hence
there is a unique solution to (3.13).
(ii) This follows from Berge Maximum Principle.

3.4

Sensitivity analysis

In this section, I perform sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium prices with respect to the
system parameters. This is a critical exercise as the exact system parameters are often
unknown and the results depend on how these parameters are calibrated. I characterize
the sensitivity analysis as a fixed point problem and prove the existence and uniqueness of
the solution to this problem. Sensitivity analysis for systems with debt linkages has been
studied in [82, 55]. However, as far as I am aware, this work is the the first to attempt such
an analysis in the context of fire sale.
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3.4.1

Fixed point formulation

I want to start off by considering the sensitivity of the equilibrium prices with respect to the
risk-weights αk . Later, I show that the framework that I develop in this exercise is generally
applicable to sensitivity analysis with respect to the other parameters as well.
Considering (3.6) and using the chain rule of differentiation, at equilibrium I have,
∂ q̄j (α)
∂ F̄j (Γj (q̄(α), q(α), α))
=
∂αk
∂αk
=
where F̄j0 =
equilibrium,

F̄j0 ((∇q̄ Γj )> ∇αk q̄(α)

∂ F̄j
,
∂Γj

∂Γ

∇q̄ Γj = [ ∂ q¯1j

∂Γj
∂ q¯2

+

(3.14)
F̄j0 (∇q Γj )> ∇αk q(α)

+

∂ q¯1
...]> and ∇αk q̄ = [ ∂α
k

F̄j0 (∇α Γj )> (∇αk α)

∂ q¯1
∂αk

...]> . In a similar way, at

∂qj (α)
∂Fj (Γj (q̄(α), q(α), α))
=
∂αk
∂αk
=

Fj0 ((∇q̄ Γj )> ∇αk q̄(α)

+

(3.15)
Fj0 (∇q Γj )> ∇αk q(α)

+

Fj0 (∇α Γj )> (∇αk α)

∂ q̄ (α)

j
is in both sides of the equation. A similar observation can
From (3.14), I note that ∂α
k
∂qj (α)
be made about ∂αk in (3.15). Hence the sensitivity analysis may be characterized using a
fixed point equation in a similar way as [55]. In particular, considering the same argument
for j = 1, 2, ..., m, the sensitivity of qj and q̄j with respect to αk can be considered as the
∂ q̄j (α)
∂qj (α)
and ∂α
for j = 1, 2, .., m.
solution set of a system of joint fixed point equations in ∂α
k
k
Note that with some minor readjustment this set of 2m joint fixed point equations can be
∂qj (α)
∂ q̄j (α)
described by the following set of 2m linear equations in ∂α
and ∂α
for j = 1, 2, .., m.
k
k

0 1
0 1
1 − F¯1 ∂Γ
−F¯1 ∂Γ
∂ q̄1
∂ q̄2

0 2
2
¯
 −F¯2 0 ∂Γ
1 − F2 ∂Γ
∂ q̄1
∂ q̄2


...
...


1
1
 −F1 0 ∂Γ
−F2 0 ∂Γ
∂ q̄1
∂ q̄2


...
...

0 ∂Γm
m
−Fm ∂ q̄1 −Fm 0 ∂Γ
∂ q̄2



0

1
... −F¯1 ∂Γ
∂q1
0
... −F¯2 ∂Γ2

∂q2

...
...

...
...
...
0 ∂Γ1
... 1 − F1 ∂q1 ...
...
...
...
0 ∂Γm
... −Fm ∂q1 ...

 
  0

0 ∂Γ1
∂ q̄1
¯1 ∂Γ1
−F¯1 ∂q
F
∂αk
m
k
 ¯ 0 ∂α

0 ∂Γ1   ∂ q̄2 
∂Γ2 
¯



−F2 ∂qm   ∂αk  
F
2
∂αk 

  ...   ... 
...
 
 

·  ∂q1  =  0 ∂Γ1 
0 ∂Γ1 




−F1 ∂qm   ∂αk   F1 ∂αk 

  ...   ... 
...
 
 

∂qm
0 ∂Γm
0 ∂Γm
Fm ∂αk
1 − Fm ∂qm
∂αk
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(3.16)

In (3.16), I consider the sensitivity of the prices q and q̄ with respect to the risk-weight αk .
This can be similarly done for all the risk-weights k = 1, 2, .., m.
More generally, I can consider the sensitivity of the prices with respect to other system
parameters viz. the shortfall of the banks hi for i = 1, 2, .., n as well as the regulatory
threshold θmin . In fact, the sensitivity analysis with respect to θmin allows me to consider
an interesting application in evaluating the cost of regulation which is discussed later. In a
similar way as the sensitivity analysis with respect to the risk-weights, the sensitivity with
respect to other parameters can be characterized by a system of linear equations. I consider
the general case in the following equation.

0 1
0 1
−F¯1 ∂Γ
1 − F¯1 ∂Γ
∂ q̄1
∂ q̄2

0 ∂Γ2
2
¯
¯
 −F2 ∂ q̄ 1 − F2 0 ∂Γ
∂ q̄2
1


...
...


1
1
 −F1 0 ∂Γ
−F2 0 ∂Γ
∂ q̄1
∂ q̄2


...
...

0 ∂Γm
m
−Fm ∂ q̄1 −Fm 0 ∂Γ
∂ q̄2



0

1
... −F¯1 ∂Γ
∂q1
0
... −F¯2 ∂Γ2

∂q2

...
...

...
...
...
1
... 1 − F1 0 ∂Γ
...
∂q1
...
...
...
0 ∂Γm
... −Fm ∂q1 ...

 
  0

0 ∂Γ1
∂ q̄1
¯1 ∂Γ1
F
−F¯1 ∂q
∂#
∂#
m


0 ∂Γ1   ∂ q̄2 
2 
  ∂#   F¯2 0 ∂Γ
−F¯2 ∂q
∂# 
m
 
 
  ...   ... 
...
 
 

·  ∂q1  =  0 ∂Γ1 
0 ∂Γ1 

 

−F1 ∂qm 
  ∂#   F1 ∂# 





...
  ...   ... 
∂qm
m
m
1 − Fm 0 ∂Γ
Fm 0 ∂Γ
∂qm
∂#
∂#

where # ∈ {h1 , h2 , ..., hn , θmin , α1 , ..., αm }.

Let me define
0 1
0 1
1 − F¯1 ∂Γ
−F¯1 ∂Γ
∂ q̄1
∂ q̄2

2
¯2 0 ∂Γ2
 −F¯2 0 ∂Γ
1
−
F
∂ q̄1
∂ q̄2


...
...

I −W =
0
∂Γ
1
1
 −F1 ∂ q̄
−F2 0 ∂Γ
∂ q̄2
1


...
...

0 ∂Γm
m
−Fm ∂ q̄1 −Fm 0 ∂Γ
∂ q̄2
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0

1
... −F¯1 ∂Γ
∂q1
0
... −F¯2 ∂Γ2

∂q2

...
...

...
...
...
0 ∂Γ1
... 1 − F1 ∂q1 ...
...
...
...
0 ∂Γm
... −Fm ∂q1 ...


0 ∂Γ1
−F¯1 ∂q
m
0 ∂Γ1 

−F¯2 ∂q
m


...

0 ∂Γ1 
−F1 ∂qm 


...

0 ∂Γm
1 − Fm ∂qm

(3.17)

From (3.17), I note that regardless of the parameter with respect to which I perform the
analysis, the matrix I − W will remain same. I have to only vary the right hand side of the
equation accordingly. The existence and uniqueness of a solution for the sensitivity of the
prices is thus entirely decided by the invertibility of the matrix I − W .
Proposition 3.4.1. Consider the setting of Theorem 3.3.1 (iii). If additionally, γ is strictly
decreasing in (q, q̄) then I − W is invertible.
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.
Thus under the condition of the previous proposition, I − W is invertible and (3.17) admits
a unique solution given by


0 1
F¯1 ∂Γ
∂#


 ¯ 0 ∂Γ



 F2 ∂#2 




 ... 
 ... 




 ∂q1  = (I-W)−1 ·  0 ∂Γ1 
 ∂# 
 F1 ∂# 




 ... 
 ... 




∂qm
0 ∂Γm
Fm ∂#
∂#


∂ q̄1
∂#
∂ q̄2
∂#



3.4.2



Cost of regulation

A particularly interesting application of the sensitivity analysis is in the development of a
scheme for computing the cost of regulation incurred by each bank. This is based on the
idea that a tightened regulatory threshold θmin will result in an increased loss for a bank
and hence computing the loss incurred for a marginal increase in the regulatory threshold
gives a measure of the regulatory cost for a bank. The loss incurred, and hence the cost of
regulation, may be quantified in two different ways:
• Cost of regulation based on realized loss: Let me consider the situation where under
the current regulatory regime, a bank has to liquidate a part of its assets. Then as
the threshold θmin increases, the bank has to liquidate more of its assets. Then I can
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use the marginal change in liquidation loss for a marginal change in θmin to quantify
the cost of regulation. Let (q ∗ , q̄ ∗ ) be the equilibrium pricing vectors and let γi ∗ be the
liquidation strategy of bank i under the current θmin . Mathematically, for bank i, I
represent cost of regulation based on realized loss (CRLi ) as
CRLi =

∂(1 − q̄ ∗ )> γi∗
∂θmin

(3.18)

∗
∗
P
∂(1−q̄ ∗ )> γ ∗
∗ ∂γik
∗ ∂ q̄k
For computation purposes, ∂θmin i = m
k=1 ((1 − q̄k ) ∂θmin − γik ∂θmin ).
∗
∂ q̄k∗
∂γik
for
k
=
1,
2,
..,
m
can
be
obtained
from
(3.17)
and
depends on the chosen
∂θmin
∂θmin
liquidation function. I note that for the situation where banks are not liquidating any
assets, increasing θmin will not result in increased liquidation losses and indeed in such
instances CRLi will be equal to 0.

• Cost of regulation based on marked to market impact: As I noted in the earlier paragraph, when banks are not liquidating any asset, increasing θmin will not result in
increased liquidation losses. However, increasing θmin might cause some other bank to
liquidate more and hence depreciate the price. As banks hold overlapping portfolios
this causes impacts globally to all other banks due to marked-to-market accounting,
even if they are not performing direct liquidation. Mathematically, for bank i, I represent cost of regulation based on marked-to-market impact (CM Ii ) as
∂(xi + li + q¯∗ > γi∗ + q ∗> [si − γi∗ ] − p̄i )
CM Ii = −
∂θmin

(3.19)

Thus for bank i, CM Ii is the negative of the partial derivative of the equity of bank i
with respect to θmin . Hence this will capture the losses that are not reflected in CRLi .
The computation can be done in a similar fashion as CRLi . I note that in the situation,
where none of the banks need to liquidate any of their assets, increasing θmin will not
result in further price depreciation and hence marked-to-market losses. Hence in that
case for all banks CM Ii = 0.
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3.5

Case studies

In this section I consider three case studies to discuss the implications of my model. For
simplicity, each of the case studies is undertaken with a linear inverse demand function. I
restrict the risk-weight α to the bound discussed in (3.8). The three case studies are as
follows:
(i) First, I consider the case where all banks are symmetric, i.e., their assets and liabilities
are exactly similar. In this case, I am able to provide an analytical solution to the
equilibrium price problem. I use this framework to explore the effect of splitting up a
bank into smaller, symmetric components.
(ii) I consider a two asset two bank system and explore the implications of diversification
under different liquidation functions.
(iii) Finally, I consider a system of six large banks participating in the 2015 CCAR stress
test as considered in [26]. I use this data to study the cost of regulation (as discussed
in Section 3.4.2).

3.5.1

Symmetrical system

Pricing Equilibrium:
The simplest example to consider is the case for symmetrical banks i.e. where the assets and
liabilities of the banks are exactly similar (e.g. [5, 23]). In this case I am able to provide an
analytical solution to the pricing problem.
Here I consider a system of n symmetrical banks i.e. xi = x, p̄i = p̄, li = l for all i = 1, 2, ..n.
Then the shortfall hi = h = p̄ − x − (1 − θmin αl )l for all i. Also let me consider only one
marketable asset and let each bank has s shares of this asset. So M = ns.
If any bank has to sell its asset, then all bank will sell the same amount of assets by symmetry.
Let this amount be γ ∈ [0, s]. Then Γ = nγ.
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I shall consider a linear inverse demand function F (Γ) = 1 − 2βΓ for Γ ∈ [0, M ]. Hence
1
F̄ (Γ) = 1 − βΓ for Γ ∈ [0, M ]. In this example, I let β ∈ (0, 2M
). Using (3.8), I restrict the
risk-weight to
 1
2βM
1 
α∈
,
.
(3.20)
θmin 1 + 2βM θmin
.
Then at equilibrium I have,

q = 1 − 2βnγ

(3.21)

q̄ = 1 − βnγ
 h − q(1 − αθ )s +
min
γ=
∧s
q̄ − (1 − αθmin )q

(3.22)
(3.23)

There are three possible scenarios:
• The banks are solvent and do not need to liquidate. This happens if and only if
h − q(1 − αθmin )s ≤ 0 i.e. γ = 0 if h ≤ (1 − αθmin )s.
• The banks are insolvent. This happens if and only if
h ≥ (1 − βM )s.

h−q(1−αθmin )s
q̄−(1−αθmin )q

≥ s i.e. γ = s if

• The banks are solvent, but liquidate some of their assets. In this case, I have the
following quadratic equation in γ.

(1 − 2αθmin )βnγ 2 + [αθmin − 2(1 − αθmin )βM ]γ − [h − (1 − αθmin )s] = 0

(3.24)

I make the observation that using (3.20), [αθmin − 2(1 − αθmin )βM ] > 0. Three cases
need to be considered:
(i) αθmin = 12 .
In this case γ =

2[h−(1−αθmin )s]
.
1−2βM
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(ii) αθmin < 21 .
Then the only root of the
√ quadratic equation (3.24) that gives a feasible solution
[−αθmin +2(1−αθmin )βM ]+ [−αθmin +2(1−αθmin )βM ]2 +4(1−2αθmin )βn[h−(1−αθmin )s]
is
.
2(1−2αθmin )βn
The other root of the quadratic equation is less than 0 and hence not feasible.
(iii) αθmin > 12 .
Then the only root of the
√ quadratic equation (3.24) that gives a feasible solution
[−αθmin +2(1−αθmin )βM ]− [−αθmin +2(1−αθmin )βM ]2 +4(1−2αθmin )βn[h−(1−αθmin )s]
.
is
2(1−2αθmin )βn
The other root of the quadratic equation is greater than s and hence not feasible.
Let T ≡ [−αθmin + 2(1 − αθmin )βM ]. Then, combining all the cases, the solution set is given
by:

γ=



0






s


 √

T 2 +4(1−2αθmin )βn[h−(1−αθmin )s]
2(1−2αθmin )βn

√


T + T 2 +4(1−2αθmin )βn[h−(1−αθmin )s]



2(1−2αθmin )βn



 2[h−(1−αθmin )s]
1−2βM
T−

if h ≤ (1 − αθmin )s
if h ≥ (1 − βM )s
if (1 − βM )s ≥ h ≥ (1 − αθmin )s, αθmin >

1
2

if (1 − βM )s ≥ h ≥ (1 − αθmin )s, αθmin <

1
2

if (1 − βM )s ≥ h ≥ (1 − αθmin )s, αθmin = 21
(3.25)

Remark 3.5.1. Using (3.20) and the fact that 2βM ≤ 1, 1 − αθmin <
the partition of h where γ = 0 and γ = s are clearly disjoint.

1
1+2βM

≤ 1 − βM , so

Remark 3.5.2. From (3.25), it is evident the strong influence that regulatory requirements
have in the liquidation process. First, it influences when the liquidation starts. Secondly
in the case where banks are forced to liquidate a part of their assets, even under the same
shortfall the precise liquidation is affected by the condition whether αθ is greater, equal or
less than 0.5.
I highlight the results obtained in this setting through a numerical example. I consider a
system with 100 banks. I assume that s = 1 and the price is given by a linear inverse demand
function with β = 0.002. For simplicity, I assume that x = 0 and l = 0. Thus the shortfall h
is only determined by the liabilities p̄. In this example I vary p̄, thus varying h. This enables
me to study the effect of the shortfall h on the price q. To study the regulatory impact on the
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Figure 3.2: Case Study 3.5.1 Effect of shortfall h on the price q in a symmetrical system
liquidation process, I consider three settings: αθ = 0.3, αθ = 0.5 and αθ = 0.7. This enables
me to contrast the setting of αθ < 0.5, αθ = 0.5 and αθ > 0.5 which becomes important
when the banks are liquidating but are not insolvent as I saw in (3.25).
The results of this exercise is shown in Figure 3.2. I start from a scenario with no fire
sale. As h increases banks are forced to liquidate some of their assets until at h = 0.8, the
banks become insolvent and the price reaches its nadir. The effect of αθ becomes evident
if I compare across the three regulatory settings. First, as discussed in Remark (3.5.2), it
influences at which h liquidations start. Secondly, it strongly influences the manner in which
the liquidation occurs which is evident from the shape of the curves at different values of
αθ. For αθ = 0.5, the curve is linear, for αθ < 0.5 I get a strictly convex curve whereas for
αθ > 0.5, I get a strictly concave curve.

Splitting into symmetrical sub components:
An interesting application of the symmetrical system is to study the effect of splitting up a
bank into smaller symmetrical components. Initially consider n = 1 and this bank has cash
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x0 , non-marketable assets l0 and liabilities p̄0 . Let the shortfall be given by h0 . The bank
has s0 = M illiquid assets.
Now let me consider the situation where this large bank has been split into n symmetric
banks. I assume that the assets and liabilities have been split equally, i.e., each bank has
0
0
0
liquid assets x1 = xn , non-marketable assets l1 = ln and liabilities p̄1 = p̄n . Thus the shortfall
0
in illiquid assets.
h1 = h0 /n. Each bank has s1 = sn = M
n
I note that αθ and βM remains constant across both cases so the partitions of h in (3.25)
corresponds to exactly same condition in either case. Further examining (3.25), I find that
0
γ 1 = γn . Then Γ1 = nγ 1 = γ 0 = Γ0 . Thus under both conditions, the prices q and q̄ are
exactly same.
Thus under the regulatory condition described in this chapter and a linear inverse demand
function, splitting up a bank into symmetrical sub components does not alter the pricing
equilibrium.

Sensitivity Analysis:
I conclude this case study with a discussion of sensitivity analysis. Similar to the equilibrium
pricing, I am able to provide an analytical solution to the sensitivity problem. In this
particular case, I consider the sensitivity analyis of the prices with respect to the risk-weight
α. Sensitivity analysis with respect to the other system parameters will follow in the exact
same manner.
Let q ∗ , q̄ ∗ be the solution to the pricing equilibrium. Under the symmetric setting, Equation
(3.16) reduces to
!

1 − F̄ 0 ∂Γ
∂ q̄

−F̄ 0 ∂Γ
∂q

−F 0 ∂Γ
∂ q̄

1 − F 0 ∂Γ
∂q

·

∂ q̄
∂α
∂q
∂α

!
=

∂Γ
F̄ 0 ∂α
∂Γ
F 0 ∂α

!

In a similar manner to the pricing problem, three cases need to be considered.

83

(3.26)

(i) q ∗ = q̄ ∗ = 1. This corresponds to the case where γ = 0. Then from (3.26),
∂q
= 0.
∂α

∂ q̄
∂α

= 0 and

(ii) q ∗ = 1 − 2βM , q̄ ∗ = 1 − βM . This corresponds to the case where γ = s. Then from
∂q
∂ q̄
= 0 and ∂α
= 0.
(3.26), ∂α
(iii) 1 − 2βM < q ∗ < q̄ ∗ < 1. This corresponds to the case where 0 < γ < s.
F 0 = −2β, F̄ 0 = −β
∂Γ
∂α

=

nq ∗ θmin (sq̄ ∗ −h)
, ∂Γ
[q̄ ∗ −(1−αθmin )q ∗ ]2 ∂q

=

n(1−αθmin )(h−sq̄ ∗ ) ∂Γ
, ∂ q̄
[q̄ ∗ −(1−αθmin )q ∗ ]2

=

−n(h−s(1−αθmin )q ∗ )
[q̄ ∗ −(1−αθmin )q ∗ ]2

Let me define
2 2
D(q, q̄) = α2 θm
q − 2αθmin q 2 + 2αθmin q q̄ − βM q̄αθmin − 2βhnαθmin + q 2 − 2q q̄ + βM q+

q̄ 2 − 2βM q̄ + βhn
Solving (3.26), I have
∂ q̄
βnq ∗ θmin (h − q̄ ∗ s)
=
∂α
D(q ∗ , q̄ ∗ )
∂q
2βnq ∗ θmin (h − q̄ ∗ s)
=
∂α
D(q ∗ , q̄ ∗ )

3.5.2

(3.27)
(3.28)

Diversity vs Diversification

In this case study, I consider a two bank (n = 2) and two asset (m = 2) system. I assume
that the banks do not hold any liquid or non-marketable asset i.e., xi = li = 0 for i = 1, 2.
I assume that both banks have liabilities p̄i = 1 and the total market capitalization of each
asset is 2, i.e., Mk = s1k + s2k = 2 for k = 1, 2.
I study the impact of diversity vs diversification by varying the composition of the illquid
assets held by each bank. I use a similar setting as [53]. I use a parameter λ ∈ [0, 2] and set
s11 = λ, s12 = M2 − λ, s21 = M1 − λ and s22 = λ. When λ = {0, 2}, the banks are holding
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non-overlapping portfolios and this corresponds to a fully diverse system. When λ = 1, the
portfolios of the banks are exactly same and this corresponds to a fully diversified system.
Due to symmetry, I will only consider λ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus as λ increases, the system moves from
fully diverse to fully diversified.
I will use the linear inverse demand function Fk = 1 − 0.2Γk for k = 1, 2. The liquidation
will depend on the choice of the liquidation function. In this example, I will explore two
such liquidation functions:
• Proportional Liquidation as discussed in Section (3.3.2).
• Utility Maximizing Liquidation as discussed in section (3.3.2). In this example, I use
the Cobb-Douglas utility i.e. ui (γi ) = (si1 − γi1 )0.5 (si2 − γi2 )0.5 for i = 1, 2.
Initially, the regulatory environment is set by θ = 0.2 and α1 = α2 = 2. Under this setting,
there is no liquidation under both Proportional and Utility Maximizing liquidation. At this
point, I assume that asset 1 has been downgraded and its risk-weight has been doubled i.e.
α1 = 4. I will consider this setting for the remainder of this example. Under this condition,
significant liquidation happens and is shown in Figure 3.3. The fact that downgrading one
asset sets off significant fire sale reinforces the crucial role played by these system parameters.
Let me first examine the case of Proportional Liquidation. From Figure 3.3, I see that the
diversification of assets improves the market capitalization till a particular peak is reached
at around λ = 0.4. Thereafter, the market capitalization decreases till it reaches its lowest
point at λ = 1 i.e. the fully diversified system. This highlights the fact that, under certain
liquidation regimes, contagion effects from holding similar portfolios can surpass the benefits
of diversification. In fact, even though the risk-weight of asset 2 has not been downgraded,
it reaches its lowest point under the fully diversified system thus highlighting cross-asset
contagion. In contrast, in the fully diverse system, the fire sale is limited to Asset 1, even
though it can be extremely significant.
Next I examine the case of Utility Maximizing liquidation function. I see that the diversification of assets does not uniformly improve market capitalization. In fact, the market
capitalization increases till λ = 0.47, starts to decrease till λ = 0.6 approximately and then
again continues to increase till it reaches its peak at λ = 1 i.e. the fully diversified system. In
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(a) Price under Proportional and Utility Maximizing Liquidation with varying diversification

(b) Market Capitalization under Proportional and
Utility Maximizing Liquidation with varying diversification

Figure 3.3: Case Study 3.5.2: Diversity vs Diversification under Proportional, Utility Maximizing and Equilibrium Liquidation
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this case, the fully diverse system corresponds to the worst case scenario in terms of market
capitalization with very significant fire sale in Asset 1. The fully diversified situation i.e.
λ = 1 corresponds to the best case in terms of market capitalization as the fire sale remain
confined to Asset 1 but the banks enjoy the stabilizing effect of a more diversified portfolio
comprising of the less risky Asset 2 which reduces the detrimental effect of the fire sale in
Asset 1.
I conclude this Case Study by comparing the situations under Proportional and Utility
Maximizing liquidation functions. The market capitalization, under the Utility Maximizing
is uniformly better under the Proportional regime. The fully diverse system, i.e. λ = 0
fares equally under both liquidation functions in terms of market capitalization with the fire
sale remaining confined to the downgraded Asset 1. In contrast, the fully diversified system
λ = 1 corresponds to the best case for the Utility Maximizing liquidation and the worst case
for Proportional liquidation in terms of market capitalization. In the Proportional case, the
fire sale spreads to Asset 2 and hence outweighs the benefits of diversification whereas in the
Utility Maximizing case the fire sale remain confined to Asset 1 thus enabling the banks to
reap the dividends of diversification. This shows that price-mediated contagion is very much
dependent on the choice of the liquidation function.

3.5.3

Cost of regulation

In this case study, I explore the cost of regulation as developed in Section 3.5.2. For this, I
use the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) 2015 data. In their website
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System reports that "The Federal Reserve
conducts the annual Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) exercise to assess
capital positions and planning practices of large firms consistent with Regulation YY (12
CFR part 252) and the capital plan rule (12 CFR 225.8)". For a detailed discussion on
CCAR see [26]. For this case study, I consider the six Global Systemically Important Banks
(GSIBs) with large trading operations viz. Bank of America, Citigroup, The Goldman Sachs,
JP Morgan Chase Co., Morgan Stanley and Wells Fargo Company along the lines of [26].
The data for these organizations is shown in Table 3.1 which has been replicated from Table
7 and an unnumbered table titled "Calibrated quantities (in billion)" from Page 67 of [26].
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Banks

Total Capital

Bank of America
Citigroup
The Goldman Sachs
JP Morgan Chase & Co
Morgan Stanley
Wells Fargo & Company

Total Assets

161.623
165.454
90.978
206.594
74.972
192.900

2104.534
1842.181
856.240
2572.274
801.510
1687.155

V T rad

V Bank

565.20
596.90
473.97
857.40
430.72
355.95

1400.70
1213.17
324.69
1687.90
349.40
1311.61

RW AT rad
279.40
203.50
335.91
313.40
204.04
130.24

RW ABank
1185.60
1089.10
234.50
1305.60
251.98
1115.26

Table 3.1: Assets (in billion of dollars) for the six banks under consideration in Case Study
3.5.3
I calibrate the system parameters using the data in Table 3.1. For each bank i, I set
p̄i = Total Assets − Total Capital
xi = Total Assets − V T rad − V Bank
li = V Bank
αli =

RW ABank
V Bank

For calibrating s, I make use of the risk-weights for commonly traded assets. I assume that
there are m = 16 illiquid marketable asset and choose α for these 16 assets. This is shown in
Table 3.2. I choose assets with a wide array of risk-weights. I note that the purpose of this
calibration is to provide a demonstrative data set for the case study. An accurate calibration
of the financial system is an interesting problem in itself and beyond the scope of the current
work.
Asset

1

2

3

4

5

α

0.07

0.08

0.1

0.12

0.15

6

7

0.18 0.2

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

0.25

0.35

0.5

0.6

0.75

1

2.5

4.25

6.5

Table 3.2: Risk-weight α for the assets in Case Study 3.5.3

For each bank i, the individual portfolio si is chosen by using the following optimization
problem
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min ||si ||2
s.t.

si ≥ 0
m
X
sik = ViT rad
k=1
m
X

αk sik = RW ATi rad

k=1

I consider θmin = 0.08 in accordance with Basel III norms. Under the setting considered I
find that the banks do not need to liquidate and hence no fire sale occurs. For demonstrative
purposes, I consider a shock of 8% to the non-marketable illquid asset li of each bank. Under
this stress regime, I find that four banks: Citigroup, The Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley
and Wells Fargo Company do not need to perform any liquidation. JP Morgan Chase and
Co needs to perform some liquidation and Bank of America is insolvent. Under this condition
I consider the cost of regulation. This is plotted in Figure 3.4. I note that while only Bank
of America and JP Morgan Chase and Co show a non-zero CRL, all the 6 banks have a
non-zero CM I. This highlights that even though the four banks are not liquidating under
the current stress regime, they will incur marked-to-market losses if θmin is increased.

89

Figure 3.4: Case Study 3.5.3: Cost of Regulation
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Chapter 4
Dynamic clearing and contagion in
financial networks
This chapter is based on [12] which is joint work with Alex Bernstein and Zachary Feinstein.

4.1

Introduction

The Eisenberg--Noe model [45] and the majority of the literature in the network model
based approach consider a static framework. Hence, they fail to account for liabilities with
different maturity periods as well as dynamic clearing in financial networks. Consequently,
in the stress tests developed using the network models, only the aggregate liabilities are
taken into consideration. This can give an incorrect assessment of the health of the financial
system.
This chapter will focus on adding the time dynamics to the setting of [45]. In fact, the
conclusion of [45] provides a discussion of future extensions, one of which is the inclusion of
multiple clearing dates. This has been studied directly in [27, 57]. Additionally, [80] considers a similar approach to model financial networks with multiple maturities. [52] further
provides another approach to financial networks with multiple maturities by considering each
clearing date as a different asset. All of these works, however, only consider clearing at discrete times. [98] presents a continuous-time clearing model that exactly replicates the static
Eisenberg--Noe framework. In this chapter, I will present both discrete and continuous-time
clearing models. However, my emphasis is on the derivation and the characterization of
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the continuous-time model as a differential equation driven by stochastic cash flows. In
particular, I consider existence and uniqueness of the clearing solutions, and a numerical
algorithm for finding sample paths of this clearing solution, under cash flows modeled by
Itô processes. The proof of existence and uniqueness in the continuous time framework is
approached in an entirely different manner than the traditional fixed point approach used
in the network models. This is in contrast to the other works on multiple maturity models such as [80, 27, 57]. The main benefit of this approach is that it no longer requires
strong monotonicity assumptions for existence and uniqueness which are generally required
for static and discrete-time systems (that typically employ the Tarski fixed point theorem).
This is also valuable for future works that may model network formation and payments as
a non-cooperative game; such games may not satisfy the strong monotonicity assumptions
usually considered in static and discrete-time systems, but would likely satisfy the sufficient
conditions for the continuous-time framework. Further, I discuss the implications of the time
dynamics on the clearing process. In particular, I find that the static Eisenberg--Noe clearing
solution can be recovered in the continuous-time setting by choosing the network parameters
precisely. This allows for a notion of determining the true order of defaults as opposed to
the fictitious default order discussed in the static literature based on [45]. However, if the
continuous-time network parameters are determined to not follow the rules for recreating
the static Eisenberg--Noe setting, then the dynamic and static clearing solutions will generally not coincide. In fact, the set of defaulting and solvent institutions can be altered by
rearranging the timing of obligations. As such, using the static Eisenberg--Noe framework
for stress testing may result in an incorrect assessment of the health of the financial system.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.2, I will provide a review of the
static clearing systems; I consider the clearing to be in terms of the equity and losses of the
firms, as considered in, e.g., [103, 16] rather than payments as originally studied in [45]. In
Section 4.3, I propose a discrete-time formulation for the Eisenberg--Noe model. In discrete
time I provide results on existence and uniqueness, as well as a numerical algorithm based on
the fictitious default algorithm of [45]. I then extend my model to a continuous-time setting
in Section 4.4. For continuous time I consider existence and uniqueness of the clearing
solutions, and a numerical algorithm for finding sample paths of this clearing solution, under
cash flows modeled by Itô processes. I additionally provide conditions for the discrete-time
setting to converge to the continuous-time solution as the time step limits to 0. Section 4.5
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provides discussion on the financial implications of time dynamics in interbank networks.
The proofs of the main results are provided in the Appendix.

4.2

Static clearing systems

I begin this chapter by reviewing some notation for static clearing systems. For a detailed
discussion of the mathematical framework for static systems, I refer the reader to Chapter
1.3. The goal of this chapter is to extend this framework to include dynamic clearing.
Throughout this chapter, I will consider a network of n financial institutions. I will denote
the set of all banks in the network by N := {1, 2, . . . , n}. I will consider an additional node
0, which encompasses the entirety of the financial system outside of the n banks; this node 0
will also be referred to as society or the societal node. The full set of institutions, including
the societal node, is denoted by N0 := N ∪ {0}.
I will be extending the model from [45] in this chapter. In that work, any bank i ∈ N may
have obligations Lij ≥ 0 to any other firm or society j ∈ N0 . I will assume that no firm
has any obligations to itself, i.e., Lii = 0 for all firms i ∈ N , and the society node has no
liabilities at all, i.e., L0j = 0 for all firms j ∈ N0 . Thus the total liabilities for bank i ∈ N
P
L
is given by p̄i := j∈N0 Lij ≥ 0 and relative liabilities πij := p̄iji if p̄i > 0 and arbitrary
otherwise; for simplicity, in the case that p̄i = 0, I will let πij = n1 for all j ∈ N0 \{i} and
P
πii = 0 to retain the property that j∈N0 πij = 1. On the other side of the balance sheet, all
firms are assumed to begin with some amount of external assets xi ≥ 0 for all firms i ∈ N0 .
In particular, the societal node has x0 > 0. The resultant clearing payments, under a no
priority of payments assumption, satisfy the fixed point problem in payments p ∈ [0, p̄]
(4.1)


p = p̄ ∧ x + Π> p .
That is, each bank pays the minimum of what it owes (p̄i ) and what it has (xi +
The resultant vector of wealths for all firms is given by
V = x + Π> p − p̄.
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P

j∈N

πji pj ).

(4.2)

Due to the equivalence of the clearing payments and clearing wealths as discussed in Chapter
1.3.3, I am able to consider the Eisenberg--Noe system as a fixed point of clearing wealth,
as given by (4.3), rather than payments. For a detailed discussion on this point, I refer the
reader to Chapter 1.3.3.

V = x + Π> [p̄ − V − ]+ − p̄.

(4.3)

In Chapter 1.3, results for the existence and uniqueness of the clearing payments (and thus
for the clearing wealths as well) are provided. In fact, it can be shown that there exists a
unique clearing solution in the Eisenberg--Noe framework so long as Li0 > 0 for all firms
i ∈ N . I will take advantage of this result later in this paper. This is a reasonable assumption
(as discussed in, e.g., [67]) as obligations to society include, e.g., deposits to the banks.

4.3

Discrete-time clearing systems

Consider now a discrete set of clearing times T, e.g., T = {0, 1, . . . , T } for some (finite)
terminal time T < ∞ or T = N. Such a setting is presented in [27]. For processes I will use
the notation from [35] such that the process Z : T → Rn has value of Z(t) at time t ∈ T and
history Zt := (Z(s))ts=0 .
In this setting, I will consider the external (incoming) cash flow x : T → Rn+1
and nominal
+
(n+1)×(n+1)
liabilities L : T → R+
to be functions of the clearing time, i.e., as assets and
liabilities with different maturities. The external cash in-flows and nominal liabilities can
explicitly depend on the clearing results of the prior times (i.e., x(t, Vt−1 ) and L(t, Vt−1 ))
without affecting the existence and uniqueness results I present, but for simplicity of notation
I will focus on the case where the external assets and nominal liabilities are independent of
the health and wealth of the firms. Throughout I am considering the discounted cash flows
and liabilities so as to simplify notation.
In contrast to the static Eisenberg--Noe framework, herein I need to consider the results of
the prior times. In particular, if firm i has positive equity at time t − 1 (i.e., Vi (t − 1) > 0)
then these additional assets are available to firm i at time t in order to satisfy its obligations.
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Balance Sheet
Assets

Liabilities

Cash-Flow @ t = 0
xi (0)

Cash-Flow
@t=0
Pn
L
j=1 ij (0)

Cash-Flow @ t = 1
xi (1)

Interbank
@t=0
Pn
j=1 πji (0)pj (0)

Cash-Flow
@t=1
Pn
j=1 Lij (1)

Interbank
@t=1
Pn
j=1 πji (1)pj (1)

Capital
Vi (1)

(a) Stylized actualized balance sheet for firm i with two time periods.

Balance Sheet @ t = 0
Assets
Liabilities
Cash-Flow
xi (0)

PnInterbank
j=1 πji (0)pj (0)

Cash-Flow
P
n
j=1 Lij (0)

Capital
Vi (0)

Balance Sheet @ t = 1
Assets
Liabilities
Cash-Flow
xi (1)
Carry-Forward
Vi (0)+
PnInterbank
j=1 πji (1)pj (1)

Cash-Flow
P
n
j=1 Lij (1)

Capital
Vi (1)

Carry-Forward
Vi (0)− = 0

(b) Stylized “snapshot” of actualized balance sheet for firm i at times 0 and 1.

Figure 4.1: Comparison of the full balance sheet to the snapshot of maturities utilized for
Section 4.3.
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Similarly, if firm i has negative wealth at time t − 1 (i.e., Vi (t − 1) < 0) then the debts,
that the firm has not yet paid, will roll-forward in time and be due at the next period.
For example, consider a network in which obligations come due throughout the day at, e.g.,
opening, mid-day, and closing, but that all debts must be cleared by the end of the day.
In such a way, the current unpaid liabilities may be paid at a future time, but before the
terminal time. That is, a firm can be considered in distress at a time if it is unable to satisfy
its obligations at that time, but only defaults if it has negative wealth at the terminal time.
Thus in this chapter I primarily focus on the intra-day dynamics rather than the inter-day
dynamics. See Figure 4.1b for a stylized (snapshot of the) balance sheet example for a firm
that has positive wealth at time 0 that rolls forward to time 1. The full (actualized) balance
sheet for this example with only those two time periods is displayed in Figure 4.1a; Note
that the full balance sheet as depicted considers actualized payments rather than the book
value of the obligations.
Remark 4.3.1. To incorporate the inter-day dynamics in this framework I can “zero out” a
firm before the terminal date if it is deemed to default in much the same as in [14]. A broader
framework for dealing with various default mechanisms is discussed in Remark 4.3.7. I can
further consider the Nash game in which firms decide if they will allow debts to be rolled
forward in time. In such a setting, if I include a delay for payment due to, e.g., bankruptcy
court so that defaulting firms do not pay any obligations until after the terminal time T ,
then the optimal strategy for all firms (up until the terminal time T ) would be to always
allow other firms to roll all debts forward so as to maximize payments.
Assumption 4.3.2. Before the time of interest, all firms are solvent and liquid. That is,
Vi (−1) ≥ 0 for all firms i ∈ N0 .
I can now construct the total liabilities and relative liabilities at time t ∈ T as
p̄i (t, Vt−1 ) :=

X

Lij (t) + Vi (t − 1)−

j∈N

πij (t, Vt−1 ) :=

 0
Lij (t)+πij (t−1,Vt−2 )Vi (t−1)−



p̄i (t,Vt−1 )

1

n



0

if p̄i (t, Vt−1 ) > 0
if p̄i (t, Vt−1 ) = 0, j 6= i
if p̄i (t, Vt−1 ) = 0, j = i
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∀i, j ∈ N0 .

In this way, coupled with the accumulation of positive equity over time, the clearing wealths
must satisfy the following fixed point problem in time t wealths:
+

V (t) = V (t − 1)+ + x(t) + Π(t, Vt−1 )> p̄(t, Vt−1 ) − V (t)− − p̄(t, Vt−1 ).

(4.4)

That is, all firms have a clearing wealth that is the summation of their positive equity at the
prior time, the new incoming external cash flow, and the payments made by all other firms
minus the total obligations of the firm (including the prior unpaid liabilities). In this way I
can construct the wealths of firms forward in time. This can be considered a discrete-time
extension of Equation 4.2.
I now wish to consider a reformulation of (4.4). To accomplish this, I consider a process of
cash flows c and functional relative exposures A. These I define by
c(t) := x(t) + L(t)>~1 − L(t)~1

π (t, V )
ij
t−1
aij (t, Vt ) :=
 Lij (t)+aij (t−1,Vt−2 )Vi (t−1)−
Vi (t)−

if p̄i (t, Vt−1 ) ≥ Vi (t)−
if p̄i (t, Vt−1 ) < Vi (t)−

∀i, j ∈ N0 .

(4.5)

In the above, ~1 := (1, 1, . . . , 1)> ∈ Rn is the vector of ones. Here I consider c(t) = x(t) +
L(t)>~1 − L(t)~1 ∈ Rn+1 to be the vector of book capital levels at time t, i.e., the new wealth
of each firm assuming all other firms pay in full. I wish to note that the new total liabilities
are given by L(t)~1 and the new incoming interbank obligations are given by L(t)>~1. I can
also consider ci (t) to be the net cash flow for firm i at time t. Further, I introduce the
functional matrix A : T × Rn+1 → [0, 1](n+1)×(n+1) to be the relative exposure matrix. That
is, aij (t, Vt )Vi (t)− provides the (negative) impact that firm i’s losses have on firm j’s wealth
at time t ∈ T. This is in contrast to Π, the relative liabilities, in that it endogenously imposes
the limited exposures concept. In this work the two notions will generally coincide, but for
mathematical simplicity I introduce this relative exposure matrix. For the equivalence I seek,
I define the relative exposures so that
L(t)>~1 + A(t − 1, Vt−1 )> V (t − 1)− − A(t, Vt )> V (t)− = Π(t, Vt−1 )> [p̄(t, Vt−1 ) − V (t)− ]+
for any V (t) ∈ Rn+1 . This formulation is such that if the positive part were removed from the
right hand side, the relative exposures A would be defined exactly as the relative liabilities Π
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by construction. In particular, I will define the relative exposures element-wise and pointwise
so as to encompass the limited exposures as in (4.5). If p̄i (t, Vt−1 ) > 0 then I can simplify
L (t)+a (t−1,V
)Vi (t−1)−
.
this further as aij (t, Vt ) = ij max{p̄iji (t,Vt−1t−1
),Vi (t)− }
Using the notation and terms above I can rewrite (4.4) with respect to the cash flows c and
relative exposures A as
V (t) = V (t − 1)+ + x(t) + Π(t, Vt−1 )> [p̄(t, Vt−1 ) − V (t)− ]+ − p̄(t, Vt−1 )
= V (t − 1)+ + x(t) + L(t)>~1 + A(t − 1, Vt−1 )> V (t − 1)−
− A(t, Vt )> V (t)− − L(t)~1 − V (t − 1)−
= V (t − 1) + x(t) + L(t)>~1 + A(t − 1, Vt−1 )> V (t − 1)− − A(t, Vt )> V (t)− − L(t)~1
= V (t − 1) + c(t) − A(t, Vt )> V (t)− + A(t − 1, Vt )> V (t − 1)− .

(4.6)

For the remainder of this chapter I will utilize the cash flow c rather than the external
(incoming) cash flow x. That is, I will consider financial networks defined by the joint
parameters (c, L) as given by the state equations (4.6) and (4.5) for wealths and relative
exposures.
With this setup I now wish to extend the existence and uniqueness results of [45] to discrete
time.
(n+1)×(n+1)

Theorem 4.3.3. Let (c, L) : T → Rn+1 × R+
define a dynamic financial network
such that every bank has cash flow at least at the level dictated by nominal interbank liabilities,
P
P
i.e., ci (t) ≥ j∈N Lji (t) − j∈N0 Lij (t), and so that every bank owes to the societal node at
all times t ∈ T, i.e., Li0 (t) > 0 for all banks i ∈ N and times t ∈ T. Under Assumption 4.3.2,
there exists a unique solution of clearing wealths V : T → Rn+1 to (4.6).
Remark 4.3.4. The assumption that all firms have obligations to the societal node 0 at all
times t ∈ T guarantees that the financial system is a “regular network” (see [45, Definition
5]) at all times.
The analysis of the discrete-time framework can be extended to a probabilistic setting over
the filtered probability space (Ω, F, (F(t))t∈T , P). That is, I can consider the clearing wealths
in the same manner assuming the cash flow c : T × Ω → Rn+1 and nominal liabilities
(n+1)×(n+1)
L : T × Ω → R+
be adapted processes. Let L0t (Rm ) be the space of Ft -measurable
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random vectors in Rm . Let Lpt (Rm ) ⊆ L0t (Rm ) for p ∈ (0, ∞] be the space of equivalence
1/p
R
classes of Ft -measurable functions X : Ω → Rm such that kXkp := Ω |X(ω)|p dP(ω)
<
∞ for p < ∞ and kXk∞ := ess supω∈Ω |X(ω)| for p = ∞. The following corollary considers
the boundedness and measurability properties of the discrete-time clearing wealths. Though
I will not utilize this discrete-time result in this chapter, I consider it important to discuss
random events to more closely match reality. Further, this result will implicitly appear in
the construction and analysis of the continuous-time Eisenberg--Noe formulation of the next
section.
Corollary 4.3.5. Consider the setting of Theorem 4.3.3 where the random network parameters (c, L) adapted to the filtered probability space (Ω, F, (F(t))t∈T , P). If c(s) ∈ Lps (Rn+1 )
(n+1)×(n+1)
and L(s) ∈ Lps (R+
) for all times s ≤ t for some p ∈ [0, ∞], then the unique clearing
solution at time t has finite p-norm, i.e., V (t) ∈ Lpt (Rn+1 ).
With the construction of the existence and uniqueness of the solution I now want to emphasize the fictitious default algorithm from [45] to construct this clearing wealths vector
over time. This algorithm is presented for the deterministic setting; if a stochastic setting is
desired then Algorithm 4.3.6 provides a method for computing a single sample path. I note
that at each time t this algorithm takes at most n iterations. Thus with a terminal time T ,
this algorithm will construct the full clearing solution over T in nT iterations.
Algorithm 4.3.6. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.3.3 in a deterministic setting the
clearing wealths process V : T → Rn+1 can be found by the following algorithm. Initialize
t = −1 and V (−1) ≥ 0 as a given. Repeat until t = max T:
(i) Increment t = t + 1.
(ii) Initialize k = 0, V 0 = V (t − 1) + c(t), and D0 = ∅. Repeat until convergence:
(a) Increment k = k + 1;

(b) Denote the set of insolvent banks by Dk := i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} | Vik−1 < 0 .
(c) If Dk = Dk−1 then terminate and set V (t) = V k−1 .

1 if i = j ∈ Dk
k
n×n
k
(d) Define the matrix Λ ∈ {0, 1}
so that Λij =
.
0 else
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(e) Define V k = (I − Π(t, Vt−1 )> Λk )−1 V (t − 1) + c(t) + A(t − 1, Vt−1 )> V (t − 1)− .
Remark 4.3.7. Note that in the construction of V k in step (iie) of the fictitious default
algorithm I utilize the relative liabilities Π(t, Vt−1 ) in the matrix inverse rather than the
relative exposures A(t, (Vt−1 , V k )). This has the added benefit that this definition of V k is
not a fixed point problem, which it would be if the relative exposures matrix at time t were
considered. This change is possible since, as discussed in the proof of Theorem 4.3.3, any
clearing solution must be in the domain so that the relative liabilities and exposures coincide.
This additionally provides the invertibility of this matrix using standard input-output results
as discussed in [45, 55].
I wish to finish up my discussion of the discrete-time Eisenberg--Noe framework by considering some extensions involving loans.
Remark 4.3.8. The theoretical framework presented in this chapter can be easily extended
to incorporate the concepts of loans until some (deterministic) insolvency condition is hit.
In particular, I will consider loans made from a central bank or lender of last resort who I
will assume are part of the societal node 0. From this perspective I consider three cases that
a firm might be in:
• solvent and liquid in which case the firm has positive equity and pays off its obligations in full;
• solvent and distressed in which case the firm has negative equity, but receives an
overnight loan (with interest rate set at the risk-free rate for simplicity) to cover all
obligations due on that date; and
• insolvent in which the firm will not receive any loans and is sent to a bankruptcy
court.
The determination whether a firm is solvent can be done with an appropriate exogenous
solvency function. I will assume that once a firm is deemed insolvent it can never recover to
solvency again. Two possible systems for considering insolvent firms are:
(i) Receivership: In such a system, when a firm is deemed insolvent it is placed in
receivership so that obligations are payed out on a first-come first-serve basis.
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(ii) Auctions: In such a system, when a firm is deemed insolvent its future assets are
auctioned off in order to pay the future liabilities (in a proportional scheme) at the
next time point. This will then affect the cash flows c and nominal liabilities L, as
such I would need to consider c(t, Vt−1 ) and L(t, Vt−1 ) to truly consider this case. I
refer to [27] for a detailed discussion of the auction model for insolvency. The auction
system can be interpreted as an internal mechanism for determining bankruptcy costs
in contrast to the exogenous parameter in, e.g., [96].
The existence and uniqueness of the clearing solutions in these scenarios require an additional
monotonicity property; I can use the notion of a speculative system from Chapter 5 to get
the desired results. This condition encodes the notion that a firm does not benefit from any
firm’s distress.

4.4

Continuous-time clearing systems

Consider now a continuous set of clearing times T, e.g., T = [0, T ] for some (finite) terminal
time T < ∞ or T = R+ . As before, for processes I will use the notation from [35] such that
the process Z : T → Rn has value of Z(t) at time t ∈ T and history Zt := (Z(s))s∈[0,t] . I will
now construct an extension of the continuous-time setting of [98] in that I allow for liabilities
to change over time and for firms to have stochastic cash flows.
In order to construct a continuous-time model I will begin by considering my network parameters of cash flows and nominal liabilities. Instead of considering c(t) to be the net cash
flow at time t ∈ T, I will consider the term dc(t) of marginal change in cash flow at time
t. Similarly I will consider dL(t) to be the marginal change in nominal liabilities matrix
at time t; I note that by assumption dLij (t) ≥ 0 for all firms i, j ∈ N0 as, without any
payments made, total liabilities should accumulate over time. My main result in this section
(Theorem 4.4.5) provides existence and uniqueness of the clearing wealths driven by (dc, dL)
Rt
Rt
when c(t) = 0 dc(s) is an Itô process and L(t) = 0 dL(s) is deterministic and continuous
(e.g., dL does not include any Dirac delta functions). This setting, and the results on the
continuous-time Eisenberg--Noe model, can be extended to the case in which the cash flows
and liabilities are additionally functions of the wealths V . For simplicity, in this section I
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will restrict myself so that the parameters are independent of the current wealths. In order
to construct a continuous-time differential system, I will consider again the discrete-time
setting with explicit time steps ∆t.
Assumption 4.4.1. The cash flows c are defined by the Itô stochastic differential equation
dc(t) = µ(t, c(t))dt + σ(t, c(t))dW (t) for (n + 1)-vector of Brownian motions W over some
filtered probability space (Ω, F, (Ft )t∈T , P). Additionally, the drift and diffusion functions
µ : T × Rn+1 → Rn+1 and σ : T × Rn+1 → R(n+1)×(n+1) are jointly continuous and satisfy the
linear growth and Lipschitz continuous conditions, i.e., there exist constants C, D > 0 such
that for all times t ∈ T and cash flows c, d ∈ Rn+1
kµ(t, c)k1 + kσ(t, c)kop
1 ≤ C(1 + kck1 )
kµ(t, c) − µ(t, d)k1 + kσ(t, c) − σ(t, d)kop
1 ≤ Dkc − dk1
where k · k1 is the 1-norm and k · kop
1 is the corresponding operator norm. The nominal
(n+1)×(n+1)
liabilities L : T → R+
are deterministic and twice differentiable; for notation I will
define dL(t) = L̇(t)dt and d2 L(t) = L̈(t)dt2 . Further, the relative liabilities to society is
(t)
= δ > 0 for all banks i ∈ N .
bounded from below by a level δ > 0, i.e., inf t∈T P dLi0dL
ik (t)
k∈N0

The assumption on the cash flows can be relaxed so long as the stochastic differential equation
has a unique strong solution on T and µ, σ satisfy a local linear growth condition and are
locally Lipschitz. This relaxation will be applied in Examples 4.5.3 and 4.5.7.
In the prior section on a discrete-time model for clearing wealths, I implicitly assumed a
constant time-step between each clearing date of ∆t = 1 throughout. In order to construct
a continuous-time clearing model I will begin by making a discrete-time model with an
explicit ∆t > 0 term. In fact, this is immediate from the prior construction with a minor
alteration to the cash flow term. Herein I construct the net cash flow at time t to be given
Rt
by ∆c(t, ∆t) := t−∆t dc(s) and the nominal liabilities at time t are similarly provided by
Rt
∆L(t, ∆t) := t−∆t dL(s) where both dc and dL are discussed above (additionally, I set
dc(−t) = 0 and dL(−t) = 0 for any times t < 0). The choice of notation for ∆c and ∆L are
to make explicit the “change” inherent in the construction.
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With these parameters I can construct the ∆t-discrete-time clearing process V (t, ∆t) and
exposure matrix A(t, ∆t, Vt (∆t)) by:
V (t, ∆t) = V (t − ∆t, ∆t) + ∆c(t, ∆t) − A(t, ∆t, Vt (∆t))> V (t, ∆t)−
+ A(t − ∆t, ∆t, Vt−∆t (∆t))> V (t − ∆t, ∆t)−
aij (t, ∆t, Vt (∆t)) =

∆Lij (t, ∆t) + aij (t − ∆t, ∆t, Vt−∆t (∆t))Vi (t − ∆t, ∆t)−
P
1{i6=0}
max{ k∈N0 ∆Lik (t, ∆t) + Vi (t − ∆t, ∆t)− , Vi (t, ∆t)− }
1
+ 1{i=0, j6=0}
∀i, j ∈ N0 .
n

(4.7)

(4.8)

Here I assume that V (t) = V (−1) ≥ 0 for every time t < 0 as in Assumption 4.3.2. This
construction can be computed either in continuous time t ∈ T with sliding intervals of size
∆t or at the discrete times t ∈ {0, ∆t, ..., T }. The existence and uniqueness of this system
follow exactly as in Theorem 4.3.3 under Assumption 4.4.1.
(n+1)×(n+1)

Corollary 4.4.2. Let (dc, dL) : T → Rn+1 × R+
define a dynamic financial network
satisfying Assumption 4.4.1 such that every bank has cash flow at least at the level dictated
P
P
by nominal interbank liabilities, i.e., ∆ci (t, ∆t) ≥ j∈N ∆Lji (t, ∆t) − j∈N0 ∆Lij (t, ∆t) for
all banks i ∈ N0 , times t ∈ T, and step-sizes ∆t > 0. Under Assumption 4.3.2, there exists
a unique solution of clearing wealths V : T × R++ → Rn+1 to (4.7). Further, the clearing
wealths are jointly continuous in time and step-size.
Now I want to consider the limiting behavior of this discrete-time system as ∆t tends to 0.
To do so, first, I will consider the formulation of the relative exposures aij from bank i to
j. From Corollary 4.4.2 and Assumption 4.4.1, I know that for any time t ∈ T and bank
P
i ∈ N it must follow that k∈N0 ∆Lik (t, ∆t) + Vi (t − ∆t, ∆t)− ≥ Vi (t, ∆t)− for ∆t > 0 small
enough due to the joint continuity of the wealths in time and step-size. Thus in the limiting
case, as ∆t & 0, I find that I can consider the relative liabilities rather than the relative
exposures, i.e., for ∆t small enough
aij (t, ∆t, Vt (∆t)) =

∆Lij (t, ∆t) + aij (t − ∆t, ∆t, Vt−∆t (∆t))Vi (t − ∆t, ∆t)−
P
1{i6=0}
−
k∈N0 ∆Lik (t, ∆t) + Vi (t − ∆t, ∆t)
1
+ 1{i=0, j6=0}
∀i, j ∈ N0 .
n
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(4.9)

Rearranging these terms I am able to deduce that, for any firm i ∈ N ,
[aij (t, ∆t, Vt (∆t)) − aij (t − ∆t, ∆t, Vt−∆t (∆t))]Vi (t − ∆t, ∆t)−
X
= ∆Lij (t, ∆t) − aij (t, ∆t, Vt (∆t))
∆Lik (t, ∆t).

(4.10)

k∈N0

Coupled with the assumption that the societal node always has positive wealth, I am thus
able to consider the limiting behavior of (4.7) as the step-size ∆t tends to 0. To do so,
consider
V (t, ∆t) = V (t − ∆t, ∆t) + ∆c(t, ∆t) − A(t, ∆t, Vt (∆t))> V (t, ∆t)−
+ A(t − ∆t, ∆t, Vt−∆t )> V (t − ∆t, ∆t)−
= V (t − ∆t, ∆t) + ∆c(t, ∆t)
− A(t, ∆t, Vt (∆t))> V (t, ∆t)− + A(t, ∆t, Vt (∆t))> V (t − ∆t, ∆t)−
− A(t, ∆t, Vt (∆t))> V (t − ∆t, ∆t)− + A(t − ∆t, ∆t, Vt−∆t )> V (t − ∆t, ∆t)−
= V (t − ∆t, ∆t) + ∆c(t, ∆t) − A(t, ∆t, Vt (∆t))> [V (t, ∆t)− − V (t − ∆t, ∆t)− ]
− ∆L(t, ∆t)>~1 + A(t, ∆t, Vt (∆t))> ∆L(t, ∆t)~1.
Consider the notation for the matrix of distressed firms from the fictitious default algorithm
(Algorithm 4.3.6), i.e., Λ(V ) ∈ {0, 1}(n+1)×(n+1) is the diagonal matrix of banks in distress

1 if i = j 6= 0 and V < 0
i
Λij (V ) =
0 else

∀i, j ∈ N0 .

I am able to set Λ00 (V ) = 0 without loss of generality since, by assumption, the outside
node 0 has no obligations into the system. Thus, as with (4.9), by continuity of the clearing
wealths and ∆t small enough, I can conclude that except at specific event times (to be
considered later, see Algorithm 4.4.8) it follows that Λ(V (t, ∆t)) = Λ(V (t − ∆t, ∆t)). Thus,
with this added notation I can reformulate the clearing wealths equation (4.7) as
V (t, ∆t) = V (t − ∆t, ∆t) + A(t, ∆t, Vt (∆t))> Λ(V (t, ∆t))[V (t, ∆t) − V (t − ∆t, ∆t)] + ∆c(t, ∆t)
− ∆L(t, ∆t)>~1 + A(t, ∆t, Vt (∆t))> ∆L(t, ∆t)~1.
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For the construction of a differential form I can consider the equivalent formulation
V (t, ∆t) − V (t − ∆t, ∆t) =
[I − A(t, ∆t, Vt (∆t))> Λ(V (t, ∆t))]−1

∆c(t, ∆t) − ∆L(t, ∆t)>~1
+A(t, ∆t, Vt (∆t))> ∆L(t, ∆t)~1

!
.

(4.11)

Note that I −A(t, ∆t, Vt (∆t))> Λ(V (t, ∆t)) is invertible by standard input-output results and
as proven in Proposition C.2.1.
Utilizing (4.11) and (4.9) and taking the limit as ∆t & 0, I am thus able to construct the
joint differential system:


dV (t) = [I − A(t)> Λ(V (t))]−1 dc(t) − dL(t)>~1 + A(t)> dL(t)~1
 2
P
d Lij (t)−aij (t) k∈N d2 Lik (t)
0

P
if i ∈ N , Vi (t) ≥ 0


dLik (t)
k∈NP

0
daij (t) = dLij (t)−aij (t) −k∈N0 dLik (t)
if i ∈ N , Vi (t) < 0 ∀i, j ∈ N0
Vi (t)



0
if i = 0
with initial conditions V (0) ≥ 0 given and aij (0) =

P

dLij (0)
1
dLik (0) {i6=0}

k∈N0

(4.12)

(4.13)

+ n1 1{i=0, j6=0} for all

firms i, j ∈ N0 . As in (4.11), I − A(t)> Λ(V (t)) is invertible by standard input-output results
and as proven in Proposition C.2.1. The first case in (4.13) is constructed by noting that
dL (t)
aij (t) = P ijdLik (t) if Vi (t) ≥ 0 and i ∈ N and da0j (t) = 0 for any firm j ∈ N0 for all times
k∈N0
t; the second case in (4.13) follows from (4.10) and taking the limit as ∆t & 0. Note that
this differential system is discontinuous, with events at times when firms cross the 0 wealth
boundary, i.e., when Λ(V (t)) 6= Λ(V (t− )). As such, I will consider the differential system on
the inter-event intervals, then update the differential system between these intervals. This
is made more explicit in the proof of Theorem 4.4.5 and in Algorithm 4.4.8. As with the
discrete-time system (4.8), the relative exposures follow the incoming proportional obligations if a firm has a surplus wealth. When a firm is in distress, the relative exposures follow
a path that provides the average relative obligations between new liabilities and the prior
unpaid liabilities.
Remark 4.4.3. As in the discrete-time section I consider the debt to roll forward in this
case. In this way I encode the notion of either intra-day dynamics in this model or when
bankruptcy court would not settle debts before the terminal time T for the system. To allow
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for insolvencies, I can consider some (deterministic) mechanism to determine when a bank
becomes insolvent and restart the differential system with updated parameters from that
time point, e.g., using an instantaneous auction as in [27]; see also Remarks 4.3.7 and 4.4.9.
I will complete my discussion of the construction of this differential system by providing
some properties on the relative liabilities and exposures matrix A. Notably, these properties
are those that would be expected from the discrete-time setting for the relative exposures.
Namely, as a firm recovers from a distressed state its relative liabilities return to be only
the fraction of incoming liabilities, that the relative exposures are bounded from below by 0
(and to society by δ as provided in Assumption 4.4.1), and the relative exposure matrix is
row stochastic at all times.
(n+1)×(n+1)

Proposition 4.4.4. Let (dc, dL) : T → Rn+1 × R+
define a dynamic financial
n+1
(n+1)×(n+1)
network satisfying Assumption 4.4.1. Let (V, A) : T → R ×R
be any solution of
the differential system (4.12) and (4.13) satisfying Assumption 4.3.2. The relative exposure
matrix A(t) satisfies the following properties:
(i) For any bank i ∈ N , if Vi (t) % 0 as t % τ then limt%τ aij (t) =

P

dLij (τ )
.
dLik (τ )

k∈N0

(ii) For all times t ∈ T and for any bank i ∈ N , the elements aij (t) ≥ 0 for all banks j ∈ N
and ai0 (t) ≥ δ;
(iii) For all times t ∈ T and for any bank i ∈ N0 , the row sums

P

k∈N0

aik (t) = 1;

With this differential construction (4.12) and (4.13), I seek to prove existence and uniqueness
of the clearing solutions. For notational simplicity, define the space of relative exposure
matrices


1
(n+1)×(n+1)
A := A ∈ [0, 1]
| A~1 = ~1, aii = 0, ai0 ≥ δ ∀i ∈ N , a0j = ∀j ∈ N .
n
From Proposition 4.4.4, I have already proven that if (V, A) : T → Rn+1 × R(n+1)×(n+1) is a
solution to the continuous-time Eisenberg--Noe system then A(t) ∈ A for all times t ∈ T.
Theorem 4.4.5. Let T = [0, T ] be a finite time period and let (dc, dL) : T → Rn+1 ×
(n+1)×(n+1)
R+
define a dynamic financial network satisfying Assumption 4.4.1. There exists a
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unique strong solution to the clearing wealths and relative exposures (V, A) satisfying (4.12)
and (4.13) if V (0) ∈ Rn+1
++ .
Proof. The proof is presented in the appendix.
Remark 4.4.6. The proof of existence and uniqueness, presented in the preceding theorem,
is approached in an entirely different manner than the traditional approach used in the
network models. In particular, I make use of the results on the uniqueness of differential
equations. This is in contrast to other works on multiple maturity models [80, 27, 57] which
employ the Tarski fixed point theorem. The main benefit of my approach is that it no longer
requires the strong monotonicity assumptions for Tarski fixed point theorem to hold.
Remark 4.4.7. The restrictions on the cash flows dc made in Assumption 4.4.1 can be
relaxed to depend explicitly on the wealths and relative exposures, i.e.,
dc(t) = µ(t, c(t), V (t), A(t))dt + σ(t, c(t), V (t), A(t))dW (t).
This would still guarantee a unique strong solution of the clearing wealths and relative
exposures as in Theorem 4.4.5 so long as µ, σ satisfy a local linear growth condition, local
Lipschitz condition, and c(t) can be bounded above and below by elements of L2t (Rn+1 ) for
all time t.
I now present an algorithm for numerically computing an approximation of a single sample
path for the continuous-time Eisenberg--Noe clearing system. To do so I consider Euler’s
method for differential equations with an event finding algorithm.
Algorithm 4.4.8. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.4.5 for a fixed event ω ∈ Ω the
clearing wealths process V : T → Rn+1 and relative exposures A : T → A can be found
by the following algorithm. Fix a step-size ∆t0 > 0. Initialize t = 0, V (0) ≥ 0 given,
dL (0)
aij (0) = P ijdLik (0) 1{i6=0} + n1 1{i=0, j6=0} , and Λ = {0}(n+1)×(n+1) . Repeat until t ≥ T :
k∈N0

(i) Initialize Λ0 6= Λ and ∆t = ∆t0 .
(ii) Sample Z ∼ N (0, I).
(iii) Repeat until Λ0 = Λ:
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(a) Set Λ0 = Λ.
(b) Compute
>

−1

µ̄(t) = (I − A(t) Λ)




~
µ(t, c(t)) − L̇(t) 1 + A(t) L̇(t)1
>~

>

σ̄(t) = (I − A(t)> Λ)−1 σ(t, c(t))Z.
(c) Loop through each bank i ∈ N :
i. If Vi (t) > 0, µ̄i (t) < 0, and σ̄i (t)2 − 4µ̄i (t)Vi (t) ≥ 0 then

∆t = min




!2 
p
−σ̄i (t) − σ̄i (t)2 − 4µ̄i (t)Vi (t) 
.

2µ̄i (t)

∆t ,



ii. If Vi (t) < 0, µ̄i (t) 6= 0, and σ̄i (t)2 − 4µ̄i (t)Vi (t) ≥ 0 then

∆t = min




!2 
p
2
−σ̄i (t) + σ̄i (t) − 4µ̄i (t)Vi (t) 
.

2µ̄i (t)

∆t ,



iii. If µ̄i (t) = 0 and Vi (t)σ̄i (t) < 0 then ∆t = min {∆t , Vi (t)2 /σ̄i (t)2 }.
iv. If µ̄i (t)σ̄i (t) < 0 then ∆t = min {∆t , σ̄i (t)2 /µ̄i (t)2 }.
√
(d) Compute ∆V (t) = µ̄(t)∆t + σ̄(t) ∆t.
(e) Define the matrix Λ ∈ {0, 1}(n+1)×(n+1) such that



0 if i = j 6= 0, Vi (t) > 0 or [Vi (t) = 0, ∆Vi (t) ≥ 0]


Λij = 1 if i = j 6= 0, Vi (t) < 0 or [Vi (t) = 0, ∆Vi (t) < 0]



0 else

(iv) Define the matrix Λ̄ ∈ {0, 1}(n+1)×(n+1)


1 if i = j 6= 0, V (t) < 0
i
so that Λ̄ =
.
0 else

(v) Set
√
c(t + ∆t) = c(t) + µ(t, c(t))∆t + σ(t, c(t)) ∆tZ
V (t + ∆t) = V (t) + ∆V (t)
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h
i
A(t + ∆t) = Λ̄ A(t) + diag(V (t)− )−1 [L̇(t) − A(t) ∗ (L̇(t)1)]∆t
+ (I − Λ̄) diag(L̇(t)~1)−1 L̇(t).
where 1 = {1}(n+1)×(n+1) and ∗ denotes the element-wise multiplication operator.
(vi) Increment t = t + ∆t.
If t > T then set
c(t) − c(t − ∆t)
(T − [t − ∆t])
∆t
V (t) − V (t − ∆t)
(T − [t − ∆t])
V (T ) = V (t − ∆t) +
∆t
A(t) − A(t − ∆t)
A(T ) = A(t − ∆t) +
(T − [t − ∆t]).
∆t
c(T ) = c(t − ∆t) +

In the above event-finding algorithm for the continuous-time Eisenberg--Noe system, the
main concern is that I do not increment time too far in any step so as to pass over an event
(e.g., a solvent bank becoming a distressed bank). This is accomplished in the loop described
√
in step (iiic). In particular, (iii(c)i)-(iii(c)iii) guarantee that Vi (t) + µ̄i (t)∆t + σ̄i (t) ∆t is
nonnegative if Vi (t) > 0 and nonpositive if Vi (t) < 0. The additional condition in (iii(c)iv)
√
guarantees that the direction of µ̄i (t)∆t + σ̄i (t) ∆t is maintained as ∆t shrinks, i.e., if ∆t is
too large then the direction of the change in wealth could be impacted by choosing a smaller
(and thus more accurate) step-size. While not strictly necessary, I include step (iii(c)iv) as
it improves the accuracy of the algorithm.
Remark 4.4.9. As with the discrete-time setting discussed in Remark 4.3.7, I can introduce
the concept of loans from a central bank to the continuous-time Eisenberg--Noe system.
To do so I would need to introduce stopping times associated with each bank becoming
insolvent. Notably, the receivership setting would act the same as the described continuoustime Eisenberg--Noe system after insolvencies occur. In contrast, a pure auction model
would eliminate all need for continuous-time contagion. At the time of the auction a static
system would be considered, e.g., the static Eisenberg--Noe clearing, based on the results of
the auction; this would update the cash flow parameters for each firm going forward, but no
dynamic contagion would need to be modeled.
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4.5

Discussion

In this section, I will consider the implications of time on the clearing solutions in the
Eisenberg--Noe setting. Specifically, I will focus on the continuous-time formulation, though
all conclusions hold in the discrete-time setting as well. Notably, I deduce rules so as to recreate the static Eisenberg--Noe clearing solution via the continuous-time differential system,
which (independently) replicates the results from [98]. Further, I consider the implications
of time dynamics on the health of the financial system by determining bounds on how different the static clearing solution and a dynamic solution might be. This demonstrates the
importance of time dynamics on accurately assessing the health and wealth of the financial
system.

4.5.1

The static model as a differential system

Herein I will consider the case in which the relative liabilities are constant through time.
P
P
That is, I consider the setting in which dLij (s)/ k∈N0 dLik (s) = dLij (t)/ k∈N0 dLik (t) for
P
P
all times s, t ∈ T and firms i, j ∈ N0 so long as k∈N0 dLik (s), k∈N0 dLik (t) > 0. The key
implication of this assumption is that the relative exposures matrix in (4.13) can be found
explicitly to equal the relative liabilities

aij (t) = πij :=


dLij (si )

P


 k∈N0 dLik (si )
1

n



0

if si < sup T
if si = sup T, j 6= i
if si = sup T, j = i

P
for all times t and banks i, j ∈ N0 where si ∈ {t ∈ T | k∈N0 dLik (t) > 0} chosen arbitrarily
strictly less than sup T (and si = sup T if the supremum is taken over the empty set).
Further, expanding and solving the differential system (4.12), I deduce that the continuoustime clearing wealths must satisfy the fixed point problem
Z
V (t) = V (0) +

t

dc(s) − Π> V (t)−

0
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(4.14)

Rt
Rt
Rt
at all time t ∈ T. Therefore, if 0 dc(s) ≥ 0 dL(s)>~1 − 0 dL(s)~1 at some time t, it follows
that V (t) are the static clearing wealths to the Eisenberg--Noe system with aggregated data
Rt
with nominal
liabilities matrix defined
by 0 dL(s) and (incoming) external cash flow given by


Rt
Rt
Rt
dc(s) − 0 dL(s)>~1 − 0 dL(s)~1 . Importantly, this means that, if the relative liabilities
0
are kept constant over time, taking aggregated data and considering the static Eisenberg-Noe framework will produce the same final clearing wealths as the dynamic Eisenberg--Noe
setting presented in this chapter. However, though the set of defaulting banks is the same
as in the static setting, the order of defaults need not strictly follow the order given in the
fictitious default algorithm of [45].
Definition 4.5.1. A bank is called a kth-order default in the static Eisenberg--Noe setting
if it is determined to be in default in the kth iteration of the fictitious default algorithm (see,
e.g., [45, Section 3.1] or the inner loop of Algorithm 4.3.6).
I note that the first-order defaults are exactly those firms that have negative wealth even
if it has no negative exposure to other firms (i.e., all other firms satisfy their obligations in
full).
(n+1)×(n+1)

Proposition 4.5.2. Let (x, L̄) ∈ Rn+1
denote the static incoming external cash
+ ×R+
flow and nominal liabilities. Define a dynamic system
over the time period

 T = [0, T ] such
1
1
that V (0) ∈ [0, x], dL(t) = T L̄dt, and dc(t) = T x − V (0) + L̄>~1 − L̄~1 dt. The clearing
wealths at the terminal time V (T ) are equal to those given in the static setting. Additionally,
no firm will ever recover from distress in the dynamic setting. Finally, the first kth-order
default will occur only after the first (k − 1)th-order default in the static fictitious default
algorithm; in particular, the first firm to become distressed will be a first-order default in the
static fictitious default algorithm.
Proof. The fact that the clearing wealths V (T ) are equal to the static Eisenberg--Noe clearing
wealths follows from (4.14) and the logic given in the proof of Lemma ??. Additionally, since
dc(t) is constant in time and firms are beginning in a solvent state, over time the unpaid
liabilities may accumulate as a negative factor on bank balance sheets, but there is no outlet
to allow for a firm to recover from distress. Finally, by definition, a kth-order default is only
driven into distress through the failure of the (k − 1)th-order defaults (and not solely by the
(k − 2)th-order defaults). Therefore, by way of contradiction, if a kth-order default were to
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occur before any (k − 1)th-order default then such a firm must default without regard to
what happens to the (k −1)th-order defaults, i.e., this firm must be a (k −1)th-order default.
By this same logic, the first firm to become distressed must be a first-order default.
The notion of real defaulting times differing from the order introduced by the fictitious default
algorithm of [45] is unsurprising. Consider a financial system with two subgraphs that are
only connected through their obligations to the societal node. By construction, the default
of a firm in one subgraph will have no impact on the firms in the other subgraph. Thus I
can construct a network so that all defaults in one subgraph (including higher order defaults
as defined in Definition 4.5.1) occur before any first-order defaults in the other subgraph.
Notably, Proposition 4.5.2 states that, provided the aggregate data (until the terminal time)
is kept constant, the clearing wealths at the terminal time will be path-independent in this
setting. I will demonstrate this with an illustrative example demonstrating this setting in
a small 4 bank (plus societal node) system. In particular, I will consider the cash flows c
to be defined as a Brownian bridge so as to provide the appropriate aggregate data at the
terminal time.
Example 4.5.3. Consider a financial system with four banks, each with an additional obligation to an external societal node. Consider the time interval T = [0, 1] with aggregated
data such that the initial wealths are given by V (0) = (100, 1, 3, 2, 5)> , cash flows dc are
R1
such that 0 dc(s) = L̄>~1 − L̄~1, and where the nominal liabilities matrix dL = L̄dt is defined
by


0 0 0 0 0


3 0 7 1 1


.
L̄ = 
3
3
0
3
3




3 1 1 0 1
3 1 2 1 0
The static Eisenberg--Noe clearing wealths, with nominal liabilities L̄ and external assets
V (0), are found to be V (1) ≈ (109.38, −6.81, −3.03, −0.32, 1.62)> . Further, from the static
fictitious default algorithm, I can determine that bank 1 is a first-order default, bank 2 is
a second-order default, and bank 3 is a third-order default. Consider now three dynamic
settings which are differentiated only by the choice of the cash flows dc:
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(i) Consider the deterministic setting introduced in Proposition 4.5.2, i.e., dc(t) = [L̄>~1 −
L̄~1]dt for all times t ∈ T.
>~

~

L̄1−c(t)
dt + dW (t) for
(ii) Consider a Brownian bridge with low volatility, i.e., dc(t) = L̄ 1−1−t
vector of independent Brownian motions W and with c(0) = 0.
>~

~

L̄1−c(t)
(iii) Consider a Brownian bridge with high volatility, i.e., dc(t) = L̄ 1−1−t
dt + 5dW (t)
for vector of independent Brownian motions W and with c(0) = 0.

A single sample path for each dynamic setting is provided. In each plot I reduce the equity
of the societal node by 100 so that it begins with an initial wealth of 0, but more importantly
so that it can easily be displayed on the same plot as the other 4 institutions. First, I point
out that, as indicated by the circles at the terminal time in each plot, the terminal wealths
of the continuous-time setting match up with the clearing wealths in the static model. I
further note that in the deterministic setting (Figure 4.2a) and the low volatility setting
(Figure 4.2b) the order of defaults is maintained. However, in the high volatility setting
(Figure 4.2c) the order of defaults given by the fictitious default algorithm no longer holds.

4.5.2

The implications of time dynamics

Now I will consider the case in which the relative liabilities change over time. As in the
prior discussion, I will focus on the setting in which the aggregate cash flows and interbank
liabilities correspond to a static Eisenberg--Noe model. As the liabilities are now changing
over time there is an inherent prioritization in the obligations due to the rolling forward of
unpaid debts. Any earlier obligations are more likely to be paid, and accumulate to be paid
proportionally with any new obligations. As such, by altering only the rate at which the
liabilities are due, the terminal wealths and also the set of defaulting firms can be modified.
Proposition 4.5.5 provides analysis on which banks will always be solvent and which will
always be in default at the terminal time. In particular, the results of Proposition 4.5.5 show
that the static Eisenberg--Noe model applied to aggregate data can produce a viewpoint on
the health of the financial system that is either incorrectly optimistic or pessimistic; without
explicitly knowing the dynamics of the cash flows and liabilities, only rough estimates can
be considered. This is in contrast to, e.g., [67] in which data from the European Banking
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Authority’s 2011 stress test was utilized to assess the health of the European financial system
without time dynamics.
Definition 4.5.4. In the static Eisenberg--Noe setting a bank is called a first-order solvency if it has positive wealth even under the maximum negative exposure (i.e., no other
firms pay at all).
Note that, by assumption, the societal node 0 will always be a first-order solvent institution.
(n+1)×(n+1)

Proposition 4.5.5. Let (x, L̄) ∈ Rn+1
× R+
denote the static incoming external
+
cash flow and nominal liabilities. Define a dynamic system over the time period T = [0, T ]
RT
RT
such that V (0) ∈ [0, x], 0 dL(t) = L̄, and 0 dc(t) = x − V (0) + L̄>~1 − L̄~1. At time T ,
those banks that are first-order defaults in the static setting will be in default in the dynamic
setting. Similarly, those banks that are first-order solvencies in the static setting will be
solvent in the dynamic setting at the terminal time.
Proof. This result follows from the definition of a first-order default or solvency as such firms
allow me to disregard all interbank dynamics.
To conclude this discussion, I will consider two examples with the same aggregate values as
given in Example 4.5.3. The first example considers the case in which the nominal liabilities
are shifted in time so as to have the maximum possible number of banks be solvent or,
vice versa, the maximum number of banks be in default at the terminal time. The second
example considers a fixed structure for the nominal liabilities in time (but non-constant
relative liabilities), thus demonstrating the path-dependence of the clearing wealths on the
cash flows.
Example 4.5.6. Consider the financial system described in Example 4.5.3 over the time
interval T = [0, 1] with aggregated data such that the initial wealths V (0) = (100, 1, 3, 2, 5)>
and where the aggregate nominal liabilities matrix is defined by L̄. Further, consider the
cash flows dc(t) = dL(t)>~1 − dL(t)~1 for all times t ∈ T where dL is either:
(i) prioritizing the defaulting firms: dL(t) = 5L̄ E0 1{t∈(0.8,1]} +
or
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P

i∈N


Ei 1{t∈(0.2(i−1),0.2i]} ,

(ii) prioritizing society: dL(t) = 5L̄ E0 1{t∈[0,0.2)} +

P

i∈N

Ei 1{t∈(0.2i,0.2(i+1)]}



where the collection of matrices Ei ∈ {0, 1}(n+1)×(n+1) are such that (Ei )ii = 1 and all other
elements are set to 0. As in Figure 4.2, the circles at the terminal time in both plots denote
the clearing wealths under the static Eisenberg--Noe setting. It is clear in both examples that
the terminal dynamic clearing wealths now are not equal to the static wealths. Further, by
choosing the liabilities to be introduced in the order provided I provide the settings so that
only the first-order defaults, Bank 1, have negative terminal wealth (Figure 4.3a) or so that
only the first-order solvencies, the societal firm, have positive terminal wealth (Figure 4.3b).
In Figure 4.3a, I notice that firms 2 and 3 have a terminal wealth of 0, so although they are
not defaulting, they do not have any positive equity either. Further, it is clear that though
all financial firms have improved their wealth given this ordering of the nominal liabilities,
the societal wealth is decreased (though to a lesser amount than the aggregate improvement
for the banks) in comparison to the static results. In contrast, in the second scenario in
which obligations to society are first (Figure 4.3b), the societal wealths are greater than
those provided in the static setting but all banks have less wealth. Notice further that, even
after the obligations to society have “ended” at time 0.2 the societal wealth still increases.
This occurs as the banks in distress receive money as their incoming liabilities come due and
thus they have cash to immediately transfer to cover the prior unpaid obligations to, e.g.,
society. Finally, this numerically verifies the results of Proposition 4.5.5 and demonstrates
the importance of understanding the order of obligations for an accurate measure of the
health of the financial system.
Example 4.5.7. Consider the financial system described in Example 4.5.3 over the time
interval T = [0, 1] with aggregated data such that the initial wealths V (0) = (100, 1, 3, 2, 5)>
and where the aggregate nominal liabilities matrix is defined by L̄. Further, consider the
nominal liabilities determined by
dL(t) = L̄

1
1
E1 1{t∈[0.145,0.382]} + 0.178
E2 1{t∈[0.331,0.509]}
E0 + 0.237
1
1
+ 0.439
E3 1{t∈[0.301,0.740]} + 0.105
E4 1{t∈[0.673,0.778]}

!

where the collection of matrices Ei ∈ {0, 1}(n+1)×(n+1) are such that (Ei )ii = 1 and all other
elements are set to 0. Finally, consider the cash flows determined by a Brownian bridge
>~ L̄~
1−c(t)
dt + 2dW (t) for vector of independent Brownian
with volatility of 2, i.e., dc(t) = L̄ 1−1−t
motions W and with c(0) = 0. Figure 4.4 depicts the empirical distribution of the terminal
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societal wealths under 10,000 samples of the Brownian bridge cash flows. The black curve
depicts the kernel density for this empirical distribution. The × illustrates the societal wealth
under the static Eisenberg--Noe framework considering the aggregated data (as provided in
Example 4.5.3). The key takeaway of this figure is the payments to society range from 8.12
to 10.20 out of an obligated 12, i.e., society can experience anywhere from 16% to 32%
shortfall in payments depending on the sample path. This also implies that society can
experience anywhere from a 13.4% decrease to an 8.8% increase over the payments found
under the static Eisenberg--Noe model. Similar results can be shown for the other firms in
the system as well. Notably, firms 2, 3, and 4 all have simulations in which they are solvent
at the terminal time and simulations in which they are defaulting on their obligations. Recall
none of these three firms are first-order defaults or first-order solvencies. Empirically, firm
2 (a second-order default) is found to default in approximately 98% of the simulations; firm
3 (a third-order default) is found to default in approximately 3.6% of simulations; firm 4
(which does not default in the static setting) is found to default in just 0.03% of the provided
simulations (i.e., 3 out of the 10,000 simulations). Therefore, if relative liabilities are not
constant over time, the order of the cash flows can have a significant impact on the health
of the system.
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(a) Example 4.5.3: Clearing wealths over
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Figure 4.2: Example 4.5.3: Comparison of clearing wealths under deterministic and random
cash flows that aggregate to the same terminal values.
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(a) Example 4.5.6: Clearing wealths over
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order-defaults solvent at the terminal time.
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Figure 4.3: Example 4.5.6: Comparison of clearing wealths under different ordering of the
nominal liabilities in time that aggregate to the same terminal values.

Figure 4.4: Example 4.5.7: Empirical distribution of the terminal societal wealths under random cash flows. The × marks the societal wealth under the static Eisenberg--Noe framework
with aggregated data.
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Chapter 5
Impact of contingent payments on
systemic risk in financial networks
This chapter is based on [14] which is joint work with Zachary Feinstein.

5.1

Introduction

The 2008 financial crisis proved that linkages formed between banks and insurance companies
can act as potential channels of financial contagion. These linkages are formed and resolved
in a way that is different from normal bank loans. A typical example of such a linkage is
a credit default swap [CDS]. A credit default swap is a contract in which a buyer pays a
premium to a seller in order to protect itself against a potential loss due to the occurrence
of a credit event that affects the value of the contract’s underlying reference obligation, e.g.,
a corporate or sovereign bond. The contract specifies the credit events that will trigger
payment from the seller to the buyer. Whereas such instruments can be used to hedge risks,
they may also be used for speculative purposes to put a short position on the credit markets.
The important role that such contingent linkages play is demonstrated by the financial crisis
of 2007-2009. As that crisis unfolded, AIG faced bankruptcy after the failure of Lehman
Brothers due to the large payouts it was required to make on its CDS contracts referencing
Lehman and mortgage-backed securities. When the crisis hit, the sudden calls to pay out
the CDS contracts put great pressure on AIG, which traditionally had a thin capital base.
Consequently AIG had to be rescued by the U.S. Department of Treasury so as to avoid
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jeopardizing the financial health of firms which bought CDSs from AIG. However, despite
the importance of these linkages, current models are unable to account for the conditional
payments that an insurance or credit default swap contract would require. I refer to [24] for
a preliminary study of the insurance and reinsurance market.
As far as I am aware, theoretical work on contingent payments and CDS in relation to
systemic risk has not been explored much. [19, 18] show that the clearing vector in the
presence of generalized CDS contracts is not well-defined and need not exist. They further
propose a static setting to model CDS payments and give sufficient conditions on the network
topology for existence of a clearing solution. [81] considers such a model in a static framework
and proposes a method to rewrite some classes of network topologies as an Eisenberg--Noe
system. [17, 36] modeled CDS payments, but most of the reference entities are required
to be external to the financial system. [78] modeled reinsurance networks and studied the
implications of network topologies on existence and uniqueness of the liabilities and clearing
payments. A different approach has been taken in [74] in which a stochastic setting is used
to analyze contagion caused by credit default swaps. The role of credit default swaps in
causing financial contagion has been captured in several empirical studies, see e.g. [92, 84].
This chapter aims to provide a generalized theoretical framework in which to study credit
default swaps and other contingent payments in the Eisenberg--Noe setting. I focus on
existence and uniqueness of the clearing payments under contingent payments without presupposing the nature of those payments or strong assumptions on the network topology.
This is in contrast to the aforementioned literature on CDS network models in which there
is no guarantee that the realized networks would obey the required conditions. Hence it is
paramount to develop results for a general network, irrespective of the topology. I do this
by first considering the problem in a static framework where all claims are settled simultaneously. In such a setting I find that uniqueness of the clearing solution follows so long as
no firm is “speculating” on another firm’s failure. However, with speculation the problem in
a static setting no longer satisfies the sufficient mathematical properties for uniqueness. In
order to overcome this issue, I introduce a dynamic framework. This setting ensures both
existence and uniqueness of a clearing solution under the usual conditions from [45]. Additionally I demonstrate how this framework can be applied to problems that were ill-defined
in the static framework through numerical examples.
120

This chapter is organized in the following way: First, in Section 5.2, I will introduce the
mathematical and financial setting. In Section 5.3, I develop the static framework for incorporating contingent payments such as insurance and CDS, provide results on existence
and develop conditions for uniqueness that are intimately related to considerations of insurance versus speculation. Further I demonstrate some shortcomings inherent to the static
framework with contingent payments. In Section 5.4, I introduce a discrete time dynamic
framework and discuss existence and uniqueness results.

5.2

Background

I begin this chapter by reviewing notation for the clearing system used in [45]. For a detailed
discussion of this mathematical framework, I refer the reader to Chapter 1.3. The goal of
this chapter is to extend this framework to include contingent payments.
Throughout this chapter, I will consider a network of n financial institutions. I will denote
the set of all banks in the network by N := {1, 2, . . . , n}. I will consider an additional node
0, which encompasses the entirety of the financial system outside of the n banks; this node 0
will also be referred to as society or the societal node. The full set of institutions, including
the societal node, is denoted by N0 := N ∪ {0}.
I will be extending the model from [45] in this chapter. In that work, any bank i ∈ N may
have obligations Lij ≥ 0 to any other firm or society j ∈ N0 . I will assume that no firm
has any obligations to itself, i.e., Lii = 0 for all firms i ∈ N , and the society node has no
liabilities at all, i.e., L0j = 0 for all firms j ∈ N0 . Thus the total liabilities for bank i ∈ N
P
L
is given by p̄i := j∈N0 Lij ≥ 0 and relative liabilities πij := p̄iji if p̄i > 0 and arbitrary
otherwise; for simplicity, in the case that p̄i = 0, I will let πij = n1 for all j ∈ N0 \{i} and
P
πii = 0 to retain the property that j∈N0 πij = 1. On the other side of the balance sheet, all
firms are assumed to begin with some amount of external assets xi ≥ 0 for all firms i ∈ N0 .
In particular, the societal node has x0 > 0. The resultant clearing payments, under a no
priority of payments assumption, satisfy the fixed point problem in payments p ∈ [0, p̄]

p = p̄ ∧ x + Π> p .
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(5.1)

That is, each bank pays the minimum of what it owes (p̄i ) and what it has (xi +
The resultant vector of wealths for all firms is given by
V = x + Π> p − p̄.

P

j∈N

πji pj ).

(5.2)

Due to the equivalence of the clearing payments and clearing wealths as discussed in Chapter
1.3.3, I am able to consider the Eisenberg--Noe system as a fixed point of clearing wealth
rather than payments as given by the following equation. For a detailed discussion on this
point, I refer the reader to Chapter 1.3.3.

V = x + Π> [p̄ − V − ]+ − p̄.

(5.3)

In Chapter 1.3, results for the existence and uniqueness of the clearing payments (and thus
for the clearing wealths as well) are provided. In fact, it can be shown that there exists a
unique clearing solution in the Eisenberg--Noe framework so long as Li0 > 0 for all firms
i ∈ N . I will take advantage of this result later in this paper. This is a reasonable assumption
(as discussed in, e.g., [67]) as obligations to society include, e.g., deposits to the banks.

5.3

Simultaneous network clearing with contingent payments

5.3.1

General setting

Let me now consider the case when the nominal liabilities between financial institutions
depend explicitly on the wealths of the firms. This is, for instance, the case with insurance, credit default swaps, reserve requirements with a central bank, or the default waterfall
enacted by central counterparties; see Examples 5.3.2-5.3.5 for more details of those cases.
As a general setting, this corresponds to the situation in which the nominal liabilities Lij :
Rn+1 → R+ from bank i ∈ N to j ∈ N0 is a mapping from the vector of bank wealths
into the obligations; as mentioned above, I will assume that L0i ≡ 0 and Lii ≡ 0 for all
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firms i ∈ N . That is, dependent on the actualized wealths V ∈ Rn+1 of all institutions
(n+1)×(n+1)
in the system, the nominal liabilities will adjust to be L(V ) ∈ R+
a nonnegative
matrix with 0 diagonal. In the case that the societal node is not desired, then this can be
incorporated by setting Li0 ≡ 0 for all i ∈ N . Thus I consider a static setting for these
contingent payments, i.e., I assume all claims are resolved simultaneously and the nominal
liabilities L account for all layers of contingent claims.
Assumption 5.3.1. The nominal liabilities Lij : Rn+1 → R+ are bounded with upper bound
L̄ij ≥ 0 for all institutions i, j ∈ N0 .
Example 5.3.2. Consider a static network model of external assets x ∈ Rn+1
and liabilities
+
(n+1)×(n+1)
0
0
L ∈ R+
(with corresponding total liabilities p̄ and relative liabilities Π0 ). Firm
j ∈ N0 purchased an insurance contract from firm i ∈ N on the event that firm k ∈ N does
not pay its obligations in full to firm j; this is encoded in the nominal liabilities function
Lij (V ) = L0ij +

X

Lkj (V )
Vk− .
L
(V
)
l∈N0 kl

ηijk (V ) P

k∈N

In the above equation I set the parameter ηijk : Rn+1 → [0, 1] to denote the level of insurance
offered by the contract. Logically I impose the condition that ηiji ≡ 0 for all firms i ∈ N
and j ∈ N0 so as a firm is not insuring against itself. I further impose a tree structure
on the insurance, that is insurers will not directly insure nonpayments from other insurers
in a cyclical manner. This is codified in the condition that ηijk1 ηkk12j . . . ηki m j = 0 for all
i, j, k1 , · · · , km ∈ N0 . This tree structure immediately implies the uniqueness of the nominal
(n+1)×(n+1)
liabilities matrix L : Rn+1 → R+
. These conditions are related to the “green core”
system in [19]. In the case that ηijk (V ) > 1, this is the situation of over-insurance which
no longer is considered “insurance” in the strict legal sense; see Example 5.3.3 for this more
P
general setting. More generally, over-insurance is implied by the condition i∈N ηijk (V ) >
1, i.e., the total amount of insurance on any payment should be bounded by 1. Though
explained as a single insurance contract, multiple such contracts may be layered so that
one financial institution may have insurance against the failures of multiple counterparties.
The simplest insurance contracts are such that ηijk ≡ η̂ijk ∈ [0, 1], though by considering the
functional I allow for situations in which insurance only pays losses exceeding a threshold
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τijk , e.g.,
h
ηijk (V ) = η̂ijk

L

(V )

Lkj (V ) − P kj Lkl (V ) Vk− + τijk
l∈N0
h
i+
L (V )
Lkj (V ) − P kj Lkl (V ) Vk−

i+
.

l∈N0

Also within this framework I allow for reinsurance contracts; that is, insurance contracts
that pay out once payments from an insurer reach a certain threshold so as to contain the
losses for the insurer itself.
Example 5.3.3. As in Example 5.3.2, consider an initial static network model with asset
and liability parameters (x, L0 ). Though similar to an insurance policy, a firm may purchase
credit default swaps. Firm j ∈ N0 purchased a credit default swap [CDS] from firm i ∈ N
on the failure of firm k ∈ N is encoded in the formula
Lij (V ) = L0ij +

X

ηijk (V )Vk− .

k∈N

In this example I define ηijk : Rn+1 → R+ without restriction on the number of swaps
purchased or the existence of an insurable interest. In such a way I allow for so-called
“naked” CDSs where the payments to firm j are not based on any insurable interest in firm
k.
Example 5.3.4. As in Example 5.3.2, consider an initial static network model with asset
and liability parameters (x, L0 ). I will now consider a system in which all firms must pay
towards a centralized stability fund. That is, prior to the start some amount y ∈ [0, x] of
the external assets are provided from each firm used in the stability fund. In the case of
failures this fund would support the defaulting firms. Consider this centralized fund to be
denoted as node B and let NB = N0 ∪ {B}. This system can be described in which the
bailout fund is capitalized prior to clearing or as part of clearing. If the bailout is collected
prior to clearing than this system is described by external assets of xi − yi ≥ 0 for all firms
P
i ∈ N and i∈N yi ≥ 0 for the stability fund node B and liabilities of
Lij (V ) = L0ij ∀i, j ∈ N0 ,

LBi (V ) = Vi− ∀i ∈ N ,
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LiB (V ) = 0 ∀i ∈ N .

The payments to this stability fund can also be made as a part of clearing. In this case the
external assets are x and liabilities are
Lij (V ) = L0ij ∀i, j ∈ N0 ,

LBi (V ) = Vi− ∀i ∈ N ,

LiB (V ) = yi ∀i ∈ N .

This can be extended further by setting the payments to the stability fund y to itself be a
function of the wealth of each institution. This allows for concepts such as pooled reserve
requirements to be encoded into the general framework.
Example 5.3.5. The final general conceptual example I wish to present is the situation of
introducing a central counterparty [CCP]. In this setting, the network topology follows a star
shape, i.e., firms only have liabilities to and from some centralized CCP node. The true CCP
rules, however, also include what is called a default waterfall. The default waterfall kicks in
when the CCP is unable to pay out in full through the initial collected liabilities and margin
payments. In such a case the remaining solvent firms are forced to provide more liquidity to
the CCP node. In a broad sense, this fits within the general framework considered herein as
the obligations to the CCP are directly dependent on the wealths of all firms in the system.
CCPs are described in more detail in [2, 89, 34, 36].
As in the construction of the Eisenberg--Noe setting [45], the total and relative liabilities
will implicitly be functions of the system wealths as well, i.e.,
p̄i (V ) =

X

Lij (V )

(5.4)

j∈N0

πij (V ) =


Lij (V )



 p̄i (V )
1

n



0

if p̄i (V ) > 0
if p̄i (V ) = 0, i 6= j

(5.5)

if p̄i (V ) = 0, i = j

for firms i, j ∈ N0 and system equities V ∈ Rn+1 .
With this contingent setting I can define the extension of the Eisenberg--Noe framework as
the fixed point problem
V = x + Π(V )> [p̄(V ) − V − ]+ − p̄(V ).
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(5.6)

That is, the wealths are the sum of external assets and payments from other banks minus
the payments owed. This could equivalently be defined directly as the payments as is done
in [45], I choose to consider the wealths directly in this work as it is easier to consider the
examples, e.g., insurance payments. The realized payments can be defined (as discussed
previously without contingent payments) by p = [p̄(V ) − V − ]+ .
Proposition 5.3.6. Under Assumption 5.3.1, any fixed point wealth V ∈ Rn+1 of (5.6) lies
Q
P
P
within the compact set ni=1 [xi − j∈N0 L̄ij , xi + j∈N L̄ji ].
Proof. The result is immediate by the boundedness properties of Assumption 5.3.1.
Corollary 5.3.7. Under Assumption 5.3.1, there exists an equilibrium wealth of (5.6) if
Lij : Rn+1 → R+ is continuous as a function of wealths for all firms i, j ∈ N0 .
Proof. This follows from the compactness argument of Proposition 5.3.6 and the Brouwer
fixed point theorem.
Though in Corollary 5.3.7 I have proven the existence of an equilibrium solution to (5.6),
this need not be a unique solution. The following example illustrates a simple network with
multiple equilibria. Further, Corollary 5.3.7 and (5.6) implicitly assume that there are no
bankruptcy costs. With such costs (as introduced in [96]), Corollary 5.3.7 will no longer
apply. See also Remark 5.3.12 for a discussion on sufficient conditions to guarantee existence
of a clearing wealths vector under bankruptcy costs.
Example 5.3.8. Consider the network with n = 3 banks, and without the societal node.
This network is depicted in Figure 5.1. Banks 1 and 3 have x1 = x3 = 0 external assets and
bank 2 begins with x2 = 3/16 external assets. I consider the case in which L23 = L32 ≡ 1
are fixed obligations whereas the first bank has purchased a credit default swap on the
third institution defaulting on its obligations from the second institution that pays out
L21 (V ) = V3− . No other exposures exist within this system. The system of wealths must
therefore satisfy
V3−
−
− +
V1 =
− (1 + V3 − V2 )
1 + V3
3
V2 =
+ (1 − V3− )+ − (1 + V3− )
16
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V3 =

1
(1 + V3− − V2− )+ − 1.
1 + V3−

It can be shown that the following are both equilibrium wealths of the contingent network:
• V = (0 , 3/16 , 0)> , i.e., payments are given by p = p̄(V ) − V − = (0 , 1 , 1)> , and
• V = (3/16 , −21/16 , −3/4)> , i.e., payments are given by p = p̄(V )−V − = (0 , 7/16 , 1/4)> .
L32 ≡ 1
x1 = 0

L21 (V ) =

V3−

x2 =

3
16

x3 = 0
L23 ≡ 1

Figure 5.1: Example 5.3.8: A graphical representation of the network model with 3 banks
which accepts more than one clearing solution.

5.3.2

A nonspeculative financial network

I will now impose additional properties upon the financial system to have stronger existence
results, culminating in uniqueness of the clearing solutions. These results provide monotonicity of the wealth of the banks in the financial system. The first of such properties,
defined as a nonspeculative property, is provided below in Definition 5.3.9.
Definition 5.3.9. Firm i ∈ N0 is called nonspeculative if
xi +

X

πji (V )[p̄j (V ) − Vj− ]+ − p̄i (V )

j∈N

is nondecreasing in V ∈ Rn+1 . The network N0 is called nonspeculative if all firms i ∈ N0
are nonspeculative.
I call the property in Definition 5.3.9 “nonspeculative” as it provides conditions so that firm
i ∈ N0 does not benefit from (i.e., speculate on) the failure of another firm. I do, however,
allow for firm i to hedge its exposure to other firms. This exposure can be either direct or
indirect.
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Remark 5.3.10. The nonspeculative framework considered herein is similar to, and can be
considered as an extension of the properties considered in [19]. In that work, the monotonicity
property, in the definition of nonspeculative systems that I consider, is specified for credit
default swaps. Properties on solutions, which I will derive from this nonspeculative property,
are considered as a function of the network topology in [19]; in fact, the topological features
required in [19] guarantee that the “green core” system is inherently nonspeculative.
Lemma 5.3.11. Under Assumption 5.3.1, any nonspeculative system has a greatest and least
Q
equilibrium wealth V ↑ ≥ V ↓ satisfying (5.6) existing within the compact space i∈N0 [xi −
P
P
j∈N0 L̄ij , xi +
j∈N L̄ji ]. Additionally, under all clearing vectors the value of the equity
of each node of the financial system is the same, that is, if V and V̂ are any two clearing
wealths then V + = V̂ + .
Proof. By the nonspeculative property I can apply the Tarski fixed point theorem to get the
existence of a maximal and minimal fixed point V ↑ ≥ V ↓ . By Proposition 5.3.6 I have that
such solutions must exist within the provided compact space.
Now I will show the uniqueness of the positive equities by proving that (V ↑ )+ = (V ↓ )+ . By
definition I know that (V ↑ )+ ≥ (V ↓ )+ , so as in [45, Theorem 1] I will prove that the total
positive equity in the system remains constant. Let V ∈ Rn+1 be some equilibrium wealth
solution, then since p̄0 ≡ 0 by definition I recover that
!+
X

Vi+ =

i∈N0

X

xi +

X

i∈N0

j∈N

X

X

πji (V )[p̄j (V ) − Vj− ]+ − p̄i (V )
!

=

xi +

i∈N0

=
=

X

j∈N

xi +

j∈N

X

X

xi +

i∈N0

=

X

i∈N0

X

πji (V )[p̄j (V ) − Vj− ]+ − [p̄i (V ) − Vi− ]+

[p̄j (V ) − Vj− ]+

X

πji (V ) −

i∈N0

[p̄j (V ) − Vj− ]+ −

j∈N

X

X
i∈N0

[p̄i (V ) − Vi− ]+

i∈N0

xi .

i∈N0

Therefore

↑ +
i∈N0 (Vi )

P

=

P

↓ +
i∈N0 (Vi )

and thus (V ↑ )+ = (V ↓ )+ .
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[p̄i (V ) − Vi− ]+

Remark 5.3.12. The inclusion of bankruptcy costs to this setting, in much the same way
as accomplished in [96, 19], would guarantee the existence of a maximal and minimal clearing wealths vector under the assumptions of Lemma 5.3.11. Much as in [19], without the
nonspeculative assumption, a solution may not exist since Corollary 5.3.7 will no longer
apply.
I will now give additional properties for the societal node 0 to satisfy.
Assumption 5.3.13. All firms i ∈ N have strictly positive obligations to society, i.e.,
Li0 : Rn+1 → R++ . Additionally, the obligations to society depend only on the negative
wealths of all firms, i.e., Li0 (V ) = Li0 (−V − ) for all i ∈ N .
Definition 5.3.14. The societal node is called strictly nonspeculative if
X

πj0 (V )[p̄j (V ) − Vj− ]+

j∈N

is strictly increasing in V ∈ Rn+1
− . The network N0 is called strictly nonspeculative if the
system is nonspeculative and the societal node is strictly nonspeculative.
I call this property strictly nonspeculative since it provides the condition that society does
strictly worse as any firm defaults by any additional amount. This requires that society can
never perfectly hedge its risk, and as a consequence is strictly not speculating on any firm’s
failure. This is a reasonable property as society should always be exposed to banking failures
to some degree through, e.g., deposits and the payments necessary for deposit insurance.
Corollary 5.3.15. Under Assumptions 5.3.1 and 5.3.13, any strictly nonspeculative sysQ
tem has a unique equilibrium wealth of (5.6) existing within the compact space i∈N0 [xi −
P
P
j∈N0 L̄ij , xi +
j∈N L̄ji ].
Proof. Using Lemma 5.3.11 I have the existence of greatest and least fixed points V ↑ ≥ V ↓ .
Assume there exists some firm i ∈ N such that 0 > Vi↑ > Vi↓ (otherwise uniqueness is
guaranteed by nonexistence of such a firm as well as the uniqueness of the positive equities).
By the definition of the equilibrium wealth of the society node
V0↑ =

X

πj0 (V ↑ )[p̄j (V ↑ ) − (Vj↑ )− ]+

j∈N
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>

X

πj0 (V ↓ )[p̄j (V ↓ ) − (Vj↓ )− ]+ = V0↓ .

j∈N

However, immediately I know that the societal node has positive equity, therefore by Lemma
5.3.11 it must follow that V0↑ = V0↓ , which is a contradiction so uniqueness must follow.
I will now provide a version of the fictitious default algorithm (as discussed in, e.g., [45,
96, 6, 51, 104]) for the contingent payments described in (5.6). Algorithm 5.3.16 provides
the maximal fixed point V ↑ under the conditions of Lemma 5.3.11, that is, for a network
of nonspeculative banks. It can easily be modified to provide the minimal fixed point V ↓
instead. Under the assumptions of Corollary 5.3.15 this algorithm results in the unique
equilibrium wealths.
Algorithm 5.3.16. Consider the setting of Lemma 5.3.11 such that L(V ) = L(−V − ) for
every V ∈ Rn+1 . The greatest clearing wealths V ↑ can be found in at most n iterations of
the following algorithm. Initialize k = 0, D0 = ∅, and V 0 = x + Π(0)> p̄(0) − p̄(0).
(i) Increment k = k + 1;
(ii) Denote the set of insolvent banks by Dk = {i ∈ N | Vik−1 < 0};
(iii) If Dk = Dk−1 then terminate;
(iv) Define the matrix Λ ∈ {0, 1}(n+1)×(n+1) so that

1 if i = j ∈ Dk
Λij =
;
0 else
(v) V k = V̂ is the maximal solution of the following fixed point problem:
V̂ = x + Π(ΛV̂ )> [p̄(ΛV̂ ) + ΛV̂ ]+ − p̄(ΛV̂ )
in the domain

Q

i∈N0 [xi

−

P

j∈N0

L̄ij , xi +

(vi) Go back to step i.
130

P

j∈N

L̄ji ];

In Algorithm 5.3.16 at most n iterations are needed, as opposed to n+1 as would generally be
stated for the fictitious default algorithm of [45]. This is due to the fact that, by definition,
the societal node 0 has no obligations and therefore cannot default. The additional condition
that L(V ) = L(−V − ) for Algorithm 5.3.16 corresponds to the case in which the nominal
liabilities only depend on the set of solvent institutions and the shortfall of each insolvent
institution. This is satisfied for, e.g., CDS as described in Example 5.3.3.
I now consider a simple sensitivity analysis of the clearing wealths V under uncertainty in
the initial endowments x ∈ Rn+1
+ . In so doing I am able to consider similar comparative
statics results as in Lemma 5 of [45].
Proposition 5.3.17. Consider the setting of Corollary 5.3.15 such that the nominal liabilities Lij : Rn+1 → R+ are continuous for every pair of firms i, j ∈ N0 . The unique clearing
wealths V : Rn+1
→ Rn+1 are continuous and nondecreasing as a function of the initial
+
endowments x ∈ Rn+1
+ .
Proof. The proof is presented in the appendix.

5.3.3

Shortcomings

I wish to conclude my discussion of the system with contingent obligations under simultaneous claims by considering shortfalls to this approach. In the subsequent section I will
consider a dynamic approach to overcome these shortcomings, as well the issues on existence
and uniqueness considered above and by [19, 18].
Consider a setting in which a firm takes out an insurance contract on its own failure. This
setting is of particular interest as it is inherently the type of contingent payment owed to
a central counterparty as part of the default waterfall in the CCP framework considered
in Example 5.3.5 or the stability fund discussed in Example 5.3.4. To further simplify this
setting, and again to make it relevant with regards to the CCP framework, I will consider
the case in which the firm(s) offering insurance have enough assets to make all payments
in full. Allow the firm taking out the insurance contracts to be firm 1. If the sum total of
all contingent payments are exactly enough to make firm 1 whole again, i.e., all contingent
payments to firm 1 sum up to V1− , then in principle firm 1 will never default. However,
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in equilibrium, this is not what the insurance payments will be; in fact, if the insurance
payments in a fixed point were to make firm 1 whole then no insurance payments would
be made and the initial shortfall would be realized once more. Therefore, in equilibrium, it
must be the case that firm 1 will default even if they are paid the insurance. As a simple
demonstrative example, if firm 1 only has obligations to the societal node (allowing to ignore
all feedback effects from firm 1 paying more and having a higher recovery rate through the
network) then the insurance will add up to exactly half of firm 1’s initial shortfall in the
fixed point as the new shortfall for firm 1 will be equal to the contingent payments that are
being made.
However, while this conceptual problem with a firm taking out an insurance contract on its
own losses is important, it can conceivably be overcome by providing a sufficiently complicated structure to the contingent payments. A more subtle, but pernicious, flaw is that this
contingent payment system is speculative by construction. Namely, if the wealth of firm 1
is lowered, no other firm does better (firm 1 will pay out less and the insurance companies
will have higher claims to pay), but firm 1 itself improves its wealth. This is due to the
nonspeculative property being constructed in which firm 1 does not directly get hit by its
own lower wealth, but would only occur in network effects that would be on the second order,
not in evidence in the single iteration of the definition. Thus, even though the network is
constructed from the notion that no firm benefits in the case of defaults (and this would be
evidenced in any equilibrium), the monotonicity of the nonspeculative property is a stronger
construct that cannot be satisfied so easily from a conceptual standpoint.
The above described problems could, in specific circumstances (e.g., a single insurer and
only one contingent payment contract or a “green core” system from [19]), be overcome by
reformulating the payments appropriately. However, in the general case with each contract
incorporating no speculation from a financial perspective, this system would have the aforementioned shortcomings. These challenges, along with the inability to deal with speculative
systems in general, stem from structural issues in such a static framework. Specifically, insurance, and contingent payments more generally, are paid on specific claims, not simultaneous
to the claim being made. This necessitates a dynamic approach to this problem, which I will
discuss in the subsequent section.
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5.4

Dynamic framework

As detailed above, the static, simultaneous claims, model presented has both mathematical
and economic issues that I am not aware of any way to overcome in a general setting. These
problems are associated with the presence of, potentially, infinite cycles. Much as with [80],
these cycles could alternate between two states, particularly for speculative systems. That is,
for instance, insurance is paid out because a bank is insolvent, but because of this insurance
payment the firm is no longer insolvent and no payment would be necessary. As in [80], I will
consider an algorithmic approach to this issue. I thus propose a simple dynamic framework.
Additionally, I consider this setting to be more realistic than the static setting considered
above and by [19] as the financial system does not include the payment of, e.g., a CDS on
the obligation inherent in that contract.

5.4.1

General setting

I adapt the framework introduced in Chapter 4 for the purposes of constructing a simple
dynamic framework for contingent payments. Consider a discrete set of clearing times T,
e.g., T = {0, 1, . . . , T } for some (finite) terminal time T < ∞ or T = N. For processes
I will use the notation from [35] such that the process Z : T → Rn has value of Z(t)
at time t ∈ T and history Zt := (Z(s))ts=0 . As an explicit extension to Chapter 4.3, I
consider the external (incoming) cash flow x : T × R(n+1)×|T| → Rn+1
and nominal liabilities
+
(n+1)×(n+1)
L : T × R(n+1)×|T| → R+
to be functions of the clearing time and prior wealths. For
simplicity, I will consider x(t, ·) := x(t) to be independent of the prior wealths, though it
may still depend on time. The distinguishing feature of this model compared to the static
Eisenberg--Noe model (or the static contingent payment model above and in [19]) is that the
system parameters may depend on prior times. For example, if firm i has positive equity at
time t − 1 (i.e., Vi (t − 1) > 0) then these surplus assets are available to firm i at time t in
order to satisfy its obligations. In the contingent setting, the wealths of all banks at time
t − 1 may affect the obligations due at time t as well.
I note that in Chapter 4.3 all unpaid obligations from a prior time are assumed to roll forward
automatically. That is, if firm i has negative wealth at time t − 1 then the debts that the
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firm has not yet paid will roll forward in time and be due at the next time point. Under
such an assumption, no firm is deemed to default on its obligations until the terminal time
T . Herein, with the explicit consideration of the contingent payments, I may “zero out” a
firm before the terminal date if it is deemed to default in much the same as in, e.g., [27].
While I can incorporate the notion of loans from [27] as well, I will restrict my analysis to
debts rolling forward in time so as to simplify the discussion.
As noted above, in addition to the structure from Chapter 4.3, the nominal liabilities will
explicitly depend on the clearing wealths of the prior time(s), i.e., L : T × R(n+1)×|T| →
(n+1)×(n+1)
R+
. Often, to make this difference explicit especially in examples, I consider the full
nominal liabilities L to be a combination of two components: a non-contingent component
(n+1)×(n+1)
L0 : T → R+
which is only a function of clearing times and a contingent component
(n+1)×(n+1)
c
(n+1)×|T|
L : T×R
→ R+
which is a function of both the clearing times and the
past history (but only encodes the contingent payments based on the past history). That is,
L = L0 + Lc .
As a descriptive consideration of the contingent obligations Lc , consider the insurance-based
(Example 5.3.2) or credit default swap (Example 5.3.3) scenarios of the previous section. For
instance, a bank j may purchase a credit default swap from bank i on the failure of firm k
as described in Example 5.3.3. As opposed to the simultaneous claims setting in Section 5.3,
in this dynamic setting I consider an order of operations. That is, first firm k must fail at
time t − 1, and only then would the credit default swap be paid at time t. This delay in
payments is a reflection of the real financial system in which there is a time between a claim
being made by bank j to i and the payment on that claim. The payment due to this credit
default swap would be incorporated in Lcij but not L0ij .
Even with this important distinction, I can use the same methodology as in Chapter 4.3
to prove existence and uniqueness of the clearing wealths in this setting. The following
assumption, with the concept taken from Chapter 4.3 guarantees that all firms are solvent
at the start of the system and that the system is a regular network as described by [45].
Assumption 5.4.1. Before the time of interest, all firms are solvent and liquid. That is,
Vi (−1) ≥ 0 for all firms i ∈ N0 . Additionally, all firms have positive external cash flow or
obligations to society at all times t ∈ T, i.e., xi (t) + Li0 (t) > 0 for all firms i ∈ N and all
times t ∈ T.
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To incorporate the possibility of firms defaulting before the terminal time, let N0t (Vt−1 ) ⊆ N0
denote the firms that are paying obligations at time t ∈ T based on the history of wealths up
to time t − 1. In particular, I will assume that N00 (V−1 ) := N0 and N0t+1 (Vt ) ⊆ N0t (Vt−1 ) for
any time t and any wealths process V . That is, all firms are deemed solvent at time 0 as in
Assumption 5.4.1 and no firm recovers from default. This notion allows for a consideration
in much the same manner as [27]. Mathematically this does not require further consideration
than in Chapter 4.3 as N0t only depends on the history up to time t − 1. With this notation
I can define Lij (t, Vt−1 ) = 0 for all firms j ∈ N0 and i 6∈ N0t (Vt−1 ). With the notion of an
auction from [27] it will also follow that Lji (t, Vt−1 ) = 0 for all firms j ∈ N0 and i 6∈ N0t (Vt−1 ).
I define the total liabilities and relative liabilities at time t ∈ T as
p̄i (t, Vt−1 ) :=

X

Lij (t, Vt−1 ) + Vi (t − 1)−

j∈N

πij (t, Vt−1 ) :=

 0
Lij (t,Vt−1 )+πij (t−1,Vt−2 )Vi (t−1)−



p̄i (t,Vt−1 )

1

n



0

if p̄i (t, Vt−1 ) > 0
if p̄i (t, Vt−1 ) = 0, j 6= i

∀i, j ∈ N0 .

if p̄i (t, Vt−1 ) = 0, j = i

Then the clearing wealths must satisfy the following fixed point problem in time t wealths:

+
V (t) = V (t−1)+ +x(t)+Π(t, Vt−1 )> diag(I{} {i ∈ N0t (Vt−1 )}) p̄(t, Vt−1 ) − V (t)− −p̄(t, Vt−1 ).
(5.7)
I proceed to reformulate the problem as in Chapter 4.3. I consider a process of cash flows c
and functional relative exposures A. These I define by
c(t, Vt−1 ) := x(t) + L(t, Vt−1 )>~1 − L(t, Vt−1 )~1

π (t, V )
if p̄i (t, Vt−1 ) ≥ Vi (t)− , i ∈ N0t (Vt−1 )
ij
t−1
aij (t, Vt ) :=
 Lij (t,Vt−1 )+aij (t−1,Vt−1 )Vi (t−1)− else

∀i, j ∈ N0 .

Vi (t)−

(5.8)
That is, I consider c(t, Vt−1 ) ∈ Rn+1 to be the vector of book capital levels at time t, i.e., the
new wealth of each firm assuming all other firms pay in full. I can also consider ci (t, Vt−1 ) to
be the net cash flow for firm i at time t. I define the functional matrix A : T × R(n+1)×|T| →
[0, 1](n+1)×(n+1) to be the relative exposure matrix. That is, aij (t, Vt )Vi (t)− provides the
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(negative) impact that firm i’s losses have on firm j’s wealth at time t ∈ T. This is in
contrast to Π, the relative liabilities, in that it endogenously imposes the limited exposures
concept. This equivalent formulation provides mathematical simplicity to the analysis.
Thus the fixed point equation reduces to
V (t) = V (t − 1) + c(t, Vt−1 ) − A(t, Vt )> V (t)− + A(t − 1, Vt−1 )> V (t − 1)− .

(5.9)

With this setup I now wish to extend the existence and uniqueness results of [45] to discrete
time.
(n+1)×(n+1)

Corollary 5.4.2. Let (c, L) : T×R(n+1)×|T| → Rn+1 ×R+
define a dynamic financial
network such that every bank has cash flow at least at the level dictated by nominal interbank
P
P
liabilities, i.e., ci (t, Vt−1 ) ≥ j∈N Lji (t, Vt−1 ) − j∈N0 Lij (t, Vt−1 ) for all times t ∈ T and all
wealth processes V , and so that every bank owes to the societal node at all times t ∈ T, i.e.,
Li0 (t, Vt−1 ) > 0 for all banks i ∈ N , times t ∈ T, and wealths V . Under Assumption 5.4.1,
there exists a unique solution of clearing wealths V : T → Rn+1 to (5.9).
Proof. This follows directly from the proof of Theorem 4.3.3.
With the construction of the existence and uniqueness of the solution, I now want to emphasize the fictitious default algorithm from [45] to construct this clearing wealths vector over
time. I note that at each time t this algorithm takes at most n iterations as is the case for
the fictitious default algorithm originally presented in [45]. Thus with a terminal time T ,
this algorithm will construct the full clearing solution over T in nT iterations.
Algorithm 5.4.3. Under the assumptions of Theorem 5.4.2, the clearing wealths process
V : T → Rn+1 can be found by the following algorithm. Initialize t = −1 and V (−1) ≥ 0 as
a given. Repeat until t = max T:
(i) Increment t = t + 1.
(ii) Initialize k = 0, V 0 = V (t − 1) + c(t, Vt−1 ), and D0 = ∅. Repeat until convergence:
(a) Increment k = k + 1;
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(b) Denote the set of illiquid banks by Dk := i ∈ N0t (Vt−1 ) | Vik−1 < 0 .
(c) If Dk = Dk−1 then terminate and set V (t) = V k−1 .

1 if i = j ∈ Dk
.
(d) Define the matrix Λk ∈ {0, 1}n×n so that Λkij =
0 else

(e) Define V k = (I−Π(t, Vt−1 )> Λk )−1 V (t − 1) + c(t, Vt−1 ) + A(t − 1, Vt−1 )> V (t − 1)− .
In step (iie) of the fictitious default algorithm I am able to replace A(t, Vt ) with Π(t, Vt−1 ).
This is beneficial as it allows to directly compute V k without requiring a fixed point problem.
I additionally note that the inclusion of defaulted banks only required the change that the
fictitious set of illiquid banks is a subset of N0t (Vt−1 ) at each time t.
Remark 5.4.4. The dynamic framework provides a flexible way to deal with contingent
payments. In particular, I can have as many time steps as the number of contingent payment
layers in the network. For example, to consider insurance I need to have two time points
to incorporate the nominal claims and the insurance claims triggered by the clearing of
these nominal claims. For reinsurance markets, I need three time steps, the third one to
incorporate the reinsurance claims triggered by the clearing of the insurance claims. I feel
this hierarchical resolution of the claims is widely observed in reality.
Remark 5.4.5. One of the advantages of the dynamic framework is that it provides a
natural way to include bankruptcy costs. This is a deviation from the static framework
where I might not have existence of solutions for bankruptcy costs. However in the dynamic
framework I can always determine the time point when the equity of a bank reaches zero
and include the bankruptcy costs for the successive time periods. Hence the solution will
exist and be unique.
Remark 5.4.6. I can provide much stronger sensitivity results in this case, as compared to
the static case. Since in this approach at every time step I get an Eisenberg--Noe system,
the sensitivity results are a sequential application of Section 4 of [45]. Directional derivatives
of the static Eisenberg--Noe approach have been considered in [82, 55].
I wish to finish this section by remarking on when the dynamic framework presented herein
will provide a clearing solution from the simultaneous claim setting in the prior section.
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Remark 5.4.7. In general, the clearing solutions of the simultaneous claims framework will
not coincide with the terminal clearing wealths of the dynamic framework. These notions
will, however, coincide if the relative liabilities are kept constant as a function of wealths
and time. Other settings, as evidenced by the examples provided in the next section, may
provide sufficient conditions for the dynamic framework to provide a clearing solution from
the simultaneous clearing setting. In particular, this will occur if the contingent payments
do not strongly feedback into the network itself, e.g. if insurance is owed to an already
solvent firm. However, I want to emphasize that the conditions under which the static and
dynamic solutions coincide are very restrictive and in general this will not be the case. This
is appropriate given the shortcomings of the static setting as expressed in Section 5.3.3.

5.4.2

Examples

I now wish to provide three illustrative examples to demonstrate the value of the discrete
time setting as a model over the static setting presented in Section 5.3. These three examples
correspond to simple networks in which the static setting has no clearing wealths, has multiple
clearing wealths, and has a poor interpretation of the clearing wealths respectively. I will
show that in all three situations the discrete time model presented above provides a unique
clearing wealth for which the interpretation of the results is as anticipated.
Example 5.4.8. I wish to consider a small network example in which the financial system
does not admit a clearing solution in the static setting, but a unique and financially meaningful solution in the dynamic setting. In this case I will consider a digital CDS. That is, in
the case the CDS is triggered, the payment is a fixed strictly positive value (herein set to be
1), otherwise it pays out nothing. Immediately I can see that this is not a continuous payout
and therefore does not automatically provide a clearing solution in the static setting (see
Corollary 5.3.7), however I will still need to prove that there does not exist any solution.
Consider the network with n = 3 banks, and without the societal node, depicted in Figure
5.2. That is, bank 1 begins with x1 = 1, bank 2 with x2 = 0, and bank 3 with x3 = 2 in
external assets. I consider the case in which L12 ≡ 2 and L23 ≡ 1.5 are fixed obligations
whereas the first bank has purchased a digital credit default swap on the second institution
defaulting on its obligations from the third institution, i.e. L31 (V ) = I{} {V2 < 0}. No other
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exposures exist within this system. The system of wealths must therefore satisfy
V1 = 1 + (I{} {V2 < 0} − V3− )+ − 2
V2 = (2 − V1− )+ − 1.5
V3 = 2 + (1.5 − V2− )+ − I{} {V2 < 0}.
To show that no clearing solution exists to this system, I will consider the two possible
settings: bank 2 is solvent or bank 2 has negative wealth.
(i) Assume bank 2 is solvent, i.e. I{} {V2 < 0} = 0. I can compute a unique solution to the
clearing wealths V = (−1, −0.5, 3)> . However, since this violates my assumption that
V2 ≥ 0, this cannot be a clearing solution to the full problem.
(ii) Assume bank 2 is insolvent, i.e. I{} {V2 < 0} = 1. I can compute a unique solution to
the clearing wealths V = (0, 0.5, 2.5)> . However, since this violates my assumption
that V2 < 0, this cannot be a clearing solution to the full problem.
As no other possible clearing solutions can exist, it must be the case that there does not
exist a clearing solution to this static financial system.
L31 (V ) = I{} {V2 < 0}

x1 = 1

L12 ≡ 2

x2 = 0

L23 ≡ 1.5

x3 = 2

Figure 5.2: Example 5.4.8: A graphical representation of the network model with 3 banks
which has no clearing in a static setting.

Now I wish to consider the same example but in the discrete time framework with T = {0, 1}.
Here I will consider all possible divisions of the external assets over the two time points.
Formally, define x (0) = (, 0, 1)> and x (1) = (1 − , 0, 1)> for any  ∈ [0, 1]. Note that,
by the topology of this network, it is a regular network (as defined in [45]) for any choice
of  ∈ [0, 1] as required by Assumption 5.4.1. In any scenario, define L12 (0) = 2 and
L23 (0) = 1.5 with no other obligations at time 0. The only new obligation owed at time 1
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is the contingent payment from bank 3 to 1, i.e., L31 (1, V0 ) = I{} {V2 (0) < 0} with no other
new obligations at time 1. Further, all scenarios will be assumed to start from zero wealths
(thus satisfying Assumption 5.4.1). I can easily compute the unique clearing wealths under
x (assuming no firms are removed from the system) as V  (0) = ( − 2,  − 1.5,  + 1)> and
(noting that V2 (0) < 0 for any  ∈ [0, 1]) V  (1) = (0, 0.5, 2.5)> . I note that this clearing
solution is identical to the proposed static wealths under the assumption that bank 2 is
insolvent. Additionally, the final wealths are independent of the choice of .
Example 5.4.9. Consider again Example 5.3.8 with three banks. In the static solution this
was encoded by the parameters: external assets of x = (0, 3/16, 0)> and sparse liabilities
provided by L23 = L32 ≡ 1 and L21 (V ) = V3− . Two clearing solutions existed, V ∗ =
(0, 3/16, 0)> and V ∗ = (3/16, −21/16, −3/4)> .
Now I wish to consider the same example but in the discrete time framework with T = {0, 1}.
Here I will consider all possible divisions of the external assets over the two time points.
Formally, define x (0) = (0, , 0)> and x (1) = (0, 3/16 − , 0)> for any  ∈ (0, 3/16] to
guarantee the uniqueness of the clearing solutions as a regular network from [45] (and as
required from Assumption 5.4.1 and since no societal node is included in this example). In
any scenario, define L23 (0) = L32 (0) ≡ 1 with no other obligations at time 0. The only new
obligation owed at time 1 is the contingent payment from bank 2 to 1, i.e., L21 (1, V0 ) = V3 (0)−
with no other new obligations at time 1. Further, all scenarios will be assumed to start
from zero wealths (thus satisfying Assumption 5.4.1). I can easily compute the unique
clearing wealths under x as V  (0) = (0, , 0)> and V  (1) = (0, 3/16, 0)> . I note that this
clearing solution is identical to the first clearing wealths solution of the static system and is
independent of the choice of .
Example 5.4.10. Finally, I want to consider a simple financial system to demonstrate the
issues discussed in Section 5.3.3 surrounding the static framework. I will then use this same
network in the discrete time framework to find a unique, financially meaningful, clearing
solution. To do so, consider a bank who takes out an insurance payment on its own losses.
As discussed in Section 5.3.3, while the insured bank may, rightly, assume that their total
losses will be made whole, in a static setting this will not happen. However, in the dynamic
framework this does occur appropriately.
Consider the network with n = 3 banks, and without the societal node, depicted in Figure
5.3. That is, bank 1 begins with x1 = 1, bank 2 with x2 = 0, and bank 3 with x3 = 2 in
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external assets. I consider the case in which L12 ≡ 2 and L23 ≡ 1.5 are fixed obligations
whereas the first bank has purchased insurance on their own losses from the third institution,
i.e. L31 (V ) = V1− . No other exposures exist within this system. The system of wealths must
therefore satisfy
V1 = 1 + (V1− − V3− )+ − 2
V2 = (2 − V1− )+ − 1.5
V3 = 2 + (1.5 − V2− )+ − V1− .
Without the insurance payment, the first bank will default with wealths of V = (−1, −0.5, 3)> .
However, if the insurance is paid out in full then the first bank is made whole and the resultant wealths are V = (0, 0.5, 2.5). In this case, the first bank does not default, which
raises the question whether any insurance payment is to be made at all. Neither of these
are clearing solutions as the system would infinitely cycle between needing insurance or not.
The clearing wealths, instead, are given by V = (−0.5, 0, 3)> . That is, bank 1 will have
a shortfall midway between its wealth with and without the insurance being paid. This,
though, is not the notion that a firm purchasing insurance would expect as it cannot make
them whole.
L31 (V ) = V1−
x1 = 1

L12 ≡ 2

x2 = 0

L23 ≡ 1.5

x3 = 2

Figure 5.3: Example 5.4.10: A graphical representation of the network model with 3 banks
which has poor interpretation in a static setting.

Now I wish to consider the same example but in the discrete time framework with T = {0, 1}.
Here I will consider all possible divisions of the external assets over the two time points.
Formally, define x (0) = (, 0, 1)> and x (1) = (1 − , 0, 1)> for any  ∈ [0, 1]. Note that,
by the topology of this network, it is a regular network (as defined in [45]) for any choice
of  ∈ [0, 1] as required by Assumption 5.4.1. In any scenario, define L12 (0) = 2 and
L23 (0) = 1.5 with no other obligations at time 0. The only new obligation owed at time
1 is the contingent payment from bank 3 to 1, i.e., L31 (1, V0 ) = V1 (0)− with no other new
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obligations at time 1. Further, all scenarios will be assumed to start from zero wealths (thus
satisfying Assumption 5.4.1). I can easily compute the unique clearing wealths under x
(assuming no firms are removed from the system) as V  (0) = ( − 2,  − 1.5,  + 1)> and
(noting that V1 (0) < 0 for any  ∈ [0, 1]) V  (1) = (1 − , 0.5, 1.5 + )> . I note that, in the
case that  = 1, this clearing solution is identical to the proposed static wealths when the
insurance is paid in full. As opposed to the prior examples, here the final wealths are a
function of .
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this dissertation, I have extended the Eisenberg--Noe framework to study channels of
contagion such as fire sale and contingent payments and accounted for realistic financial
situations viz. corporate debt pricing and dynamic clearing. These models are presented
under general settings without presupposing the nature of the network or system parameters. Hence, these results can be used to augment stress tests, calibrate system parameters,
improve data collection, and bolster current practices. Beyond their utility in systemic risk
assessment, I have found these problems extremely interesting from a mathematical standpoint and have, in the process, opened up further avenues of research.
I have presented formulas for pricing of debt and equity of firms in a financial network under comonotonic endowments. In doing so, I have considered a problem that is analytically
intractable under a general setting, developed conditions under which it can be solved analytically, and have proved that it provides a lower bound for the price of debt under the
framework of [45]. This is particularly valuable as financial networks are of particular interest in performing stress tests and studying systemic risk. In particular, when the firms
only invest in a risk-free bond and a risky asset following a geometric Brownian motion,
I have deduced closed-form expressions for the price of debt and market capitalization for
each firm in the system. Using empirical data, I have shown that the price of debt should
be significantly higher under full network effects compared to the scenario in which it is
assumed that the banks will be able to pay in full. Incorporating this risk properly in the
valuation of assets will ensure that there are no pricing shocks to the system at a future
date. An interesting extension of this work would be to consider the sensitivity analysis of
pricing under misspecification of the network.
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Next, I have developed a general mathematical and economic framework to study pricemediated contagion in a multi-asset setting where the firms liquidate assets during a crisis
due to risk-weighted capital requirements. I have formulated the equilibrium pricing problem in a fixed point framework and developed conditions for existence and uniqueness of the
solution under general settings of liquidation and inverse demand function. I have performed
sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium prices with respect to the system parameters and used
these results to evaluate the cost of regulation. Using a numerical example, I have studied
the effect of diversification of bank portfolio in our framework and found that diversification
does not uniformly lead to a more stable system, measured in this case by the total market
capitalization. This model has several policy implications. First, it provides a framework
to design stress tests beyond proportional liquidation and linear price impact. This is particularly important as I show through an example that the equilibrium price is very much
dependent on the choice of the liquidation function. Secondly, the result on the bound of the
risk-weight provides a method to calibrate the risk-weight depending on the liquidity of the
asset. Thirdly, the sensitivity analysis can be used to give results on the robustness of the
solution. Finally, the analysis of the cost of regulation would aid in the study of regulatory
thresholds. An interesting extension would be the characterization of the joint pricing and
liquidation equilibrium for the entire system.
I have considered an extension of the network model of financial contagion to allow for
cash flows and obligations to be dynamic in time. I have presented this model in both
discrete and continuous time, thus extending the frameworks of [27, 57, 80] which consider
only discrete-time clearing. For the continuous time setting, I have determined conditions
for existence and uniqueness of the clearing solutions under deterministic and Itô settings
using an approach that does not require strong monotonicity properties as in the static or
the discrete time setting. Additionally, I have found that the dynamical system for the
Eisenberg--Noe contagion model may include an inherent prioritization scheme. Specifically,
I have determined that if the relative liabilities are constant over time, then the dynamic
Eisenberg--Noe model presented herein will reproduce the static system at the terminal time
in a path-independent manner. Notably, in such a setting, I have been able to determine the
true defaulting order rather than the fictitious order found in the fictitious default algorithm
that is widely used in computing static clearing models. If, however, the relative liabilities
are not constant over time, then the static Eisenberg--Noe model may report an incorrect
picture of the financial system. This finding has two-fold policy implications. First, instead
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of collecting only aggregate data, further details should be sought on the time component
of the cash flows and liabilities. Secondly, stress tests should be designed while taking the
time dynamics into consideration. A natural extension, for which I believe the proposed
dynamic model will be especially useful, is in considering strategic or dynamic actions by
the market participants, e.g., incorporating bankruptcy costs and strategic decisions on the
rolling forward of debt. I feel that the continuous-time framework will be particularly suitable
for these extensions, as it allows us to construct unique clearing solutions without requiring
strong monotonicity assumption.
Finally, I have proposed an extension of the network model of [45] to include contingent
payments viz. insurance and CDSs with endogenous reference entities. I have studied these
contingent payments in a static, simultaneous claims, framework, and developed conditions
to provide existence and uniqueness of the clearing wealths. Further, sensitivity analysis and
financial implications are considered in this setting. I have found that the static framework
is suitable only for a certain class of networks and cannot guarantee the existence of a
clearing solution beyond these systems. Indeed the problem often becomes ill-defined from a
financial standpoint. Hence I have introduced the dynamic framework and shown that I can
get existence and uniqueness under very mild assumptions. Lastly, I have shown that the
problems which could not be solved in the simultaneous claims framework can be studied
with this dynamic approach. This extension can be used to design stress tests that take into
account the conditional nature of the payments under contingent claims. A clear extension of
this model would be to include illiquid assets along with financial derivatives on these illiquid
assets, i.e., options. These derivatives fall under the general class of contingent payments
and can be used as a tool for either hedging (insurance) or speculation. Due to the possibility
of speculation, in such a setting, a firm may have incentives to attempt to precipitate a fire
sale and collect profit from the derivatives.
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Appendix A
Expectations under random
endowments
In this section I wish to consider a partition of the endowment space Rn+ into regions so that
the defaulting set is constant in the 2n subsets. This problem was considered in great detail
in [69] for the setting without bankruptcy costs, i.e. β = 1, and with cross-ownership. Herein I
will present a quick extension that allows for bankruptcy costs, i.e. for any β ∈ [0, 1]. Notably,
when β < 1 the partitions need not be convex sets, while they are convex polyhedrons in a
system without bankruptcy costs as given in [69]. In the below, if cross-ownership is desired
then I refer to Remark 2.3.7 for the modifications necessary to the mappings ∆ and δ̄.
To consider the partitions, fix z ∈ {0, 1}n to denote the defaulting banks. By construction,
the resulting wealths given endowments x ∈ Rn+ are provided by V (x) = ∆(z)x − δ̄(z). For
an endowment vector to be consistent with the defaulting set z, it would need to be such that
Vi (x) ≥ 0 if and only if zi = 0. That is, the set of endowments that generate the defaulting
set z is given by the system of inequalities:
>
e>
i ∆(z)x ≥ ei δ̄(z) ∀i : zi = 0
>
e>
i ∆(z)x < ei δ̄(z) ∀i : zi = 1.

However, except in the special case that there are no bankruptcy costs (β = 1), these regions
need not be disjoint. If an endowment x has two clearing wealth vectors V 1 6= V 2 , then it
must be that z 1 6= z 2 where z k = I{V k <0} . If z 1 = z 2 then, by construction of ∆(z k ), δ̄(z k ),
it must follow that V 1 = V 2 . In particular, I am interested in the maximal clearing wealth,
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thus I can construct the partition from the least to greatest number of defaults by considering
the set of endowments that lead to z by X (z) ⊆ Rn+ defined as:
(
x ∈ Rn+

X (z) :=

>
e>
i ∆(z)x ≥ ei δ̄(z) ∀i : zi = 0,
>
e>
i ∆(z)x < ei δ̄(z) ∀i : zi = 1

)
∩

\

X (z̄)c .

z̄ z

That is, X (z) is constructed as the intersection of a finite number of closed and open halfsS
paces as well as an additional condition that x 6∈ z̄ z X (z̄). This additional condition is the
one that guarantees that x ∈ X (z) does not provide a “better” (i.e. fewer defaulting banks)
clearing wealth vector than the maximal clearing solution V (x). By the use of Tarski’s fixed
point theorem in the proof of Proposition 2.2.1, I am able to guarantee that this construction
of X (z) is now, in fact, disjoint. In Figure A.1 I provide an image of the partitioning of the
endowment space for a small network with 2 banks plus a societal node. I note that the
societal node in this image can never default, this is due to it having no liabilities and thus
always a nonnegative wealth.
Partition of Endowment Space into Default Regions

10
9
8

z = [1 0]

Firm 2 Endowment

7
6

z = [0 0]

5
4
3
2
z = [1 1]
1
z = [0 1]
0
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Firm 1 Endowment

Figure A.1: Sample partition of the endowment space into default regions for 2 bank plus
societal node network with bankruptcy costs.
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Lastly, I wish to consider the particular case without bankruptcy costs (β = 1) as provided
by [69]. Due to the uniqueness of the clearing wealths (Corollary 2.2.2) in this case I obtain
only a single consistent default set z ∈ {0, 1}n for every endowment x ∈ Rn+ and thus do
not need to take a secondary intersection as in the case with bankruptcy costs. Further,
in this case, those banks with 0 wealth can be considered equivalently both solvent and
defaulting; thus the set of endowments that produce z ∈ {0, 1}n can be considered as the
finite intersection of closed halfspaces only, i.e. the convex polyhedron:

X (z) := x ∈ Rn+ | (I − 2 diag(z))∆(z)x ≥ (I − 2 diag(z))δ̄(z) .
I note that the partition (X (z))z∈{0,1}n is no longer disjoint as boundaries would be shared
by the partitions. However, on this shared boundary the clearing wealths and payments will
be equivalent, and this intersection has Lebesgue measure 0, therefore I (and prior authors)
have discounted this situation for ease of constructing the sets X (z).
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Appendix B
Proofs for Chapter 3

B.1

Proof of Proposition 3.4.1

Proof. A bank i can belong to any of the following three mutually exclusive and exhaustive
sets:
• S(q, q̄) = {i ∈ N |hi ≤ q > [I − θmin A]si }.
• L(q, q̄) = {i ∈ N |q > [I − θmin A]si < hi < q̄ > si }.
• D(q, q̄) = {i ∈ N |hi ≥ q̄ > si }.
With slight abuse in notation, I shall drop the dependence and refer to L(q, q̄) as L throughP
out this proof. Let me define ΓL = i∈L γi .
For i ∈ S(q, q̄) ∪ D(q, q̄), k = 1, 2, ...m and j = 1, 2, ...m
∂γik
=0
∂qj
Similarly, for i ∈ S(q, q̄) ∪ D(q, q̄), k = 1, 2, ...m and j = 1, 2, ...m
∂γik
=0
∂ q̄j
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Hence for k = 1, 2, ...m and j = 1, 2, ...m,
P
∂ i∈L γik
∂Γk
∂ΓLk
=
=
∂qj
∂qj
∂qj
Similarly for k = 1, 2, ...m and j = 1, 2, ...m,
P
∂ i∈L γik
∂ΓLk
∂Γk
=
=
∂ q̄j
∂ q̄j
∂ q̄j
Thus, I − W can be rewritten as
0 ∂ΓL
0 ∂ΓL
1 − F¯1 ∂ q̄11 −F¯1 ∂ q̄21
L

2
¯2 0 ∂ΓL2
 −F¯2 0 ∂Γ
1
−
F
∂
q̄
∂ q̄2
1


...
...


L
∂Γ
0
0 ∂ΓL
1
 −F1 1
−F
2
∂
q̄
∂ q̄2

1

...
...




L
m
−Fm 0 ∂Γ
∂ q̄1

L
m
−Fm 0 ∂Γ
∂ q̄2

0 ∂ΓL

... −F¯1 ∂q11
0 ∂ΓL
... −F¯2 2

...

...

...

...

... 1 −

∂ΓL
F1 0 ∂q11

...

...

...

...

...

L
m
−Fm 0 ∂Γ
∂q1

...

∂q2

...


0 ∂ΓL
−F¯1 ∂qm1
0 ∂ΓL 
−F¯2 ∂qm1 


...


0 ∂ΓL
−F1 ∂qm1 


...

0 ∂ΓL
1 − Fm ∂qmm

By the liquidation condition (3.5),
X
X
q̄ > ΓL + q > [I − θmin A](
si − ΓL ) =
hi
i∈L

(B.1)

i∈L

Taking derivative of (B.1) with respect to q̄k and rewriting, for k = 1, 2, ..., m, I have
ΓLk = −(q̄ − [I − θmin A]q)> (∇q̄k ΓL )

(B.2)

Similarly, taking derivative with respect to qk , for k = 1, 2, ..., m, I have
(1 − αk θ)(sk − ΓLk ) = −(q̄ − [I − θmin A]q)> (∇qk ΓL )
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(B.3)

From (iii) of Theorem 3.3.1,
X
F̄ (Γ)> ΓL + F (Γ)> [I − θmin A](
si − ΓL ) is increasing in Γ.
i∈L

Since I assume γ is strictly decreasing in (q, q̄),
X
F̄ (Γ)> ΓL + F (Γ)> [I − θmin A](
si − ΓL ) is decreasing in(q, q̄).
i∈L

Let zk ∈ {qk , q̄k } for k = 1, 2, ..m.
Taking derivative of the above expression with respect to zk and rearranging, for k =
1, 2, ..., m, I have
X
(∇zk F̄ (Γ))> ΓL + (∇zk F (Γ))> [I − θmin A](
si − ΓL )
i∈L
zk

L >

< −(∇ Γ ) (F̄ (Γ) − [I − θmin A]F (Γ))
Then at equilibrium,
X
si − ΓL ) < −(∇zk ΓL )> (q̄ − [I − θmin A]q)
(∇zk q̄)> ΓL + (∇zk q)> [I − θmin A](
i∈L

(B.4)

Now,
[(ΓL )>

X
(
si − ΓL )> (I − θmin A)] ≥ 0
i∈L

Then applying (B.2),(B.3) and (B.4),
[(ΓL )>

X
∂ΓL m
∂ΓL m >
)k=1 (
) ] (q̄ − (I − θmin A)q)
(
si − ΓL )T (I − θmin A)]W < −[(
∂ q̄k
∂qk k=1
i∈L
X
= [(ΓL )> (
si − ΓL )T (I − θmin A)]
i∈L
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Then using Theorem 2.1 of [100], (I − W )−1 exists and is given by
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P

u

W u.

Appendix C
Proofs for Chapter 4

C.1

Proof of results in Section 4.3

Proof of Theorem 4.3.3. I will prove this result inductively. First consider time t = 0. Recall
from Assumption 4.3.2 that V (−1) ≥ 0. The clearing wealths at time 0 follow the fixed point
equation
V (0) = Φ(0, V (0)) := V (−1) + c(0) − A(0, V0 )> V (0)− .
Note that, by construction, A(0, V0 )> V (0)− ≤ L(0)>~1. Therefore any clearing solution must
fall within the compact range [V (−1) + c(0) − L(0)>~1, V (−1) + c(0)] ⊆ Rn+1 . It is clear
from the definition that Φ(0, ·) is a monotonic operator, and thus there exists a greatest
and least clearing solution V ↑ (0) ≥ V ↓ (0) by Tarski’s fixed point theorem, both of which
L
must fall within this domain. Further, aij (0, V0 ) = P ij Lik (for i ∈ N and j ∈ N0 ) for any
k∈N0
wealth V (0) in this domain since V (−1)+c(0)−L(0)>~1 ≥ −L(0)~1 = −p̄(0, V−1 ). I will prove
uniqueness as it is done in [45] by noting additionally that I can assume that the societal node
will always have positive equity (i.e., V ↓ (0) ≥ 0). First, I will show that the positive equities
are the same for every firm no matter which clearing solution is chosen, i.e., Vi↑ (0)+ = Vi↓ (0)+
P
for every firm i ∈ N0 . By definition V ↑ (0) ≥ V ↓ (0) and using j∈N0 aij (0) = 1 for every
firm i ∈ N0 I recover
X

Vi↑ (0)+

=

i∈N0

Xh

Vi↑ (0)

+

Vi↑ (0)−

i

i∈N0

"
=

X
i∈N0

#
Vi (−1) + ci (0) −

X
j∈N
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aji (0, V0↑ )Vj↑ (0)− + Vi↑ (0)−

=
=

X

[Vi (−1) + ci (0)] −

X

i∈N0

j∈N

X

X

i∈N0

[Vi (−1) + ci (0)] =

Vj↑ (0)−

X

aji (0, V0↑ ) +

i∈N0

X

Vi↑ (0)−

i∈N0

Vi↓ (0)+ .

i∈N0

Therefore it must be the case that Vi↑ (0)+ = Vi↓ (0)+ for all firms i ∈ N0 . Since I assume that
the societal node will always have positive equity, it must be the case that V0↑ (0) = V0↓ (0).
Now since I assume that each node i ∈ N owes to the societal node, if any firm i ∈ N is
such that 0 ≥ Vi↑ (0) > Vi↓ (0) then it must be that V0↑ (0) > V0↓ (0), which is a contraction.
Continuing with the inductive argument, assume that the history of clearing wealths Vt−1
up to time t − 1 is fixed and known. The clearing wealths at time t follow the fixed point
equation
V (t) = Φ(t, V (t)) := V (t − 1) + c(t) − A(t, Vt )> V (t)− + A(t − 1, Vt−1 )> V (t − 1)− .
Note that, by construction, A(t, Vt )> V (t)− ≤ L(t)>~1 + A(t − 1, Vt−1 )> V (t − 1)− . Therefore
any clearing solution must fall within the compact range [V (t − 1) + c(t) − L(t)>~1, V (t −
L +a (t−1,Vt−1 )Vi (t−1)−
1) + c(t) + A(t − 1, Vt−1 )> V (t − 1)− ] ⊆ Rn+1 . Further, aij (t, Vt ) = ijP ij Lik +V
(for
−
i (t−1)
k∈N0
i ∈ N and j ∈ N0 ) for any wealth V (t) in this domain since V (t − 1) + c(t) − L(t)>~1 ≥
−V (t − 1)− − L(t)~1 = −p̄(t, Vt−1 ). Thus I can apply the same logic as in the time 0 case to
recover existence and uniqueness of the clearing wealths V (t) at time t.
Proof of Corollary 4.3.5. This follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 4.3.3 using
induction and noting that the lattice upper and lower bounds for the domain and range
spaces of Φ(s, ·) are subsets of Lps (Rn+1 ). Therefore any clearing solution V (t) is bounded
above and below by an element of Lpt (Rn+1 ) and the result is proven.

C.2

Proof of results in Section 4.4

Proof of Corollary 4.4.2. Existence and uniqueness of the clearing solutions follows from
Theorem 4.3.3. To prove continuity I will employ an induction argument. To do so, I will
consider the reduced domain V : T × [, ∞) → Rn+1 for some  > 0. That is, I restrict the
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step-size ∆t ≥ . As I will demonstrate that the continuity argument holds for any  > 0
then the desired result must hold as well. Before continuing, consider an expanded version
of the recursive formulation of (4.7), i.e.,
t

Z

dc(s) − A(t, ∆t, Vt (∆t))> V (t, ∆t)−

V (t, ∆t) = V (−1) +

(C.1)

0

for all times t ∈ T. Fix the minimal
step-size  > 0. Note that the relative exposures
Rt
ij (s)
0 dL
Rt
satisfy aij (t, ∆t, Vt (∆t)) := P
for any time t ∈ [0, ) by the assumption that
dL (s)
k∈N0

ik

0

V (−1) ≥ 0. Thus I can conclude V : [0, ) × [, ∞) → Rn+1 is continuous by an application
of [56, Proposition A.2]. Now, by way of induction, assume that V : [0, s) × [, ∞) → Rn+1
is continuous for some s > 0. Again, by [56, Proposition A.2], I am able to immediately
conclude that V : [0, s + ) ∩ T × [, ∞) → Rn+1 is continuous. As I am able to always extend
the continuity result by  > 0 in time, the result is proven.
Proof of Proposition 4.4.4. (i) Consider firm i ∈ N . By assumption I have that aij (t) for
t % τ solves the first order differential equation:
daij (t)
+
dt

P

dLik (t)/dt
dLij (t)/dt
aij (t) =
.
−
Vi (t)
Vi (t)−

k∈N0

For sake of simplicity, let this differential equation start at time 0 with Vi (0) < 0
and some initial value aij (0).
Then this differential equation can be solved via the
R t Pk∈N0 dLik (s)
integrating factor ν(t) := 0
ds. Thus for t % τ it follow that
Vi (s)−
aij (t) = e

−ν(t)

Z

t

dLij (s)
eν(s)
Vi (s)−
0


+ aij (0) .

Therefore, utilizing L’Hôspital’s rule,
lim aij (t) =
t%τ

=

Z

t



dLij (s)
+ aij (0)
lim e
eν(s)
t%τ
Vi (s)−
0
dLij (t)
eν(t) Vi (t)
−
dLij (t)/Vi (t)−
lim ν(t) d
= lim P
t%τ e
ν(t) t%τ k∈N0 dLik (t)/Vi (t)−
dt
−ν(t)
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dLij (τ )
.
k∈N0 dLik (τ )

=P

(ii) First, if Vi (t) ≥ 0 then by construction (and the above result) it follows that aij (t) =
dLij (t)
P
≥ 0 for any i, j ∈ N0 and ai0 (t) ≥ δ by this construction. Consider now
k∈N0 dLik (t)
the case for Vi (t) < 0 and assume aij (t) < 0. Let τ = sup{s ≤ t | Vi (s) = 0}. Since
aij (τ ) ∈ [0, 1] by construction and the relative exposures are continuous, this implies
there exists some time s ∈ [τ, t) such that aij (s) = 0. By the definition of the relative
exposures, this must follow that daij (s) ≥ 0 for any time aij (s) ≤ 0 (with daij (s) > 0
if aij (s) < 0), thus aij (t) < 0 can never be reached. Further, assume ai0 (t) < δ. By
(s)
Assumption 4.4.1, if ai0 (s) ≤ P dLi0dL
then dai0 (s) ≥ 0. In particular, if ai0 (s) ≤ δ
ik (s)
k∈N0
then dai0 (s) ≥ 0 (with dai0 (s) > 0 if ai0 (s) < δ). Thus, by the same contradiction
found in the case for j ∈ N , I am able to bound ai0 (t) ≥ δ.
P
(iii) First, if i = 0 then j∈N0 a0j (t) = 1 by property that a0j (t) = n1 1{j6=0} for all times t.
Now consider i ∈ N , if Vi (t) ≥ 0 then by construction (and the above result) it follows
P
P
dL (t)
that j∈N0 aij (t) = j∈N0 P ijdLik (t) = 1. Consider now the case for Vi (t) < 0 and
k∈N0
P
let τ = sup{s ≤ t | Vi (s) = 0}. Since j∈N0 aij (τ ) = 1 by prior results, I will assume
P
that j∈N0 aij (t) = 1 to deduce
P
X dLij (t) − aij (t) k∈N dLik (t)
0
daij (t) =
−
V
i (t)
j∈N0
j∈N0
P
 P

P
a
(t)
dL
(t)
ij
ik
dL
(t)
j∈N
k∈N
ij
0
0
j∈N0
−
= 0.
=
−
−
Vi (t)
Vi (t)
X

Therefore based on the initial conditions, aij (t) must evolve so that it maintains the
constant row sum of 1.

Proof of Theorem 4.4.5. Recall that the initial values to the Eisenberg-Noe differential sysdL (0)
tem are Vi (0) > 0 and aij (0) = P ijdLik (0) 1{i6=0} + n1 1{i=0, j6=0} for all banks i, j ∈ N0 . For
k∈N0
ease of notation, consider τ0 := 0 and recursively define the stopping times
τm+1 := inf{t ∈ (τm , T ] | Vi (τm )Vi (t) < 0 or [Vi (τm ) = 0, dVi (τm )Vi (t) < 0]}.
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That is, τm ∈ T is the time of the mth change in Λ(V ). Without loss of generality, I will
assume that τm = T if the infimum is taken over an empty set. I note that the times τm are
all stopping times with respect to the natural filtration.
With these times, note that in particular, on the interval (τm , τm+1 ] I can consider the set of
distressed banks to be constant; to simplify, and slightly abuse, notation I can thus consider
a constant matrix of distressed firms Λ(τm ) in the interval (τm , τm+1 ]. I will now construct
the unique strong solution forward in time over these time intervals, noting that I update Λ
and τm+1 once the next event is found.
First, by construction, on [0, τ1 ] there exists a unique solution to the differential system
dL (t)
provided by V (t) = V (0) + c(t) and aij (t) = P ijdLik (t) 1{i6=0} + n1 1{i=0, j6=0} for all banks
k∈N0
i, j ∈ N0 . Assume there exists a strong solution in the time interval [0, τm ] for τm < T . Now I
want to prove the existence and uniqueness for the clearing wealths and relative exposures on
the interval (τm , τm+1 ]. Expanding dc(t) based on its differential form allows me to consider
(4.12) as
dV (t) = [I − A(t)> Λ(τm )]−1 (µ(t, c(t)) − [L̇(t)> − A(t)> L̇(t)]~1)dt
+ [I − A(t)> Λ(τm )]−1 σ(t, c(t))dW (t)
= µ̄(t, c(t), A(t), V (t))dt + σ̄(t, c(t), A(t), V (t))dW (t).
Let me first consider the linear growth condition for dV . Utilizing the 1-norm and where
n+1
k · kop
, then
1 denotes the corresponding operator norm, let A ∈ A and V ∈ R
kµ̄(t, c, A, V )k1 + kσ̄(t, c, A, V )kop
1
≤ k(I − A
≤

∞
X

>

Λ(τm ))−1 kop
1



op
>
>
~
kµ(t, c)k1 + k[L̇(t) − A L̇(t)]1k1 + kσ(t, c)k1



op
>~
>
~
L̇(t)
1k
+
kσ(t,
c)k
k[A> Λ(τm )]k kop
kµ(t,
c)k
+
k
L̇(t)
1k
+
kA
1
1
1
1
1

k=0

≤

!
∞


X
op
~
1+
(1 − δ)k−1
kµ(t, c)k1 + kL̇(t)>~1k1 + kA> kop
k
L̇(t)
1k
+
kσ(t,
c)k
1
1
1

k=1



1 
op
>~
~
kµ(t, c)k1 + k[L̇(t) 1k1 + kL̇(t)1k1 + kσ(t, c)k1
≤ 1+
δ


1+δ
≤
sup
kµ(s, c)k1 + kL̇(s)>~1k1 + kL̇(s)~1k1 + kσ(s, c)kop
1
δ s∈[τm ,τm+1 ]
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≤ θ(1 + kck1 )
The second line follows from the triangle inequality and definition of the operator norm.
The third line is a result of Proposition C.2.1 and further use of the triangle inequality. The
fourth line follows from Proposition 4.4.4 and noting that, by assumption, Λ00 = 0. The
upper bound θ ≥ 0 can be determined by Assumption 4.4.1 and since all terms are continuous
and being evaluated on a compact interval of time (since τm+1 ≤ T by definition). Further, I
wish to prove µ̄ : T × Rn+1 × A × Rn+1 → Rn+1 and σ̄ : T × Rn+1 × A × Rn+1 → R(n+1)×(n+1)
are jointly locally Lipschitz in (c, A, V ). First (c, A, V ) ∈ Rn+1 × A × Rn+1 7→ µ(t, c) −
[L̇(t)> − A> L̇(t)]~1 and (c, A, V ) ∈ Rn+1 × A × Rn+1 7→ σ(t, c) are Lipschitz continuous by
their linear (or constant) forms with Lipschitz constants that can be taken independently
of time (via continuity and the compact time domain) as well as the definitions of µ and
σ. It remains to show that (c, A, V ) ∈ Rn+1 × A × Rn+1 7→ (I − A> Λ(τm ))−1 is Lipschitz
continuous. Let A, B ∈ A, then by the same argument as above on the bounds of the norm
of the matrix inverse,
k(I − A> Λ(τm ))−1 − (I − B > Λ(τm ))−1 kop
1
= k(I − A> Λ(τm ))−1 [(I − B > Λ(τm )) − (I − A> Λ(τm ))](I − B > Λ(τm ))−1 kop
1
= k(I − A> Λ(τm ))−1 [A − B]> Λ(τm )(I − B > Λ(τm ))−1 kop
1
op
>
−1 op
> op
≤ k(I − A> Λ(τm ))−1 kop
1 k(I − B Λ(τm )) k1 kΛ(τm )k1 k[A − B] k1
2

1+δ
op
kΛ(τm )kop
≤
1 kA − Bk∞
δ

2
1+δ
op
≤n
kΛ(τm )kop
1 kA − Bk1 .
δ

Thus µ̄ and σ̄ are appropriately locally Lipschitz continuous on [τm , τm+1 ].
Now I wish to consider the differential form for the relative exposures matrix (4.13). First,
if Λii (τm ) = 0 (and in particular, Λ00 (τm ) = 0 by assumption of the societal node) then
dL (t)
aij (t) = P ijdLik (t) 1{i6=0} + n1 1{i=0, j6=0} is the unique solution for any firm j ∈ N0 over
k∈N0
all times t ∈ (τm , τm+1 ]. In particular, this is independent of the evolution of the wealths
V , so I need only consider the joint differential equation between the wealths V and the
relative exposures aij where bank i is in distress between times τm and τm+1 , i.e., Λii (τm ) =
1. Consider bank i ∈ N with Λii (τm ) = 1. Therefore by construction Vi (t) < 0 for all
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t ∈ (τm , τm+1 ). If Vi (τm+1 ) = 0 then from Proposition 4.4.4, it already follows that the
dL (τ
)
must hold, otherwise I can extend Vi (t) < 0 for
unique solution aij (τm+1 ) = P ijdLm+1
ik (τm+1 )
k∈N0
t ∈ (τm , τm+1 ]. The differential formPfor all relative exposures (4.13) on the interval (τm , τm+1 ]
dLij (t)−aij (t) k∈N dLik (t)
0
is provided by daij (t) =
. By construction (aij , Vi ) ∈ [0, 1] × −R++ 7→
Vi (t)−
L̇ij (t)−aij

P

L̇ik (t)

is locally Lipschitz and satisfies a local linear growth condition (with
constants bounded independent of time as above utilizing continuity of the parameters and
the compact time domain).
k∈N0

−Vi

Combining my results for the joint differential system for the cash flows c, clearing wealths
V from (4.12), and relative exposures A from (4.13), I find that this system satisfies a
joint local linear growth and local Lipschitz property on the interval (τm , τm+1 ]. Therefore,
there exists some  ∈ L∞
T (R++ ) (such that τm +  is a stopping time) for which a strong
solution for (c, V, A) : [τm , τm + ] → Rn+1 × Rn+1 × A exists and is unique. Using the
same logic with local properties, I can continue my unique strong solution sequentially. This
can be continued until the stopping time τm+1 is reached (found along the path of (c, V, A)
as a stopping time) or this process reaches some maximal time T ∗ < τm+1 for which a
unique strong solution exists on the time interval [τm , T ∗ ). First, as c(t) can be calculated
separately from the clearing wealths and relative exposures, I can immediately determine
that c(T ∗ ) = limt%T ∗ c(t) exists. Further, I note that any solution V (t) must, almost surely,
exist in the (almost surely) compact space




 Z t
1+δ
−
~
dc(s) + (L(t) − L(τm )) 1 , V (τm ) + c(t) − c(τm ) ⊆ L2t (Rn+1 )
1
V (τm ) − I +
δ
τm


where 1 = {1}(n+1)×(n+1) . The lower bound is determined to be based on the bounding of
the Leontief inverse; the upper bound follows from the continuous-time version of (C.1), i.e.,
V (t) = V (0) + c(t) − A(t)> V (t)− .
Additionally, aij (t) almost surely exists in the compact neighborhood [0, 1] by definition.
Therefore (V (T ∗ ), A(T ∗ )) = limt%T ∗ (V (t), A(t)) exists by continuity of the solutions and
compactness of the range space. Thus I can continue the differential equation from time T ∗
with values (c(T ∗ ), V (T ∗ ), A(T ∗ )) which contradicts the nature that T ∗ is the maximal time.
Notably, if Vi (T ∗ ) = 0 for some bank i then it is imperative to check if τm+1 = T ∗ to update
the set of distressed banks Λ.
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Therefore, by induction, there exists a unique strong solution (V, A) to (4.12) and (4.13) on
the domain [0, τm ] for any index m ∈ N by use of [91, Theorem 5.2.1]. In particular this
holds up to τ ∗ = supm∈N τm . If τ ∗ ≥ T then the proof is complete. If τ ∗ < T , then by
the same argument as above I can find (V (τ ∗ ), A(τ ∗ )) as I can bound both the wealths and
relative exposures into an almost surely compact neighborhood (and a subset of L2τ ∗ (Rn+1 )).
Therefore, as before, I can start the process again at time τ ∗ , which contradicts the terminal
nature of τ ∗ . This concludes the proof.
Proposition C.2.1. For any relative exposure matrix A ∈ A and any distress matrix Λ ∈
{0, 1}(n+1)×(n+1) such that Λ00 = 0 and Λij = 0 for i 6= j, the matrix I − A> Λ is invertible
P
>
k
with Leontief form, i.e., (I − A> Λ)−1 = ∞
k=0 (A Λ) .
Proof. By inspection, for any A ∈ A, (I − A> Λ)(I + A> (I − ΛA> )−1 Λ) = I, i.e., the form of
the inverse is provided by I + A> (I − ΛA> )−1 Λ. I refer to [55, Theorem 2.6] for a detailed
proof that (I − ΛA> )−1 is nonsingular and is provided by the Leontief inverse. Therefore,
by construction
>

−1

(I − A Λ)

>

> −1

>

= (I + A (I − ΛA ) Λ) = I + A

∞
X
(ΛA> )k

!
Λ

k=0

=I+

∞
X

A> Λ(A> )k Λk = I +

k=0

∞
X
k=0
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(A> Λ)k+1 =

∞
X
k=0

(A> Λ)k .

Appendix D
Proofs for Chapter 5

D.1

Proof of Proposition 5.3.17

Proof. First, as in (5.6), the clearing wealths as a function of initial endowments are defined
by
V (x) = x + Π(V (x))> [p̄(V (x)) − V (x)− ]+ − p̄(V (x)).
I will prove continuity by utilizing the closed graph theorem (see, e.g., [4, Theorem 2.58])
noting that Proposition 5.3.6 provides me with the condition that the clearing wealths map
into a compact set. Theorem 4 of [87] immediately provides the monotonicity of the clearing
wealths.
Fix x ∈ Rn+1
and let X = x + [−1, 1]n+1 be a closed compact neighborhood of x in the full
+
Euclidean space Rn+1 . Then I can define V x : X → Rn+1 as the restriction (and possible
expansion to negative terms) of the domain of V to X . The graph of V x is given by:

)

(
graph V x =

(x̂, V̂ ) ∈ X ×

Y

[xi − 1 −

i∈N0

X

L̄ij , xi + 1 +

j∈N0

X

L̄ji ] | V̂ = x̂ + Π(V̂ )> [p̄(V̂ ) − V̂ − ]+ − p̄(V̂ )

j∈N

To see that graph V x is closed let (x̂k , V̂ k )k∈N ⊆ graph V x → (x̂, V̂ ), then immediately
h

k >

k − +

i

V̂ = lim V̂ = lim x̂ + Π(V̂ ) [p̄(V̂ ) − (V̂ ) ] − p̄(V̂ ) = x̂+Π(V̂ )> [p̄(V̂ )−V̂ − ]+ −p̄(V̂ )
k

k→∞

k

k

k→∞
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k

by continuity of the nominal liabilities matrix L. Therefore by the closed graph theorem
I immediately recover that V x is continuous for any x ∈ Rn+1
+ , which implies that V is
continuous at any x as well and thus V : Rn+1
→ Rn+1 is a continuous mapping.
+
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